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ABSTRACT 
Over the course of the last 50 years, scholars have emphasized the role that 
political processes play in shaping the nature of capital punishment practices. Empirical 
studies that have examined the relationship between political factors and capital 
punishment have attributed variation in the imposition of death sentences and the 
execution of offenders across jurisdictions in the United States to the politicization of 
criminal justice policies and practices and the shift in public sentiment towards more 
punitive ideologies that began in the 1970s. Even though historians have argued that 
capital punishment practices have always been shaped by political considerations, 
empirical research on the social determinants of the death penalty has restricted its focus 
to the period following the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia. Due to 
the restricted temporal scope used in prior empirical studies, it is unknown whether these 
political theories have captured historically specific factors associated only with post-
Furman capital punishment practices (proximate causes) or whether they can explain the 
occurrence of these practices over the course of long historical periods (ultimate causes). 
In addition, it is not known whether the politicization of capital punishment practices in 
the last third of the 20
th
 century changed the nature of the relationship between state-level 
political factors and capital punishment practices across the pre- and post-Furman time 
periods.  
In order to address these gaps in the literature, this study examined whether three 
post-Furman political perspectives were able to account for the imposition of death 
sentences and the execution of offenders in U.S. states from 1930 to 2012. The study also 
examined whether factors specific to the pre- and post-Furman eras moderated the 
viii 
 
relationship between state-level political factors and death penalty practices. The findings 
indicate that the predictive power of post-Furman political variables was not restricted to 
the last third of the 20
th
 century. The social and political factors identified in post-Furman 
empirical studies, therefore, are not proximate manifestations particular to the time period 
following the politicization of criminal justice policies and practices in the 1970s. The 
reconfiguration of political party lines and the adoption of new ideologies regarding 
correctional practices in the 1970s did not significantly alter the drivers long associated 
with capital punishment practices in the United States.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of the last 50 years, scholars have begun to place particular 
emphasis on the role that political processes play in shaping the nature of capital 
punishment practices. With this increase in interest among researchers, a number of 
theoretical perspectives have been offered to account for the persistent use of the death 
penalty in the United States and to explain variation in the use of this form of punishment 
across jurisdictions. These perspectives have primarily focused on how the changes in the 
social landscape in the 1960s and 1970s have shaped the relationship between political 
factors and correctional policies and practices over the last 40 years (Beckett, 1997; 
Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Flamm, 2005; Garland, 1993, 2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). 
More specifically, these important social changes included the increase in anxiety 
regarding the rising crime rates and the perceived disruption in the traditional social 
hierarchies associated with the civil rights movement, the collapse in support of the 
liberal ideologies that provided the foundation for the Great Society, and the movement 
towards more punitive ideologies regarding the punishment of offenders within the 
American population. These social changes effectively resulted in the topic of the death 
penalty quickly moving from political obscurity to one of the most polarizing political 
issues used by conservative officials to gain electoral success after the Supreme Court’s 
1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia (Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). After the 
politicization of capital punishment practices in the 1970s, scholars have also highlighted 
how the discourses and purposes behind the use of the punishment underwent significant 
changes that have contributed to the continued support for the use of the practice up until 
the present day (Garland, 2011; Zimring, 2003).  Empirical research that has examined 
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the key propositions outlined by these political historians has primarily demonstrated 
support for the relationship between political factors and the use of the death penalty 
(Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; Jacobs & Kent, 
2007; Jacobs et al., 2007; McCann, 2008). 
Even though the above-mentioned studies have expanded our knowledge 
regarding the political factors associated with capital punishment practices in the last 
third of the 20
th
 century, there are two significant limitations present in the empirical 
literature. The first limitation is that researchers have yet to empirically examine the 
relationship between state-level political factors and capital punishment practices in the 
pre-Furman United States. This limitation is particularly problematic because political 
historians have argued that capital punishment practices have always been shaped by the 
political and social landscapes in which they are immersed. As Garland (2011: 128) has 
noted when attempting to account for the factors that have shaped capital punishment 
practices across history: 
The use and character of capital punishment are-and always have been-shaped by the 
structure of state institutions and the decision of state officials in accordance with their 
perceptions of strategic governmental issues. State actors strive to maintain control and 
deploy power in the interest of their institutions, their allies, and their constituents.   
 
Since scholars believe that the relationship between these concepts is not limited to the 
post-Furman time period, it is important to conduct further research in order to identify 
the specific political factors related to capital punishment practices in the pre-Furman 
United States. 
Given the narrow temporal scope used in previous studies, a particularly 
noteworthy phenomenon that has yet to receive empirical attention is the substantial 
decline in the use of capital punishment practices that occurred in the United States from 
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the mid-1930s until the moratorium in the late 1960s (see Figure 1). This decline in the 
use of the death penalty is deserving of scholarly attention because it occurred across all 
jurisdictions and regions in the United States and it happened in the absence of any 
special attention from legislators or in the presence of a clear abolitionist movement 
(Bowers, 1984; Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). Based on the rather uniform nature in 
which this decline occurred, it is vital to empirically examine this time period in order to 
attain a more holistic understanding of the political factors associated with fluctuations in 
capital punishment practices over the course of the 20
th
 century.  
The second limitation found within previous empirical examinations of the 
contextual factors related to state-level capital punishment practices is that these studies 
have only examined the relationship between these concepts when use of the death 
penalty has been increasing. As Figure 1 indicates, beginning in the early portion of the 
1980s, reliance on executions in the United States rose steadily through the end of the 
millennium. This limitation is also problematic because scholars have yet to establish 
whether the same political factors identified in previous studies are also able to account 
for these practices when their use is being restrained. Considering this limitation, an 
important first step in determining whether the same political factors can account for both 
increases and decreases in the use of capital punishment practices would be to expand the 
temporal scope to include the above-mentioned decline in the use of the practice in the 
pre-Furman era.  
Perhaps the most important reason for attempting to expand recent theoretical 
contributions to investigate pre-Furman trends is that this analytic expansion will allow 
scholars to determine whether political theorists have highlighted proximate 
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manifestations associated with capital punishment practices or whether these perspectives 
have identified the ultimate causes of these practices. This distinction is particularly 
important because proximate causes are historically specific factors that are associated 
with capital punishment practices over short periods of time, while ultimate causes can 
explain the use of the death penalty over the course of long historical periods (Rosenfeld, 
2011). As Roth (2009) highlighted when examining the social factors related to 
fluctuations in homicide rates from the colonial period until the present day, the popular 
theoretical perspectives designed to account for this phenomenon failed to explain its 
occurrence when the temporal scope was expanded to include historical trends. Based on 
Roth’s (2009) theoretical contribution, which stressed the need for scholars to evaluate 
the overall efficacy of theoretical perspectives by broadening their temporal focus, it is 
important for researchers to determine whether our political perspectives are able to 
account for capital punishment practices when historical trends are included. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether recent theoretical 
contributions are able to account for long-term trends in capital punishment practices 
when the temporal scope is expanded to include pre-Furman trends. In order to examine 
long-term trends in the use of this form of punishment, two important considerations 
must be taken into account when examining capital punishment practices in the United 
States. The first consideration is the unique nature of the political institutions in the 
United States. One of the most distinct factors particular to America concerns its 
dedication to maintaining the sovereign rights of states (Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; 
Zimring, 2003). With the United States favoring the dispersion of power among the states 
over a strong centralized government, criminal justice policies are primarily shaped by  
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        *These states abolished the use of the death penalty by April 1, 2013.  
          Source: Death Penalty Information Center
 
TABLE 1: EXECUTIONS IN 20
TH
 AND 21
ST
 CENTURY UNITED STATES BY TIME 
PERIOD AND JURISDICTION  
  Region/State Pre-Furman Post-Furman Region/State Pre-Furman Post-Furman 
  Northeast 
 
  Midwest 
 
  
  Connecticut* 65 1 Illinois* 204 12 
  Maine* 0 0 Indiana 72 20 
  Massachusetts* 65 0 Iowa* 32 0 
  New Hampshire 3 0 Kansas 41 0 
  New Jersey* 187 0 Michigan* 0 0 
  New York* 644 0 Minnesota* 0 0 
  Pennsylvania 544 3 Missouri 110 64 
  Rhode Island* 0 0 Nebraska 20 0 
  Vermont* 8 0 North Dakota* 5 0 
  South 
 
  Ohio 308 49 
  Alabama 313 55 South Dakota 6 3 
  Arkansas 247 27 Wisconsin* 0 0 
  Delaware 25 16 West 
 
  
  Florida 268 73 Alaska* 8 0 
  Georgia 625 47 Arizona 78 34 
  Kentucky 202 3 California 466 13 
  Louisiana 294 27 Colorado 65 1 
  Maryland* 112 5 Hawaii* 42 0 
  Mississippi 244 21 Idaho 9 3 
  North Carolina 408 38 Montana 39 3 
  Oklahoma 93 98 Nevada 41 15 
  South Carolina 278 42 New Mexico* 34 0 
  Tennessee 179 5 Oregon 68 2 
  Texas 493 479 Utah 31 7 
  Virginia 304 106 Washington 82 5 
  West Virginia* 91 0 Wyoming 16 1 
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the political and cultural landscapes particular to each jurisdiction. Another important 
aspect is that individuals who hold discretion over the power to punish are elected by 
citizens to these positions. Since politicians, judges, and district attorneys must seek      
re-election every few years, these officials must consider the demands of their 
constituents or face possible removal from these positions. In contrast to political systems 
embraced in other western nations, the political structure in the United States allows for 
the severity of penal punishment to be shaped by the concerns particular to each 
jurisdiction. 
Due to the fact that each state has the power to dictate the nature of penal 
punishments within its borders, significant variation in the use of this form of punishment 
has surfaced across jurisdictions in the United States (Bowers, 1984; Garland, 2011; 
Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2007; Zimring, 2003). Perhaps the most 
obvious example of this phenomenon is that 18 jurisdictions have abolished the use of 
this punishment in the United States, while 32 states continue to have laws allowing for 
its use on the books. Another example can be seen when examining the frequency of 
executions in the southern United States. Even though executions occur at a much higher 
rate in the South in comparison to the other three regions, the use of the death penalty in 
the South has varied considerably across jurisdictions in the post-Furman time period 
(see Table 1). To illustrate, Texas has executed more individuals than any other 
jurisdiction in the United States with 479, while Kentucky has only executed three people 
during this time period and West Virginia abolished the use of the punishment in 1965. 
Due to the significant variation across states in terms of their reliance on capital 
punishment practices, research that seeks to examine the social and political factors 
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related to the use of this punishment in the United States must account for these 
important jurisdictional differences. 
Another important aspect related to the use of capital punishment practices in the 
United States is the significant variation within jurisdictions regarding the use of the 
practice over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. As an example, California executed 
the largest number of offenders in the United States during the 20
th
 century pre-Furman 
time period with 466. However, after the Furman decision, the state of California has 
only executed 13 individuals in the last 40 years, which ranks 18
th
 among states that have 
conducted executions in this period. In addition to variation in the actual use of the death 
penalty, nine death penalty states (Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Rhode Island) in the pre-Furman 
period have passed legislation outlawing the punishment after 1972. Considering how the 
unique nature of the political institutions in the United States has influenced variation in 
the use of the punishment both across and within jurisdictions over time, this study 
examines trends in capital punishment at the state level in order to avoid obscuring 
important state-level differences. 
The second consideration that guides this dissertation’s analysis of capital 
punishment trends is the need to separately examine the political factors related to the 
imposition of death sentences and the execution of offenders. The reason these practices 
require separate examination is due to the significant time delay that exists between 
conviction and execution in the United States today. Research that has examined the 
expansion in the temporal delay between these two capital punishment stages in the    
post-Furman time period indicates that the average number of months between 
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conviction and execution increased from 74 months in 1977 to 178 months in 2010 
(Snell, 2011). Due to these significant delays resulting from the judicial review process, 
research indicates that only 10% of offenders sentenced to death are actually executed 
(Liebman et al., 2000) and the leading cause of death among death row inmates in the 
United States is natural causes (Garland, 2011).  Because receiving a death sentence does 
not necessarily translate into an execution in the post-Furman United States, this study 
examines these stages individually to determine whether important political and social 
factors differentially impact the separate phases involved with this form of punishment.   
Based on these important considerations, this dissertation examines the political 
factors related to state-level trends in death sentences and executions from 1930 to 2012. 
The three theories that guide this dissertation’s analysis of death penalty trends argue that 
political ideologies, partisan politics, and social threat are all significant factors related to 
the severity of penal practices. In order to develop the empirical component of this 
dissertation, data from governmental publications and publically available datasets 
housed at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) are 
relied upon. Since this project is interested in determining the political factors related to 
capital punishment practices across jurisdictions and over time, pooled time-series    
cross-sectional analytic procedures are employed because these procedures are able to 
capture variation across time and space simultaneously (Allison, 1994; Halaby, 2004). 
Finally, this study examines the broader theoretical and empirical implications based on 
the key results found in this dissertation. 
The findings from this project’s examination of long-term trends in capital 
punishment practices have a bearing on two important theoretical questions. The first 
10 
 
theoretical question concerns whether the propositions within the three political theories 
have identified proximate manifestations associated with short-term changes in capital 
punishment practices. If this project does, in fact, find support for these perspectives 
when long-term trends are incorporated, this would indicate that these theories are not 
mere proximate manifestations associated with capital punishment trends in the           
post-Furman era. This finding would be particularly important because research on the 
social determinants of penal policies before the 1960s has been relatively sparse, and 
scholars could potentially begin to use these indicators to examine the association 
between political factors and a wider variety of criminal justice practices over the course 
of the entire 20
th
 century. However, if this study does not find support for the 
propositions within the three political theories, this would indicate that these perspectives 
are able to account only for short-term fluctuations in capital punishment practices in the            
post-Furman time period. Since scholars have argued that penal punishment has always 
been shaped by political considerations (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 2001, 2011; Mauer, 
2001; Savelsberg, 1994; Whitman, 2005), the null findings would indicate the need for 
researchers to develop new measures designed to account for the political factors 
associated with long-term trends in capital punishment practices. Although the temporal 
scope involved with this dissertation’s analysis of capital punishment trends is not wide 
enough to determine whether these theoretical propositions are, in fact, ultimate causes, 
the findings from this project would represent an important first step in assessing the 
overall efficacy of these perspectives. 
The second important theoretical question the findings from this project will 
address is whether the politicization of capital punishment practices changed the nature of 
11 
 
the relationship between these two concepts across the pre- and post-Furman time 
periods. Since historians have never explicitly stated whether the political factors 
associated with the use of the death penalty after the Furman decision were similar or 
different from those in the pre-Furman time period, it is currently unknown whether the 
social and political changes in the 1960s and 1970s merely strengthened a pre-existing 
relationship or if these factors altogether redefined the nature of this relationship. If this 
dissertation were to find that the same political indicators from the post-Furman time 
period can account for capital punishment practices from 1930 to 2012, this would 
indicate the need for scholars to dedicate more attention towards accounting for how 
these important political factors shaped the use of capital punishment in the pre-Furman 
era. However, if this study were to find no support for the three political perspectives 
examined in this dissertation, this would signify the need for scholars to develop new 
variables designed to account for the political factors particular to the pre-Furman time 
period. Since no scholar to this author’s knowledge has empirically examined this 
important gap in the theoretical literature, this study’s findings would also constitute an 
important first step involved with determining the extent of the impact that the political 
shifts in the 1960s and 1970s had on the use of the death penalty in the United States. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds in the following manner. Chapter Two 
begins with an examination of the three theoretical perspectives, followed by a review of 
the empirical literature that has examined the association between capital punishment 
practices and political factors. This chapter also highlights the nature of capital 
punishment practices over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, and the key research 
question that guides the analysis of long-term trends in capital punishment practices is 
12 
 
articulated. Chapter Three focuses on the procedures used to collect and construct the key 
variables contained in this study, the research design and estimation methods that were 
adopted, and the analytic strategies that were used to examine the key research questions 
delineated in Chapter Two. In Chapters Four and Five, I present the findings from the 
models that examine the political factors associated with death sentences and executions 
from 1930 to 2012, as well as the results from supplemental analyses designed to 
determine the robustness of the findings from the primary models. Finally, in         
Chapter Six, a summary of my analyses is provided, as well as the theoretical 
implications associated with this study’s results. The final chapter also examines potential 
avenues for future research, the social and political factors associated with the 20
th
 and 
21
st
 century declines in reliance on capital punishment practices, and potential strategies 
abolitionist and pro-death penalty advocates could use to advance their causes. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter begins by examining the three theoretical perspectives that have 
hypothesized an association between political factors and changes in capital punishment 
practices in the post-Furman time period. This chapter then highlights the empirical 
literature that has focused on the state-level social and political factors associated with 
the imposition of death sentences and the execution of offenders. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with an examination of the historical factors related to national and regional 
trends in the use of capital punishment practices in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century United 
States, as well as stating the research question that guides this dissertation’s analysis of 
long-term trends in the use of the death penalty.  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The following review of the theoretical literature focuses on the key propositions 
from political perspectives that have stressed the importance of the use of partisan 
politics, ideological sentiment among the public, and the perceived threat that weaker 
social groups pose to the dominant group within society. Although these perspectives 
have primarily been used to explain the adoption of punitive penal policies in the last half 
of the 20
th
 century, the propositions within these theories provide the foundation for this 
dissertation’s examination of trends in capital punishment practices from 1930 to 2012.  
Partisan Politics 
 The first theoretical perspective proposes that there is a significant relationship 
between the severity of societal punishment and the incorporation of crime and 
punishment issues into local and national political debates. According to this perspective, 
scholars have proposed that political actors are autonomous agents who use calculated 
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rhetoric and practices to increase their electoral success (Beckett, 1994; Edsall & Edsall, 
1991; Flamm, 2005). Beginning with Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign in 1964, 
conservative politicians began to realize that they could use law and order rhetoric to 
attract voters who had tired of the disruptions to the traditional social hierarchy that 
accompanied the civil rights movement (Beckett, 1997; Chambliss, 1997; Edsall & 
Edsall, 1991; Flamm, 2005). In addition, the use of law and order politics also assisted 
conservatives in attracting citizens who were growing increasingly uneasy about the 
perceived increase in crime rates in the United States, which corresponded to the increase 
in attention given to criminal activity and social disturbances by politicians and the media 
(Beckett, 1997). With the increased use of law and order politics, conservative candidates 
were able to use it as a wedge issue for political gain at both the local and national level. 
Since liberals continued their ideological commitment to the welfare principles that 
provided the foundation for the New Deal and the Great Society (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 
2001), theorists have argued that law and order politics has primarily been associated 
with conservative politicians (Beckett, 1997; Flamm, 2005). However, with Bill Clinton’s 
adoption of similar rhetoric in his first presidential campaign in 1992, which helped 
Democrats find their voice on the topic of law and order, the once clear connection 
between conservatives and tough-on-crime politics appears to have been muddied.
1
 
Research that has focused on the main propositions within this perspective has found a 
significant relationship between Republican elected officials and the adoption of punitive 
criminal justice policies and practices.
2
 
                                                          
1
 Garland, 2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Holian, 2004; Kramer & Michalowski, 1995; Mauer, 1999. 
2
 Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, Malone & Iles, 2012; Jacobs et al., 2007; Stucky, 
Heimer & Lang, 2005; Yates & Fording, 2005. 
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Political Ideology 
 The second political theory posits a strong relationship between the severity of 
societal punishment and the public’s commitment to political ideologies. Scholars have 
highlighted this relationship because of the distinction between conservative and liberal 
sentiment regarding criminal justice practices. Conservative ideologies often stress that 
crime is the product of rational choice and that the best method for deterring unlawful 
transgressions involves the adoption of harsh punishments designed to incapacitate 
dangerous offenders (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 1993; Lacey, 1988; Thorne, 1990). On the 
opposite side, liberal ideologies stress that crime is the product of the unequal distribution 
of resources within society and that the best method for eliminating crime is the adoption 
of societal programs designed to temper inequality (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 1993; 
Lackoff, 1996; Thorne, 1990). Considering the argument by scholars that societal 
punishment is influenced by the broader social landscapes in which they are immersed 
(Foucault, 1977; Garland 1993, 2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Whitman, 2005), this 
perspective argues that the adoption of harsh penal policies, especially the use of the 
death penalty, is more likely to occur when there is stronger commitment to conservative 
ideologies among the public. To determine the presence of conservative and liberal 
ideologies, scholars have examined a number of measures that include membership in 
fundamentalist churches (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 2002, 2004; Messner, Baumer & 
Rosenfeld, 2006), scales based on voting records and special interest group ratings 
(Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 2002, 2004; Messner, Baumer & Rosenfeld, 2006), and 
welfare expenditures (Beckett & Western, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Stucky, 
Heimer & Lang, 2005). Relying on these measures, researchers have found a significant 
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relationship between the public’s commitment to political ideologies and both 
imprisonment
3
 and capital punishment practices (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; 
Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2007).  
Social Threat Theory 
 The final political theory examined is the social threat perspective. The basic tenet 
of this theory argues that groups in power adopt repressive forms of punishment when 
they perceive a threat to their dominant position in society. This theory contends that 
penal punishment is used by powerful groups within society to control the behavior of 
groups they deem to be a threat to the traditional social order. Whereas the partisan 
politics perspective argues that politicians, especially conservatives, shape public 
perception regarding the need for harsh punishments, this perspective argues that 
politicians adopt these policies based on pressure from the dominant groups within 
society. In order to understand the diverse nature of the social threat perspective, this 
review focuses on three hypotheses that have been categorized under the broader social 
threat umbrella. 
 The first hypothesis examined within the social threat theory is the racial threat 
perspective. This hypothesis suggests that the dominant racial group in society increases 
the severity of penal punishments in an attempt to control a growing minority population 
(Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). According to this perspective, 
groups in power initiate these policy changes because of their desire to ensure their hold 
over scarce societal resources and the privileges associated with their dominant position 
in society (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). However, racial threat theorists also 
                                                          
3
 Beckett & Western, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Stucky, Heimer &    
  Lang, 2005. 
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contend that the likelihood of punishment eventually begins to level off and decrease 
after the size of the minority population reaches a certain tipping point. After surpassing 
this tipping point, it is hypothesized that minority group presence has a greater impact on 
political affairs, thus restraining the use of harsh penal sanctions on their members. Based 
on these assertions, racial threat theorists argue that the relationship between the size of 
minority populations and the use of harsh penal punishments takes on a bell shape. 
Research that has focused on the association between racial threat and criminal justice 
practices indicates that growth in minority populations has been associated with increased 
spending on police (Kent & Jacobs, 2005), higher arrest rates (Liska, Chamlin & Reed, 
1985), higher imprisonment rates (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), the likelihood of the 
death penalty being legal (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002), the willingness of jurors to 
impose death sentences (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005), 
and the execution of offenders (Jacobs & Kent, 2007; Jacobs et al., 2007). Since the 
social landscape in the United States has long been marked by tension between the races 
(Myrdal, 1944; Tocqueville, 1948), it is important to further assess the empirical 
connection between capital punishment practices and the perceived threat posed by racial 
minority groups over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. 
The second social threat hypothesis examined in this dissertation argues that there 
is a relationship between vigilante values and criminal justice practices. The main 
proposition within this perspective argues that in areas where the vigilante tradition is 
strong, individuals will be more inclined to support the use of both legal and extralegal 
forms of violence to maintain the traditional social hierarchy. In order to understand the 
impact that vigilante values have on capital punishment practices, it is important to first 
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briefly examine the historical factors that influenced the development of this cultural 
tradition. Beginning with Reconstruction, southern whites perceived the emancipation of 
African Americans as a significant threat to their dominant position in society. In an 
attempt to maintain the traditional social order and protect the economic and political 
privileges associated with their dominant position in society (Tolnay & Beck, 1992), 
southern whites adopted violent practices, usually in the form of lynching, as a means of 
prohibiting African Americans from taking full advantage of the rights that had been 
recently afforded to them after the Civil War. The reason social threat scholars have often 
made the connection between lynching and capital punishment is that both practices were 
designed to control the behavior of minority groups.
4
 As Bowers (1984: 131) has 
commented when reflecting on the purposes behind the use of executions in the South: 
The evidence of racial discrimination in the administration of capital punishment 
suggests that the death penalty may have served as an instrument of minority group 
oppression: to keep blacks in the South in a position of subjugation and subservience. 
 
Since scholars have argued that lynching and capital punishment both serve a 
complementary purpose, it is likely that the same cultural sentiment that encouraged the 
use of vigilante violence in the southern United States also influences support for the use 
of the death penalty.  
In order to account for the way in which vigilante values have impacted capital 
punishment in the post-Furman era, Zimring (2003) has hypothesized that these 
sentiments moderate the impact that governmental distrust has on support for the death 
penalty. In other words, even though capital punishment is administered in state-operated 
facilities and is overseen by state officials, citizens who reside in areas where vigilante 
                                                          
4
 Black, 1983; Phillips, 1987; Senechal de la Roche, 1996, 2001; Tolnay & Beck, 1990; Turk, 1982;  
Wyatt-Brown, 1982. 
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values are strong are more inclined to view this form of punishment as the will of the 
community. Since research has long documented the racial disparities associated with the 
use of capital punishment (Bowers, 1984), especially in the southern United States, it is 
reasonable to believe that the dominant racial group in this region is more likely to 
sentence minorities to death and execute these individuals in order to control the behavior 
of these populations. To measure the presence of vigilante values, researchers have relied 
primarily on the number of lynching acts that occurred in the United States in the late  
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.
5
 Studies that have examined the relationship between 
vigilante values and criminal justice practices have found a significant relationship 
between past lynchings and the imposition of death sentences (Jacobs & Kent, 2007), the 
execution of offenders (Zimring, 2003), and higher imprisonment rates (Jacobs, Malone 
& Iles, 2012). 
A third hypothesis contained within the social threat perspective contends that 
there is a strong connection between the nature of criminal justice practices and economic 
considerations. The main proposition within this hypothesis argues that social elites use 
societal law and penal punishment to protect their hold over property and to control the 
behavior of the economic underclass.
6
 These neo-Marxist theorists believe that social 
elites doubt the underclass’s dedication to following the laws of society; therefore, when 
there is growth in this population, harsher forms of punishment must be adopted in order 
to deter unlawful transgressions. In order to measure growth in the economic underclass, 
scholars have relied on indicators designed to measure unemployment rates and the 
                                                          
5
 Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; King, Messner & Baller, 2009; Messner, Baumer & Rosenfeld, 2006; 
Tolnay & Beck, 1990; Zimring, 2003. 
6
 Chambliss & Seidman, 1980; Jankovic, 1977; Liska, 1987; Quinney, 1977; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939. 
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degree of economic stratification within society. Although this hypothesis has received 
extensive scholarly interest, the results from empirical studies have primarily shown 
mixed support for the connection between growth in the underclass and changes in the 
nature of penal punishment.
7
 Despite the mixed results from previous studies, this 
dissertation seeks to test the economic threat hypothesis because it has yet to be assessed 
in terms of its relationship with capital punishment practices in the pre-Furman era. 
Considering the main propositions contained within the three political theories 
highlighted above, I now provide a more in-depth examination of the nature of the 
empirical support for the relationship between these political factors and capital 
punishment practices in the United States. 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PRACTICES  
 
 This review of the empirical literature on capital punishment focuses on previous 
studies that have examined the relationship between political variables and the imposition 
of death sentences and the execution of offenders at the state level. Two of the first 
studies to focus on post-Furman trends in capital punishment practices were Jacobs and 
colleagues’ (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005) examination 
of the political factors related to state-level death sentences. In these studies, Jacobs and 
colleagues relied on pooled time-series analyses to assess the relationship between 
predictors measured in 1970, 1980, and 1990 and the number of death sentences in    
1971-1972, 1981-1982, and 1991-1992. From their analyses, Jacobs and colleagues found 
that the likelihood of receiving a death sentence is greater in states that have a higher 
                                                          
7
 Chiricos & Delone, 1992; Colvin, 1990; Galster & Scaturo, 1985; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs & Kent, 2007; Jankovic, 1977; Keen & Jacobs, 2009; Parker & Horwitz, 
1986; Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording, 2005. 
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violent crime rate, a large proportion of religious fundamentalists (political ideology), 
stronger conservative ideologies among the public (political ideology), a large minority 
population (racial threat), and an interaction between the historical presence of a vigilante 
tradition and the presence of large minority populations (vigilante values and racial 
threat). Jacobs and colleagues also found that states with liberal governors (partisan 
politics), a small minority population (racial threat), and a stronger commitment to liberal 
sentiments (political ideology) were more likely to report zero death sentences within 
their jurisdictions for the time period analyzed. The findings from these studies are 
particularly pertinent to this dissertation because they stress the importance of accounting 
for political factors when examining capital punishment practices and they demonstrate 
support for the propositions within the three political theories highlighted above. A more 
in-depth analysis of Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) findings will occur in Chapter Four. 
 A third empirical paper to focus on state-level capital punishment practices was 
Jacobs et al.’s (2007) study that examined the probability that death row inmates are 
executed. Using a discrete-time event history analysis, Jacobs et al. (2007) examined the 
individual and state-level factors related to execution probabilities in 16 states. In terms 
of their state-level results, the authors found that executions were more likely to occur in 
states where there were larger African American and Hispanic populations (racial threat), 
state populations were larger, a larger proportion of residents were born out of state, 
murder rates were higher, citizens embraced more conservative sentiments (political 
ideology), and the percentage of votes for Republican presidential candidates was higher 
(partisan politics). Similar to their earlier findings, Jacobs et al. (2007) provided further 
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support for the important relationship between state-level political factors and capital 
punishment practices. 
The final study that has examined the state-level political factors associated with 
capital punishment practices focused on this relationship from 1977 to 2004. In his study, 
McCann (2008) assessed the relationship between a number of political variables and 
aggregate death sentences and executions. From his analysis, McCann (2008) found that 
conservative political ideological sentiment (one measure constructed using measures for 
voter ideological identification, Democratic Party elite liberalism-conservatism, 
Republican Party elite liberalism-conservatism, composite policy liberalism, and 
religious fundamentalism), social threat (comprised of homicide rates, violent crime 
rates, and the percentage of minorities in the population), and an interaction between 
these two variables were all significantly related to the number of both death sentences 
and executions. In order to assess the temporal stability of these measures, McCann 
(2008) performed a split-half replication that examined the time periods from 1977 to 
1990 and 1991 to 2004. The results of this replication supported the findings from the 
models that examined the entire time period under analysis. The findings from McCann’s 
(2008) study provide further insight into the relationship between political factors and 
capital punishment practices in the post-Furman time period. This chapter now provides 
a brief historical examination of the social and political factors related to the changing 
nature of national and regional trends in death sentences and executions in the United 
States. 
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PRACTICES IN THE 
20
TH
 AND 21
ST
 CENTURIES 
 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, capital punishment practices in the United 
States continued on the path set in the previous century that involved restraining and 
restricting the use of this form of penal punishment (Banner, 2003; Bowers, 1984; 
Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). Jurisdictions across the United States were slowly 
initiating a number of policies and legal reforms that changed the nature in which capital 
punishment practices were enacted. These reforms included the restriction of capital 
crimes to all but the most serious offenses in northern states, the movement away from 
public executions due to the unpredictability of the crowds that gathered to witness these 
events, a transfer in the power to execute offenders from local authorities to state 
officials, the introduction of new legal codes that repealed mandatory death sentences for 
certain crimes, and the issuance of decisions by the Supreme Court that stressed the 
importance of protecting defendants’ rights to due process, especially in capital cases. 
With the general movement towards refining the use of capital punishment in the United 
States that began in the 19
th
 century, executions in the United States generally declined in 
the first two decades of the 20
th
 century. 
Despite the adoption of legal and judicial policies designed to restrain the use of 
the death penalty across the United States, national-level executions began to steadily 
climb from 1920 until the mid-1930s, reaching a 20
th
 century peak of 197 in 1935. A 
closer examination of the increase in the number of national-level executions over this 
decade-and-a-half period at the regional level reveals that this increase was primarily 
driven by the use of the punishment in the southern United States. As Figure 2 indicates, 
executions in the South climbed from 28 in 1919 to 128 in 1936, which signified a 450% 
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Sources: 
ESPY File: 1900-2002. 
Death Penalty Information Center: 2003-2012.
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             Source: ESPY File, 1900-1972 
 
 
increase in the use of executions over the 17-year period. Since scholars have been slow 
to propose hypotheses designed to account for this dramatic increase in southern 
executions, the social factors related to this phenomenon are still relatively unknown 
today. While this dissertation is unable to account for the factors related to the increase in 
executions in the South at this time, it is important to note that 56% of all executions 
before the Furman decision in the 20
th
 century occurred in the southern United States 
(see Figure 3). In terms of the other three regions, the number of annual executions 
remained fairly stable from 1920 to 1935.   
After the mid-1930s, the United States began to experience a relatively steady 
decline in the annual number of executions. Perhaps the most important aspect related to 
this decline is that this phenomenon occurred in the absence of a clear abolitionist 
movement or any special attention from legislators (Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). 
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Scholars have attributed this phenomenon primarily to the erosion of public support for 
the death penalty, which appeared to have impacted jurors’ willingness to impose death 
sentences (Banner, 2003; Bowers, 1984; Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006) (see Figure 4). 
The main factors that have been hypothesized to have  impacted  public perception about 
the death penalty was the rise to prominence of sociological theories that stressed that 
crime was the product of biological and environmental causes, which undercut the 
argument for the deterrent value of the death penalty (Banner, 2003), the change in 
cultural sentiments in Western societies as these societies strengthened their dedication to 
democratic and liberal ideologies (Garland, 2011), the widespread adoption across states 
of legal codes that allowed lesser punishments for crimes that had carried a mandatory 
death sentence in the past (Banner, 2003; Bowers, 1984), and the apparent willingness of 
high courts to scrutinize the decisions of lower courts in order to decrease racial 
discrimination and to prevent abuses of offenders’ rights to due process (Bowers, 1984). 
Due to the above-mentioned social and judicial changes, executions in all four regions in 
the United States continued to decline leading up to the 1960s. 
With the apparent shift in public support for capital punishment in the              
mid-20
th
 century, the first major anti-death penalty movement emerged in the United 
States during the 1960s. Perhaps one of the most important events that led to the 
organization of a national abolitionist movement was the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rudolph v. Alabama in 1963, which demonstrated the Court’s willingness to entertain 
constitutional challenges to the death penalty. Due to the unique nature of political 
institutions in the United States, the abolitionist movement took to the courts because the 
distribution of power across states prevented the same top-down reforms that abolished 
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Sources: 
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the use of the death penalty in other western nations beginning in the 1960s (Garland, 
2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Zimring, 2003). These groups sought a judicial moratorium 
based on the argument that death sentences were imposed in an arbitrary and often racist 
manner and that public sentiment had turned against the practice. Based on these 
arguments, the Supreme Court concluded in the Furman decision that the arbitrary 
implementation of capital punishment practices was unconstitutional because it violated 
both the 8
th
 amendment, which prohibits the use of cruel and unusual punishment, and the 
14
th
 amendment, which protects an accused’s right to due process. Following Furman, 
scholars have argued that this decision effectively thrust capital punishment into the 
political spotlight (Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006).  
In order to fully understand the politicization of criminal justice policies and 
practices and the movement towards more punitive ideologies that occurred in the 1970s, 
the broader social and cultural changes that occurred in the United States during this time 
period must first be examined. Although scholars have identified a wide array of factors 
that contributed to this phenomenon, I will briefly examine three of the dominant themes 
that have been associated with the death of the liberal ideologies that governed the Great 
Society and the subsequent shift towards more conservative ideologies regarding 
punishment practices. The first factor scholars have attributed to this shift in ideologies is 
the perceived disruption to the traditional social hierarchy that resulted from the civil 
rights movement. Even though the civil rights movement was met with general support 
from American citizens outside the southern United States in the beginning of the 1960s, 
by the end of the decade, public sentiment had turned against the movement based on the 
violent riots that had erupted in urban areas (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 2011; Murakawa, 
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2008). Whereas most American citizens initially viewed African Americans as an 
oppressed minority in search of equal rights, by the end of the 1960s, the public began to 
perceive these individuals as a violent minority group that had no respect for law and 
order (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 2011). The anxiety that accompanied the civil rights 
movement was particularly heightened in the southern United States where southerners 
perceived that their very way of life was under attack by liberals. Due to the disturbance 
in the traditional social hierarchy and the violence that resulted from the civil rights 
movement, there was the perception among citizens, particularly in the south, that stricter 
punishment policies and practices needed to be adopted in order to control the actions of 
African Americans (Beckett, 1997; Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Flamm, 2005). 
The second factor involved with the ascendancy of conservative ideologies during 
the 1970s was the dramatic increase in crime rates that began in the 1960s. From 1960 to 
1972, the total crime rate in the United States based on Index I offenses increased by 
close to 110%, and the violent crime rate increased by almost 150% during this time 
period (Uniform Crime Report, 1960-1972). With this increase in crime came the 
realization among citizens, especially in the suburbs, that the risk of victimization had 
significantly increased and that the problem of crime was no longer contained to poor 
inner city neighborhoods (Garland, 2001, 2011). In combination with the riots that 
accompanied the civil rights movement, the increase in crime rates contributed to the 
sense among citizens that law and order had broken down and that more punitive 
responses were needed to deter offending (Marion, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Wilson, 
1975). Another significant shift that partially resulted from the increase in crime rates 
was the eventual collapse of the rehabilitative ideal that had governed correctional 
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policies and practices for most of the modern era. One of the primary factors that 
contributed to this phenomenon concerned the attacks from both the right and the left on 
the practices associated with indeterminate sentencing, which increased the perception 
among the public that the criminal justice system was woefully inefficient and biased 
(Allen, 1981; Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2006). In addition, politicians and citizens 
began to embrace the perception that “nothing works” in terms of the rehabilitation of 
offenders and that criminals would continue to violate the law regardless of correctional 
interventions (Garland, 2001). Based on these two factors, there was the movement in the 
United States towards the idea that the only solution to the crime problem involved the 
removal of discretion regarding the punishment of offenders from criminal justice 
practitioners and the adoption of harsh correctional policies and practices designed to 
incapacitate dangerous offenders (Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2006; Marion, 1994; 
Wilson, 1975). 
The final factor that contributed to the shift in the ideologies surrounding crime 
control and correctional practices was the perceived leniency of the liberal ideals that 
provided the foundation for the Great Society. These ideologies were blamed for both the 
social disturbances associated with the civil rights movement and the increase in crime 
rates (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 2011). In terms of the civil rights movement, American 
citizens believed that liberal officials were too lenient on the African Americans that 
participated in the urban riots and that these individuals were being rewarded in the form 
of increases in welfare expenditures for their violent disregard of the law (Flamm, 2005). 
Regarding the issues surrounding the increase in crime rates, the American public began 
to perceive that this current social ill threatening society was the result of liberal 
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ideologies that created an atmosphere in the United States where violation of the law was 
considered tolerable (Flamm, 2005). Furthermore, a backlash against the progressive 
ideologies that guided the Warren Court’s ruling in a number of cases was occurring 
during this time period, and citizens began to believe that the Supreme Court was not 
concerned with the plight of the average citizen and that the justices preferred protecting 
the rights of criminals over the punishment of offenders (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 2011). 
In addition to these perceived failures, the permissiveness of liberal ideologies was also 
blamed for the Vietnam War protests, the increase in the use of recreational drugs, the 
women’s movement, and the deterioration of “traditional” moral values (Garland, 2011). 
The combination of these factors eventually contributed to the collapse of the Great 
Society and the movement away from the liberal ideologies that had provided its 
foundation. Given these three shifts in the social and cultural landscape during the 1960s 
and the beginning of the 1970s, conservative politicians and the American public began 
to perceive the retention of the death penalty as a vital instrument needed both to 
maintain order in society and to wage war against crime (Garland, 2011). 
Almost immediately following the Furman decision, conservative officials 
quickly began to introduce reforms designed to bring their death penalty practices in line 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling. Whereas the topic of the death penalty in the             
pre-Furman era did not receive exceptional interest from politicians, after this decision, 
scholars have argued that the topic became one of the most important polarizing issues 
used by conservatives to gain electoral success (Garland, 2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). 
Since the primary venue for abolition in the United States was the court system, 
abolitionist groups proved ill equipped to contend with the politicized pro-capital 
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punishment movement that emerged after the Furman decision (Gottschalk, 2006). With 
these changes in the political landscape, the number of annual death sentences 
immediately climbed from 42 in 1973 to 285 in 1975. Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976, which set forth the capital sentencing procedures 
needed for states to comply with the Eighth Amendment, states slowly began to execute 
offenders again at the end of the 1970s; the United States effectively began to deviate 
from other western nations that were continuing their movement towards abolition 
(Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Zimring, 2003). 
  Due to persistent use of the death penalty into the late 20
th
 century, scholars have 
argued that the discourse used to rationalize the use of this punishment underwent 
significant transformations in this time period (Garland, 2011; Zimring, 2003). With the 
apparent decline in favor of the deterrence argument that had justified the use of capital 
punishment for much of the modern era, the perceived purpose of the death penalty began 
to change in accordance with the political and cultural atmosphere in the late 20
th
 century 
United States (Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Zimring, 2003). The emerging discourse 
in this time period began to justify the punishment as the will of the people, an instrument 
to bring about healing and closure for the relatives of victims, a weapon in the war 
against crime, and a lawful act sanctioned by the Supreme Court (Garland, 2001, 2011; 
Gottschalk, 2006; Zimring, 2003). Based on this change in discourse, support for capital 
punishment continued to increase, and the annual number of death sentences and 
executions climbed steadily from the 1980s until the end of the millennium.  
A particularly noteworthy development in the post-Furman use of the death 
penalty is the growth in the disproportionate number of executions enacted in the  
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southern United States. In the post-Furman period, southern executions have accounted 
for 83% in the use of this form of punishment (see Figure 5). To explain the dominant use 
of the death penalty in the southern United States, scholars have proposed that southern 
executions have been influenced by the enduring commitment to vigilante values in the 
South (Zimring, 2003), that capital punishment is tightly linked to the cultural and ethnic 
identity of southerners (Garland, 2011), and that the death penalty is an integral part of 
their “traditionalist” perspective (Garland, 2011). Given the uneven distribution of 
executions in the post-Furman period, scholars have often considered the persistent 
reliance on capital punishment practices in the United States during the late 20
th
 and the 
early 21
st
 centuries to be primarily a southern issue (Garland, 2011; Zimring, 2003).   
Despite the resurgence in the use of capital punishment practices in the           
post-Furman time period, reliance on these practices has significantly declined over the 
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course of the last decade. More specifically, the imposition of death sentences and the 
execution of offenders have declined by 65% and 49%, respectively, in the last 13 years. 
In addition to the marked restraint in the use of capital punishment practices, six states 
(Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York) have 
repealed their death penalty statutes since 2007, which has increased the number of 
abolitionist jurisdictions in the United States to 18. Furthermore, public support for the 
use of capital punishment in homicide cases has declined almost 20% since the           
mid-1990s. With the apparent waning in the willingness of jurisdictions to use capital 
punishment practices in the 21
st
 century, it appears as though the United States may be 
returning to more of a pre-Furman conceptualization regarding the restraint and 
refinement in the use of this form of punishment.  
THE CURRENT STUDY 
Based on the theoretical arguments highlighted above and the previous empirical 
examinations of capital punishment practices, this dissertation seeks to determine 
whether recent political theories can account for capital punishment practices when     
pre-Furman and 21
st
 century trends are included in the analyses. As noted above, all of 
the state-level studies on trends in capital punishment practices have restricted their focus 
primarily to the post-Furman era. Since the temporal focus of these studies has been 
fairly narrow, it is important to determine whether the variables used in recent models are 
sound predictors of the same practices when the time period under consideration is 
expanded. Due to the importance involved with assessing whether scholars’ political 
theories on societal punishment represent proximate manifestations associated with    
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post-Furman trends in capital punishment practices, this study examines trends in death 
sentences and executions from 1930 to 2012.  
As well as examining whether recent political theories can account for long-term 
trends in capital punishment practices, this study seeks to determine the impact that the 
politicization of capital punishment practices and the shift towards more punitive 
ideologies in the 1970s had on the relationship between political factors and the use of 
the death penalty. As mentioned in Chapter One, scholars have focused primarily on the 
post-Furman period and little is known regarding whether the political factors associated 
with capital punishment practices were either strengthened or redefined after the Furman 
decision. In order to attain a better understanding of how the social and political changes 
impacted this relationship, I will also examine whether the strength of the relationship 
between political factors and capital punishment practices is conditioned by the time 
period in which they occurred. Considering the above-mentioned gaps in the empirical 
literature and the importance involved with expanding the temporal scope used to 
examine capital punishment practices, this study seeks to answer the following question: 
Research question: Are the state-level contextual factors associated with the 
imposition of death sentences and executions in the post-Furman era robust 
predictors of these practices when the temporal framework is expanded to include 
the period from 1930 to 2012?  
  
This dissertation now turns to the examination of the methods involved with the 
development of the empirical component of this project. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter begins with a review of the key variables examined in this study. 
Due to the eclectic nature of the data sources relied upon to construct the indicators, each 
data source is highlighted individually when examining the procedures that were adopted 
to create the variables. This chapter then provides the estimation procedures adopted and 
a description of the research design used to examine the research question articulated in 
the previous chapter. This chapter concludes with a review of the analytic strategies 
adopted to examine the social and political factors associated with long-term trends in 
death sentences and executions from 1930 to 2012.  
DATA SOURCES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable this dissertation examines is the number of offenders 
sentenced to death at the state level. To create this variable, numerous sources were relied 
upon. The first source was the Bureau of the Census’ publication Prisoners in State and 
Federal Prisons and Reformatories from 1930 to 1946. The data reported in this 
publication were gathered on a one-time annual basis (i.e., the number of offenders under 
sentence of death reported in the publication represents the number of individuals that 
were in prison at the time the data were collected). In 1947, reporting responsibilities 
were transferred from the Bureau of the Census to the Justice Department. Due to this 
transfer, death sentences were not reported in any publically available governmental 
publication from 1947 until 1959 (with the exception of the Bureau of the Census’ 
decennial report on prisoners in state institutions in 1950). Beginning in 1960, the Justice 
Department’s National Prisoner Statistics-Executions publication began to report      
state-level death sentences again, and the data reported cover prisoners received from the 
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court under sentence of death for the entire reporting year. In 1971, the Justice 
Department began publishing death sentences in the Capital Punishment Series, which 
has continued to report this information until their latest publication in 2011. State-level 
death sentences for 2012 were collected from the Death Penalty Information Center 
website (http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/). Overall, there were a number of missing 
values for this dependent variable due to the transfer in reporting responsibilities and a 
number of states failing to report death sentences within their jurisdiction. In order to 
address these missing values, a number of procedures were implemented in an attempt to 
impute the data points, and more details on these imputation strategies are reported in the 
following section.  
The second dependent variable is the annual number of state-level executions, and 
a number of sources were used to construct this variable. The first source is the ESPY 
dataset (ICPSR # 8451) for the time period from 1930 to 2002. The ESPY file was 
constructed using the records from each state’s department of corrections, newspaper 
articles, county historical files, state and local court proceedings, historical societies’ 
archives, and additional listings of executions. The second data source is the Bureau of 
Justice’s Capital Punishment Series for 2003 to 2011. These yearly bulletins contain 
detailed information on the number of offenders executed within each state. Finally, the 
last source relied upon for the number of executions in 2012 was the Death Penalty 
Information Center. 
Independent Variables 
As previously mentioned, this dissertation seeks to examine the key propositions 
associated with three political theories. This study relies on three indicators to examine 
the propositions contained within the partisan politics perspective. Based on the argument 
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that conservative officials will adopt harsh penal practices as a wedge issue to gain 
political support (Beckett, 1994; Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Flamm, 2005), this study 
measures the presence of conservative politicians using methods similar to those reported 
in previous studies. The first variable is the percentage of residents in each state who 
voted for the Republican in a presidential election. This indicator is calculated based on 
the percentage of state residents who voted for a Republican candidate out of all residents 
who voted in the presidential election.  Data for this variable were obtained from the 
Guide to U.S. Elections Volume II (2005) and the Atlas of U.S. Elections webpage 
(http://uselectionatlas.org). The final values adopted for this variable were calculated 
using two different procedures. First, if an election occurred in a measurement year (the 
turn of each decade), the percentage of the votes for a Republican candidate was directly 
adopted for these decades. Second, if an election did not occur in a measurement year, the 
average from the two closest elections was calculated to produce values for these periods.  
The second partisan politics variable examines the political affiliation of state 
governors. The data used in the construction of this variable were obtained from the 
Guide to U.S. Elections Volume II (2005) and the National Governors’ Association 
webpage (http://www.nga.org/cms/home.html). This variable was dummy coded where a 
1 indicated the presence of a Republican governor. 
The final variable used to determine the presence of conservative officials is the 
percentage of Republicans in the state legislature. Data used to construct this indicator 
were drawn from two sources. The first source of data for this variable came from 
Michael Dubin’s (2007) book, “Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by 
Year Summary. 1796-2006.” The second data source relied upon was the Bureau of the 
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Census’ Statistical Abstracts of the United States for the breakdown of party affiliation in 
2010. A limitation involved with examining party affiliation across all of the jurisdictions 
in the United States is that Nebraska has embraced a unicameral legislative system from 
1937 to the present and Minnesota used non-partisan ballots from 1913 through 1974;
8
 
therefore, the political affiliation of state legislators in these jurisdictions is unknown 
during these periods. In order to produce estimates for the missing years, the breakdown 
of party affiliation in both states’ legislatures was estimated using the average percentage 
of Republicans in the state legislature from all neighboring states.
9
  
This study also relies on four variables to examine the propositions within the 
political ideology perspective. The first variable is the percentage of individuals who 
indicated fundamental religious affiliations within each state. This variable was included 
in this study because research indicates that religious fundamentalists harbor many of the 
conservative ideologies that stress the need to adopt harsh penalties to deter unlawful 
transgressions (Curry, 1996; Erikson, Wright & McIver, 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 
1994; Thorne, 1990). Data used to construct this indicator came from the Census of 
                                                          
8
 Although Minnesota embraced a non-partisan ballot until 1974, legislative candidates began running and 
caucusing as liberals and conservatives in the late 1940s (Dubin, 2007). Based on candidates’ affiliation 
with the dominant political parties, Dubin (2007) was able to determine the breakdown of legislative 
members for the measurement periods covering the 1950s through the 1970s. 
 
9
 In order to determine the overall accuracy of this imputation method, the average percentage of 
Republicans in the state legislature was calculated for all neighboring states and then compared against 
actual state values when available. In terms of Nebraska, the average for all neighboring states (62.69%) in 
1930 was compared to Nebraska’s actual value for the same year (54.89%). With regards to Minnesota, the 
average for all neighboring states (86.50%) was also compared to the actual value for the state (69.70%) in 
1950. Although there are discrepancies between the predicted values and the actual percentage of 
Republicans in the state legislature for both states, the potential bias introduced using the imputed values is 
preferable to the potential bias involved with removing these state-years from the analyses. Due to the bias 
that could be introduced by including imputed values, additional models were examined where the missing 
state-years were excluded from the analyses. The results from the supplemental analyses indicated that 
there were no significant differences between the findings from the models that excluded the missing      
state-years for both states and those where the imputed values were included in the analyses.   
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Religious Bodies conducted in 1926 and 1936, Churches and Church Membership 
gathered by the National Council of Churches in 1952 and 1971, and the religion portion 
of the decennial Census for 1980 to 2010. Since data on religious affiliations were not 
reported in the 1960s, data from 1952 and 1971 were averaged to provide estimates for 
this decade. Using the average from the two closest data collection periods is an 
appropriate strategy for estimating the missing values because research indicates that 
religious affiliations are relatively stable in large aggregates, such as states, across time 
(Newport, 1979). The same procedures used in prior studies were adopted when 
calculating the percentage of religious fundamentalists in each state (Elazar, 1970; 
Johnson, 1976; Morgan & Watson, 1981), which involved dividing the total number of 
religious fundamentalists by the total number of adherents that reported a religious 
affiliation in each state. This study determined whether certain churches qualified as 
fundamentalist based on the religious categorizations outlined by Elazar (1970) and 
Morgan and Watson (1981).  
In addition to the religious fundamentalist indicator, this project incorporates 
three new variables to measure the strength of political ideological commitments among 
state citizens. Whereas the religious fundamentalist variable is designed to directly 
measure the strength of conservative ideologies across states, the three new indicators are 
designed to act as proxies for the strength of political ideologies in each state. The first 
new variable incorporated is state-level expenditures on welfare. This measure of 
political ideology is included because one of the key factors associated with liberal 
sentiments is the desire to temper inequality with programs designed to protect citizens 
from the harsh nature of the free market economy (Flamm, 2005; Garland, 1993; Lackoff, 
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1996; Thorne, 1990). Based on this proposition, it is likely that liberal sentiments will be 
stronger in states that dedicate a greater proportion of their overall expenditures to 
welfare. Data used to construct this variable came from the Department of Commerce’s 
publication Financial Statistics of the States (1930-1940) and the Bureau of the Census’ 
yearly publication Statistical Abstracts of the United States (1950-2010). Due to the 
significant changes in the welfare system that occurred in the United States during the 
1930s, it was not possible to measure this concept across the entire time period under 
analysis using the same procedures reported in recent studies. Therefore, this variable 
was examined by calculating the percentage of state expenditures allocated for charities 
and welfare costs to create a consistent measure across time.  
The second new variable incorporated is the incarceration rate in each state. 
Based on the proposition that conservative sentiments stress the need to reduce crime 
through the incorporation of stiff penal policies designed to incapacitate offenders, it is 
likely that incarceration rates will be higher in states where conservative ideology is 
stronger. Since this study is interested in examining the political climate in which capital 
punishment practices occur and not the cumulative influence of this ideology over time, 
this indicator examines the rate at which offenders are incarcerated per 1,000 crimes. In 
order to construct this variable, the total number of individuals admitted to state prisons 
in a particular year was divided by the total number of Index I crimes reported in the 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The first sources used to gather information on the total 
number of individuals admitted to state penitentiaries came from the Bureau of the 
Census’ Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories (1930-1940), 
Cahalan’s (1986) historical corrections statistics report for the period from 1950 to1980,  
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and the Justice Department’s publication Correctional Populations in the United States 
(1990-2010). The second data source that was used to obtain the total number of Index I 
crimes came from the UCR publications from 1930 to 2010.
10
 Overall, there were 
missing data for four state-years, which comprised slightly under 1% of the total data 
points for this variable.
11
  
The final new variable is the institutionalization rate for individuals deemed to be 
mentally ill. The main reason this study seeks to use mental institutionalization to 
measure the strength of political ideology is that this concept shares many of the same 
purposes behind the use of imprisonment. More specifically, institutionalization is also 
viewed as a form of social control designed to remove dangerous individuals from the 
community and to incapacitate them (Arvanites, 1992; Kaplan, 1978). As Arvanites 
(1992: 132) has commented when recounting the similarities between the two practices:   
As with imprisonment, the involuntary hospitalization of “threatening” individuals not 
only segregates them from the community, but also identifies and reinforces the 
parameters of behavior that social control agents find socially acceptable. 
                                                          
10
 It is important to note a limitation involved with using UCR data from its inception year in 1930. During 
this year, only a very small number of jurisdictions reported criminal activity, and there is a significant 
amount of missing state-level data. If the data for 1930 were adopted in this study, the number of Index I 
crimes would likely be seriously underestimated due to the limited number of reporting jurisdictions. To 
account for this missing data for 1930, this study relied on the total number of Index I crimes in 1931 for 
this measurement period.   
 
11
 Initially, there were 12 missing state-years for this variable, and all of the missing information involved 
the number of individuals admitted to state prisons during the measurement year. In order to address the 
missing values, two imputation techniques were relied upon. The first method involved substituting the 
missing incarceration information with the number of individuals imprisoned in the year directly following 
the measurement year, if this data were available. This approach was able to provide values for eight of the 
original 12 missing state-years. The second method attempted to provide estimated values for Alabama 
(1930), Georgia (1930 & 1940), and Mississippi (1940). Since all three of the states with missing values 
were located in the southern United States, trends in the number of individuals admitted to state prisons 
were examined for all of the states in this region. The purpose behind the examination of state-level trends 
in imprisonment in the South was to determine whether these trends could assist with approximating values 
for the missing data. The examination of trends included the closest reported values both before and after 
the missing state-years, along with the states that did not have missing data for the focal year. Overall, the 
examination of these regional trends indicated that there were inconsistent increases and decreases in the 
number of individuals admitted to state prisons over the time periods examined; therefore, it was not 
possible to accurately impute values for these four measurement years. 
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Another reason to examine this concept is that Levine and Levine (1970) argue that 
institutionalization practices are directly shaped by political ideology. Based on these 
arguments and the fact that conservatives are more inclined to support the use of 
repressive forms of punishment to deter deviant behavior, it is likely that commitments to 
mental hospitals will be higher in states where there is a stronger dedication to this 
ideology. Although the use of yearly admissions to mental institutions would provide a 
more accurate portrayal of the strength of the political ideology among citizens during the 
measurement year, data on yearly admissions were not available for the entire period 
under analysis. Instead, this study examines institutionalization in terms of the total 
number of individuals residing in mental institutions at the end of the measurement year 
in order to create a consistent indicator over time.  
The procedures used to calculate the total number of individuals institutionalized 
in mental hospitals was similar to those used by Harcourt (2011). Data on mental health 
patients from 1930 through 1960 came from the Bureau of the Census’ Mental Patients in 
State Hospitals and the National Institute of Mental Health’s Patients in Mental 
Institutions. The data gathered from these sources contained information on the number 
of individuals residing in private and public mental institutions, psychiatric wards located 
in general hospitals, psychopathic hospitals, VA hospitals, and institutions for “mental 
defectives” and epileptics.12 The data used for the time period from 1970 through 2010 
came from the decennial Census reports. The institutionalization rate was calculated 
                                                          
12
 Initially, complete data on the number of individuals residing in mental institutions at the end of the year 
were not available for Arizona (1940), Mississippi (1940), Montana (1940), and Virginia (1930). In order 
to obtain the missing values for Arizona, Mississippi, and Montana, the institutionalization rate for these 
states were calculated based on averages for the year before and after the measurement period. Since data 
on institutionalizations were not available directly before and after the measurement period for Virginia in 
1930, this state-year is considered as missing.  
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using the total number of individuals institutionalized divided by the total population in 
each state and then multiplied by 100,000.  
The last political theory examined is the social threat perspective. In terms of the 
racial threat hypothesis, this study measures the propositions in this perspective in terms 
of the percentage of African Americans in state populations. This indicator focuses 
strictly on African Americans because the Bureau of the Census did not provide separate 
information on Hispanic populations before 1970. Data used in the construction of this 
variable came from the decennial Census. In order to account for the potential tipping 
point at which minority populations are able to establish a greater political presence, this 
study also includes a quadratic term to account for the potential non-linear relationship 
between this variable and capital punishment practices. Before creating the quadratic 
term, the percentage of African Americans in a state’s population variable was first 
centered to decrease collinearity between the two indicators. 
The second social threat hypothesis this dissertation examines concerns the 
connection between capital punishment practices and vigilante values. Consistent with 
prior research that focused on vigilante values,
13
 this tradition was quantified in terms of 
the number of lynchings that occurred in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Data used 
to construct this variable were obtained from the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People’s annual reports that cover the time period from 1889 to 
1931. To calculate a lynching rate, the total number of lynching incidents in each state 
was divided by the mean population for the period from 1889 to 1931. In addition to 
examining the direct effects of this tradition, this study also examines Jacobs, 
                                                          
13
 Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; King, Messner & Baller, 2009; Messner, Baumer & Rosenfeld, 2006; 
Tolnay & Beck, 1990; Zimring, 2003. 
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Carmichael, and Kent’s (2005) hypothesis that vigilante values will have a stronger 
influence on capital punishment practices when there is a large minority population in the 
state. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction term was calculated using the 
lynching rate variable and the African American minority threat variable. 
The final social threat indicator included in this study examines economic threat 
in terms of unemployment. This indicator was constructed from decennial Census 
publications from 1930 to 2010, and this measure was calculated based on the percentage 
of working age adults in the civilian labor force who reported being unemployed.  
Control Variables 
In addition to the key political variables of interest, this study also incorporates 
nine control variables. The first control variable included is the number of homicides 
reported in each state. Since the number of individuals eligible to be given a death 
sentence is not constant across jurisdictions, this study controls for the influence that the 
number of homicides has on the imposition of state-level death sentences. In addition to 
controlling for the number of homicides in the death sentence models, the homicide rate 
per 100,000 is controlled for in the execution-specific models instead of the raw counts. 
Data used to construct the homicide counts and rates came from annual editions of the 
UCR from 1931 until the present.
14
  
                                                          
14
 Similar to the procedures used for the incarceration rate variable, the number of homicides in 1931 was 
adopted for the 1930 measurement period. In order to construct the homicide rate for this period, the total 
number of homicides from 1931 was divided by the population of all reporting jurisdictions within each 
state and multiplied by 100,000 to create a rate. Data used to create the total population within reporting 
jurisdictions came from the Bureau of the Census’ 1930 decennial report. In addition to the missing values 
for 1930, there were four states where the number of homicides was not reported in the UCR. In order to 
obtain values for these states, the number of deaths by homicide reported in the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare and the National Center for Health Statistics’ yearly Vital Statistics publication 
were supplemented for these four missing years.   
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The second control variable is the number of death sentences reported in each 
state. Similar to the rationale behind the inclusion of the number of homicides in the 
death sentence analyses, the number of state-level death sentences is included in the 
execution models to account for variation in the population at risk of receiving this form 
of punishment across states. This variable is measured in terms of the number of death 
sentences that occurred one year before the measurement of the executions. The data 
sources used to construct this variable are identical to those reported above for the death 
sentence dependent variable. 
The third control variable is the violent crime rate in each state. This variable is 
included in the analyses to account for the potential influence that high levels of violent 
crime could have on capital punishment practices. Data used to construct this measure 
came from annual editions of the UCR.
15
  
The fourth control variable is designed to account for feelings of solidarity among 
group members. This factor is controlled for because scholars have argued that when 
members of a group have strong feelings of solidarity, they are less likely to rely on harsh 
forms of penal punishment, especially the use of the death penalty (Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2002). Group solidarity was measured based on the percentage of state residents who 
indicated that they were born in the state in which they currently reside. Data used to 
construct this variable came from the decennial Census. 
                                                          
15
 One of the limitations associated with the long-term examination of violent crime rates in the United 
States is that state-level rape statistics were not reported in the UCR until 1945. Based on this limitation, 
violent crime rates were calculated using data on homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults in order to 
construct a consistent measure across the entire period examined. Another limitation involved with the 
construction of violent crime rates was missing values for 1930. Identical to the methods adopted for the 
creation of the homicide rate indicator, the violent crime rates for 1930 were constructed using the number 
of violent crimes reported for each state in 1931.  
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The fifth control variable is the total population reported in each state, and the 
inclusion of this variable is designed to account for the potential influence that population 
size may have on states’ willingness to rely on capital punishment practices. Data used to 
construct this variable were obtained from the Bureau of the Census reports for 1930 to 
2010. The values for this variable were divided by 100,000 to produce appropriately 
sized coefficients for reporting purposes. 
The sixth control variable is the percentage of residents who resided in cities with 
a population greater than 50,000. Data used in the construction of this variable came from 
the decennial Census, and this variable is included to account for the potential influence 
large urban populations have on capital punishment practices.  
The seventh control variable accounts for surpluses or deficits in states’ yearly 
revenue streams. As scholars have noted with the recent economic downturn, states have 
begun to embrace alternative forms of punishment other than incarceration in order to 
decrease their expenditures on criminal justice oriented practices (Jacobson, 2005; 
Rengifo et al., 2010). Since research indicates that the costs associated with prosecuting 
capital cases exceed the costs involved with imprisoning offenders for life (Dieter, 1997; 
Spangenberg & Walsh, 1989), this measure controls for potential economic 
considerations that may influence the decision of prosecutors to seek the death penalty. 
This economic measure was calculated by subtracting each state’s overall expenditures 
from the total revenue generated each year, and data used to construct this variable were 
obtained from the Department of Commerce’s yearly publications Financial Statistics of 
the States (1930-1940) and the Bureau of the Census’ Government Finances (1950-2000) 
and Statistical Abstracts of the States (2010). In order to account for inflation, all of the 
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monetary values have been converted to reflect prices in 1970. The values for this 
variable were divided by one billion to produce reasonably sized coefficients in the 
analyses. 
The final indicators included are dummy variables designed to control for the 
potential influence of regional and time-specific factors. This study includes a set of 
dummy variables designed to capture whether a state was located in the South, West, or 
Midwest, with the Northeastern region comprising the reference group. Time period 
specific factors were controlled for using a dummy variable coded 1 for the post-Furman 
time period. Both sets of dummy indicators were included to control for potential 
differences between regions and time periods that might otherwise bias the results of this 
study. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
This section focuses on the estimation procedures used to examine long-term 
trends in death sentences and executions, the structure of the data, and the results from 
specification tests that were relied upon to fit the models for each dependent variable. 
Even though the occurrence of criminal justice oriented events or counts are often 
converted into rates for use in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Osgood, 
2000), the adoption of this procedure for both dependent variables would be 
inappropriate for two reasons. First, as Osgood (2000) has noted, when the occurrence of 
the dependent variable is a rare event bounded by zero, as in the case of death sentences 
and executions, converting these events into rates would violate the OLS assumption 
regarding the normality of the distribution. Another reason for not converting the 
dependent variables into rates for use in an OLS regression occurs when the population at 
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risk is relatively small in comparison to the rates calculated for the dependent variable. 
Since the number of people who are executed and sentenced to death in each jurisdiction 
is conditioned by the number of individuals who are eligible for the punishment (i.e., 
individuals primarily have to commit a homicide to be eligible to receive a death sentence 
and only individuals sentenced to death can be executed), the population at risk for both 
dependent variables is relatively small in comparison to the execution and death sentence 
rates.
16
 When this issue occurs, it also violates the OLS assumption regarding the 
homogeneity of variance and it biases the precision of regression estimates (Osgood, 
2000).  
Based on the count nature of each dependent variable, a Poisson-based approach 
is adopted to examine the political factors associated with capital punishment practices. A 
major consideration involved with selecting the appropriate Poisson-based procedure 
concerns whether there is overdispersion in the data. When overdispersion is present, the 
use of a traditional Poisson analysis would be inappropriate because the data violate the 
assumption that the conditional mean and the standard deviation must be roughly 
equivalent (Long, 1997). In order to examine whether the data violate this assumption, 
the results of the likelihood ratio test were consulted. The findings from this test for death 
sentences (p < .001) and executions (p < .001) were both significant, thus indicating that 
the data violate the traditional Poisson assumption. Given these findings, a negative 
binomial approach is adopted because this estimation procedure allows the conditional 
variance to exceed the conditional mean (Long, 1997). 
                                                          
16
 For example, in 1940, Delaware had two homicides and one death sentence, which produced a death 
sentence rate of 50,000 per 100,000 homicides.  
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 Another important consideration when using a Poisson-based approach is 
whether to use an exposure variable to convert the count data into a rate. Due to the 
relatively small size of the population at risk for both forms of punishment, the addition 
of even one death sentence or execution could lead to large changes in the rates for both 
outcomes. Based on this consideration and the relatively rare occurrence of both events, 
this study avoids converting the counts into rates because this strategy could produce 
misleading results (Osgood, 2000). Instead, this study controls for the population at risk 
by including these populations in their count form as an independent variable in the 
analyses. Similar to the use of death sentence and execution rates as an outcome measure, 
the inclusion of the population at risk as an independent variable controls for the 
differences across states that result from variation in the number of people eligible for 
both forms of punishment (Chamlin & Cochran, 2004). In terms of the death sentence 
dependent variable, the number of homicides reported one year before the measurement 
of the outcome is included in the models to account for the population at risk. In terms of 
the execution models, the number of individuals sentenced to death one year before the 
measurement of this dependent variable is included to account for the population at risk. 
Due to the two different populations at risk, the occurrence of homicides within 
jurisdictions is controlled for by using the homicide rate in the execution models instead 
of using the raw counts.  
In order to examine trends in death sentences and executions, this study measures 
predictors at the turn of each decade because most of the data used to construct the 
independent variables came from the decennial Bureau of the Census reports. This 
analytic strategy is advantageous because it introduces less error into the measurement of 
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predictor variables in comparison to interpolating for missing years between Bureau of 
the Census publications. To account for the likelihood that the predictors have a delayed 
impact on death penalty practices, this study pools the number of death sentences and 
executions for the two years following the measurement of predictor variables (for 
example, this study examines independent variables measured in 1930 to predict the 
occurrence of death sentences and executions in 1931 and 1932). By pooling both 
dependent variables, this strategy minimizes the potential influence of idiosyncratic 
events. Also, in order to make the findings from this study comparable to those conducted 
by Jacobs and colleagues, this project examines trends in death sentences and executions 
across 48 states to avoid selection bias (excluding Hawaii and Alaska). 
At this time, it is important to highlight two limitations involved with the missing 
values for state-level death sentences. First, as mentioned, due to the transfer of data 
collection responsibilities from the Bureau of the Census to the Department of Justice, 
state-level death sentences were not reported for 1951-1959.
17
 Because data on death 
sentences are not available for 1951-1952, this study included the number of death 
sentences reported in 1950 in order to avoid excluding this decade from the analyses.
18
 
                                                          
17
 Even though the Bureau of the Census relinquished collection responsibility to the Department of Justice 
in 1947, the Census continued to collect data on prisoners until 1949; however, these data were never 
published. The national-level data on death sentences reported in Figure 4 in Chapter Two were obtained 
from Cahalan (1986), who had access to the Census’ unpublished reports. No state-level data on death 
sentences were published in Cahalan’s (1986) report. 
 
18
 In order to try to address the missing data for death sentences from 1947-1949 and 1951-1959, two 
different strategies were used to try to impute values for these years. The first strategy involved attempting 
to infer the number of death sentences for these years by examining the relationship between the imposition 
of death sentences and executions. More specifically, this strategy sought to determine whether there was a 
consistent relationship between these two variables by examining trends in ratios that were calculated by 
dividing the number of death sentences by executions. These trends were calculated for one and three-year 
periods from 1940-1946 and 1960-1966. The findings from this analysis indicated that these trends were 
inconsistent and sporadic in all but six states.  
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Based on the adoption of a contemporaneous measurement of the independent and death 
sentence dependent variables for 1950, a number of supplemental analyses are relied 
upon in Chapter Four to determine whether the inclusion of this period produces results 
that differ from those reported in the primary models. In addition to the missing death 
sentence data in the 1950s, the number of state-level death sentences was also missing for 
Alabama (1930-1939), California (1950), Georgia (1930-1946), Mississippi (1931-1946), 
Nevada (1950), and Pennsylvania (1950). Due to the same difficulties that arose when 
attempting to impute values for 1951-1952, the data for these state-years are considered 
as missing in the analyses.  
Given the structure of the data, pooled time-series cross-sectional negative 
binomial estimation procedures are adopted to determine the political factors associated 
with state-level death sentences and executions. The use of panel data is advantageous 
because it combines cross-sectional data on fixed units (states) and repeated observations 
of these units over time (years). The incorporation of cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions is important because it allows researchers to capture variation across both 
time and space simultaneously and it increases the number of observations in the dataset 
(Allison, 1994; Halaby, 2004). With the use of time-series data, a number of 
considerations must be taken into account when specifying the negative binomial models 
that rely on this type of data. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 The second strategy used to try to impute death sentences for the missing years examined the relationship 
between this variable and homicide and violent crime rates. In order to examine this relationship, death 
sentences for the year following the measurement of homicides and violent crimes were divided by the 
number of homicides and violent crimes reported in the UCR for 1942-1945 and 1960-1963. After 
calculating death sentence rates based on violent crimes and homicides, this strategy then attempted to 
determine whether there was a correlation between this rate and homicide and violent crime rates. The 
findings indicated that there was no significant correlation between these variables over the time period 
analyzed. 
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The first consideration is whether to adopt a fixed effects or random effects 
estimator, which are the two main approaches to fitting models that rely on panel data 
(Hausman, 1978; Stock & Watson, 2003). Although the adoption of a fixed effects 
estimator would be preferred, this study examines long-term trends in capital punishment 
practices using a random effects estimator. The reason that a random effects estimator 
was selected for both dependent variables is this estimation procedure is able to account 
for the time invariant cases and variables that are present in the data, which a fixed 
effects estimator cannot. If a fixed effects estimator were to be selected, this would 
require the exclusion of eight states that had zero death sentences and executions for all 
of the decades under analysis (64 state-years), as well as the one-time measurement used 
to produce the lynching rate variable. Due to the introduction of selection bias associated 
with the exclusion of these states and the inability of a fixed effects estimator to handle 
the time invariant nature of the lynching rate variable, this study examines both 
dependent variables using a random effects estimator.    
 The second consideration when using time-series data is the possibility of 
autocorrelation among the error terms. To determine whether autocorrelation is present, 
the Durbin-Watson test was relied upon. If the results of the test produce a             
Durbin-Watson statistic equal to 2, this indicates that no autocorrelation is present. 
However, if the Durbin-Watson statistic is below 2, this indicates positive 
autocorrelation, whereas a Durbin-Watson statistic above 2 indicates negative 
autocorrelation. Using the Prais-Winsten command in Stata, the results of the         
Durbin-Watson test for death sentences (Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.172) and executions 
(Durbin-Watson statistic = .813) indicated the presence of positive autocorrelation. To 
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address this finding, a one-period lag in the dependent variable was incorporated in both 
the death sentence and execution models. With the inclusion of the one-period lag, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic for the death sentence model improved to 1.898, and the results 
of the test for the execution model improved to 1.625. The introduction of lags over 
multiple time periods did not improve the Durbin-Watson statistics beyond those reported 
for the models that used a one-period lag in the dependent variable. With the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variables as an independent variable in their respective models, the 
first measurement period (1930) is effectively removed from the analyses.  
 Another consideration that must be taken into account is whether the dependent 
variable is stationary or non-stationary. A non-stationary dependent variable can be 
problematic because it could lead to the conclusion that a significant relationship between 
variables exists when, in fact, it does not (Long, 1997). In order to determine whether 
both dependent variables are stationary or non-stationary, the xtunitroot test in Stata that 
incorporated the Fisher test with the Dickey-Fuller command was relied upon. The Fisher 
test was selected because this estimation procedure is able to account for the missing data 
found in the death sentence dependent variable. The results from the Fisher test for death 
sentences (p < .000) and executions (p < .000) indicated that both dependent variables 
were stationary; therefore, no further manipulation of the data was required. 
 The final consideration regarding model specification was whether the 
independent variables in this study are highly correlated. In order to test for 
multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) test was relied upon, and the 
threshold for an acceptable amount of collinearity between variables was set at a modest 
level of four. Due to the differences in the populations at risk of receiving both forms of 
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punishment, the VIF test was conducted for the models associated with both dependent 
variables. The results of this test for the death sentence dependent variable indicated that 
the following nine variables exceeded the threshold set in this study: the percentage of 
African Americans in the state population (VIF = 11.37), the total state population      
(VIF = 7.35), the dummy variable designed to account for the southern United States     
(VIF = 6.43), the percentage of African Americans in the state population squared     
(VIF = 5.68), the number of state-level murders (VIF = 5.64), the dummy variable 
designed to account for the post-Furman time period (VIF = 5.33), the institutionalization 
rate (VIF = 4.88), the percentage of religious fundamentalists (VIF = 4.69), and the 
violent crime rate (VIF = 4.03). The results of the execution model indicated that the 
following nine variables exceeded the threshold set by this study: the percentage of 
African Americans in the state population (VIF = 11.91), the dummy variable designed to 
account for the southern United States (VIF = 6.42), the percentage of African Americans 
in the state population squared (VIF = 6.10), the dummy variable designed to account for 
the post-Furman time period (VIF = 5.44), the percentage of religious fundamentalists 
(VIF = 4.99), the institutionalization rate (VIF = 4.86), the homicide crime rate           
(VIF = 4.31),  the violent crime rate (VIF = 4.20), and the percentage of Republicans in 
the state legislature (VIF = 4.04). Based on these findings, supplemental models were run 
where each of these variables was removed one at a time from the analyses to determine 
whether the collinearity between variables produced results that differed from those when 
all of the variables were included in the models. The results of these supplemental 
analyses indicated that when each variable was removed from the models, there was only 
one instance where the inclusion of these variables had an impact on the relationship 
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between the key theoretical variables of interest and both dependent variables.
19
 Given 
these findings, all of the variables outlined above were included in the analyses so as to 
avoid the bias associated with the omission of key variables. 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY  
 This section discusses the analytic plan that is used to determine whether recent 
theoretical contributions can account for death sentences and executions when the time 
period under analysis is expanded to include pre-Furman trends. The first analytic 
strategy involves the examination of whether the key theoretical variables of interest are 
able to predict the occurrence of state-level capital punishment practices from 1930 to 
2012. In order to examine the propositions found within the three perspectives, the 
variables associated with each theory are entered into the models separately. In the fourth 
model, all of the theoretical variables of interest are incorporated to determine whether 
the findings from the first three models are sustained when the perspectives are examined 
in tandem. Finally, the fifth model incorporates all of the independent and control 
variables into the analyses. Due to the need to account for variation in the population 
eligible to receive both forms of punishment and the presence of autocorrelation, the 
respective populations at risk and the lagged dependent variables are included in all of the 
models reported above. 
After examining the direct effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variables, a number of interaction terms are incorporated into the analyses. The first set of 
                                                          
19
 In the model that examined the execution dependent variable, the directional sign of the 
institutionalization rate variable switches from positive to negative when the dummy variable designed to 
account for periodic influences was included in the model. More details regarding the nature of the 
interactive relationship between these two variables is provided in Chapter Five. The only other change that 
resulted from the removal of the variables that exceeded the set VIF threshold was the appearance of a 
significant relationship between the regional dummy indicators and both dependent variables.  
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interaction terms examines whether the relationship between the variables in the partisan 
politics and the political ideology perspectives and each dependent variable are 
conditioned by the time period specific factors. These interaction terms are comprised of 
the product of each variable in the two above-mentioned perspectives and the dummy 
indicator coded as 1 for the post-Furman time period. In addition, Jacobs, Carmichael, 
and Kent’s (2005) hypothesis is also examined. In order to examine the influence of each 
interaction term, these variables are introduced into the models one at a time. 
In addition to the primary models, four supplemental analyses are relied upon for 
each dependent variable to determine the robustness of the findings reported in the 
primary models. The first supplemental procedure used for both dependent variables 
involves the removal of the data for certain state-years in which the death penalty was not 
legal. As previously mentioned, the primary models incorporate both death penalty and 
non-death penalty states-years to avoid potential selection bias; however, it could be 
argued that including non-death penalty states in the analyses could also potentially bias 
the findings as well. The potential bias involved with the inclusion of non-death penalty 
states is that no value other than zero is possible for both death sentences and executions 
in these states. Based on this argument, the same procedures adopted in the primary 
models outlined above are used to examine the results when non-death penalty state-years 
are excluded from the analyses. Since numerous states abolished the death penalty only to 
bring it back at a later point in time, all state-years were retained in the models if this 
form of punishment was legal for at least one out of the two pooled years for each 
dependent variable. 
 The state-years removed from the analyses correspond with the breakdown of the  
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abolitionist years for each state contained in Table 2. In addition to abolitionist states, 
Table 2 also contains states that were slow to bring their death penalty statutes in line 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Furman, thus making the use of executions illegal 
during this period. Furthermore, all of the state-years from 1970 to 1972 were excluded 
from the execution models because this stage in the capital punishment process was not 
permissible during the moratorium. Based on the changes in the data structure involved 
with the exclusion of non-death penalty state-years, the introduction of one-period lags 
for each dependent variable was not possible in these models. 
The second supplemental set of analyses involves the use of zero-inflated 
negative binomial estimation procedures. Even though negative binomial procedures 
were used in the primary models, the use of zero-inflated negative binomial procedures 
would also be an appropriate estimation method to account for the excess of zeros found 
in both dependent variables. Zero-inflated procedures are also appropriate when the 
occurrence of zeros in the data can be attributed to two different factors. In other words, 
TABLE 2: PERIOD OF ABOLITION BY JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction Period of Abolition Jurisdiction Period of Abolition 
Michigan 1846- West Virginia 1965- 
Wisconsin 1853- Massachusetts* 1972-1982; 1984- 
Maine 1887- New Jersey 1972-1982; 2007- 
Kansas 1907-1935 North Dakota 1973- 
Minnesota 1911- Rhode Island  1984- 
South Dakota 1915-1939 New Mexico 2009- 
Vermont 1964- Illinois 2011- 
Oregon 1964-1978 Connecticut 2012- 
Iowa 1965-     
*In the period from 1972-1982, executions were not legal in this state because Massachusetts had yet to 
update their statutes in accordance with the Furman decision.  
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the presence of zero death sentences or executions in the data could be attributed to the 
punishment being illegal in a state or it could be due to the failure of the state to impose a 
death sentence or execute an offender. Given this procedure’s ability to account for the 
two above-mentioned factors, this method of estimation avoids the potential bias 
involved with the inclusion of non-death penalty states in the analyses. Further 
information regarding the specification of the models for both dependent variables is 
provided in the following two chapters. 
The last set of supplemental procedures for each dependent variable focuses on 
alternative specifications of the primary models. In terms of the death sentence dependent 
variable, two supplemental analyses are adopted to determine whether alternative 
measurement techniques produce results that differ from those reported in the primary 
models. The first alternative death sentence strategy excludes the contemporaneous 
measurement of the independent and dependent variables in 1950. The purpose behind 
this strategy is to determine whether the results differ between the primary and this 
supplemental model when the contemporaneous measurement for this period is excluded 
from the analyses. The second alternative strategy involves the contemporaneous 
examination of the independent and dependent variables for the entire period from 1930 
to 2010. This alternative specification is adopted because it allows for the examination of 
whether the key theoretical variables of interest have an instantaneous impact on       
state-level death sentences.  
In terms of the execution specific supplemental analyses, two alternative 
specifications of the primary model are also adopted. Since the time delay between the 
imposition of a death sentence and the actual enactment of the punishment is not uniform 
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across the pre- and post-Furman time period, the first supplemental analysis examines the 
results associated with adopting a lengthier delay between the imposition of a death 
sentence and the execution of an offender. Recent research has indicated that the average 
delay between sentencing and execution is slightly over ten years during the post-Furman 
time period (Snell, 2011). In order to account for this delay, a 10-year lag in the number 
of death sentences is adopted in place of the one-year lag used in the primary models.
20
 
The second strategy involves the incorporation of both the one-year and ten-year lags in 
the number of death sentences as independent variables in the models. The inclusion of 
these variables in the same model is designed to simultaneously control for the periodic 
delays between the imposition of a death sentence and the execution of offenders in both 
the pre- and post-Furman eras. 
This dissertation now turns to the examination of the political factors associated 
with state-level death sentences from 1930 to 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
A limitation involved with adopting a 10-year lag in this variable was that death sentences were not 
reported in publically available governmental publications in 1920. Despite the missing values for the 
1920s, this approach is still adopted because the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable to account for 
autocorrelation already eliminates the first measurement period (1930) from the analyses.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEATH SENTENCE RESULTS 
This chapter begins with the presentation of findings from a replication project 
that examines Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) article on the social and political factors 
associated with state-level death sentences from 1970 to 1992. This chapter then moves 
on to examine the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in this study and the 
bivariate relationship between these variables. The findings from the random effects 
negative binomial estimations of the political factors associated with death sentences 
from 1930 to 2012 are presented, along with the models that incorporate the interaction 
terms highlighted in the previous chapter. This chapter then concludes with the 
examination of the findings from the supplemental analyses that are designed to 
determine the robustness of the results reported in the main models.   
REPLICATION OF JACOBS AND CARMICHAEL’S (2004) ARTICLE 
This section highlights the findings from a replication of Jacobs and Carmichael’s 
(2004) article. The purpose of this replication is to determine how previous studies have 
examined the variables within the three political perspectives and to accurately duplicate 
these post-Furman predictors. This project is important to this study because the 
replicated indicators provided the foundation from which the variables outlined in 
Chapter Three were constructed.  
Similar to the procedures adopted in this dissertation to examine long-term trends 
in death sentences and executions, Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) measured their 
predictors at the turn of each decade from 1970 to 1990, and death sentences were pooled 
for the two years following the measurement of predictors. In this article, the authors 
examined the relationship between state-level death sentences and the same three 
theoretical perspectives that were outlined in Chapter Two. More specifically, the authors 
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examined the partisan politics perspective using two variables (a dummy coded variable 
for Republican governor and the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature), the 
political ideology theory using two variables (a liberalism-conservatism scale constructed 
by Berry et al. (1998) and the percentage of citizens who reported fundamentalist 
affiliations), and the social threat perspective using five variables (the percentage of 
unemployed individuals, the percentage of African Americans, the percentage of 
Hispanics, a dummy coded variable where 1 indicated that the percentage of African 
Americans exceeded the national median, and the violent crime rate in each state). The 
authors also controlled for a number of factors (the state population, the number of 
homicides, and dummy indicators for each decade and region). In accordance with the 
hypotheses associated with each of the post-Furman theoretical perspectives, Jacobs and 
Carmichael (2004) assessed these propositions by using one-tailed tests. 
In order to examine the relationship between the key political variables and the 
number of state-level death sentences, Jacobs & Carmichael (2004) relied on             
zero-inflated negative binomial estimations. Due to the fact that Osgood (2000) argues 
against the use of rates when measuring relatively rare events and when there is an 
overdispersion of zeros present in the dependent variable, Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) 
opted to use a negative binomial estimation. In addition, since the presence of zero death 
sentences could be due to the death penalty being illegal in the state or due to jurors 
failing to impose a death sentence, the authors used a zero-inflated negative binomial 
estimation. In particular, this procedure relies on two equations that separately estimate 
the likelihood of zero death sentences and the likelihood of death sentences equal to or 
greater than one. Finally, Jacobs & Carmichael (2004) accounted for the likelihood that 
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR JACOBS AND CARMICHAEL (2004) 
 
Jacobs and Carmichael Amidon 
Indicator Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Cross-
State 
Standard 
Deviation 
Over-
Time 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Cross-
State 
Standard 
Deviation 
Over-
Time 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of death sentences  8.073 15.376 12.410 9.191 7.993 14.283 12.544 6.984 
Religious fundamentalism -2.222 1.295 1.304 .000 -2.220 1.295 1.304 .000 
Liberalism-conservatism 45.072 15.980 14.761 6.356 45.136 16.011 14.783 6.382 
Ln violent crime rate 5.820 .692 .603 .347 5.824 .696 .607 .346 
Percent unemployed 6.009 1.716 1.270 1.164 5.681 1.630 1.180 1.134 
Population 4510.367 4840.705 4805.565 805.577 4509.779 4840.238 4804.950 806.356 
Number of murders 410.000 595.786 570.932 182.682 410.633 596.289 571.744 181.816 
1 if percent Black ≥ state median .500 .502 .486 .095 .500 .502 .496 .095 
Ln percent Black 1.488 1.433 1.435 .141 1.485 1.439 1.442 .136 
Ln percent Hispanic .716 1.161 1.125 .316 .715 1.171 1.131 .328 
1 if Republican governor .433 .497 .295 .401 .460 .500 .293 .407 
Percent Republicans in legislature 40.401 19.419 17.872 7.873 39.921 19.969 18.479 7.864 
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measurements within states across time are not independent using a clustering procedure 
to adjust standard errors.  
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics from both Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) 
article and my replication of these variables. As Table 3 indicates, all of the values of my 
variables are fairly close to those used by Jacobs and Carmichael (2004), with the 
exception of the presence of Republican governors and the unemployment rate measures. 
In an effort to account for these discrepancies, a number of alternative measurement 
strategies were employed.
21
 
Turning now to the results from the zero-inflated negative binomial estimations, 
Table 4 contains both of our findings from the time period spanning 1970 to 1992. Since 
the discrepancy between the values of our coefficients is fairly consistent across all of the 
models, I highlight only the discrepancies between our results for the full models in this 
section.
22
 In terms of the results in Model 5, my findings support the conclusions reached 
by Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) concerning the theoretical variables of interest. 
However, there are a number of discrepancies between our findings in terms of whether 
particular control measures were significant and the degree of significance for certain  
                                                          
21 In terms of accounting for the discrepancies between the Republican governor variables, two separate 
data sources (US Guide to Elections (2005) and the National Governors Association webpage) were 
examined; there were no discrepancies in the data on governors between the two sources. In addition, an 
attempt was made to use different procedures for measuring this variable based on whether there was a 
change in governors during the year this variable was gathered (i.e., a governor from a different party 
assumed the position during the year measured). Despite the use of two different coding techniques, I was 
unable to replicate Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) values for this variable. In terms of the unemployment 
variable, the data used to construct this variable came directly from the unemployment rate reported in the 
decennial Census. In the event that a mistake was made in the values reported by the Bureau of the Census, 
an attempt was made to account for potential discrepancies by calculating the unemployment rate based on 
the raw data provided by the Bureau of the Census. The calculations using the raw data support the 
unemployment rates reported in the decennial reports.   
 
22
 In order to ease the identification of discrepancies between Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) and my 
results, black boxes have been placed around findings that demonstrate different levels of significance. 
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TABLE 4: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 1971-1972, 1981-1982, AND 1991-1992 (N = 150 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1 (J&C) 
 
Model 1 (Amidon) 
 
Model 2 (J&C) 
 
Model 2 (Amidon) 
  b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
1 + Death Sentences 
   
 
       Ln religious fundamentalism     .5086***  .1028 
 
   .5250***   .0996 
 
    .5460***   .1142 
 
  .5678***   .1192 
Liberalism-conservatism    -.0110  .0081 
 
  -.0075   .0102 
 
    -.0092   .0085 
 
 -.0052   .0102 
Ln violent crime rate     .8223***  .2284 
 
   .9318***   .2715 
 
     .7239***   .2053 
 
  .8564***   .2512 
Percent unemployed     .0864  .0562      .0078   .0568 
 
     .0909   .0617 
 
  .0265   .0599 
Population     .0001***  .0000    .0001**   .0001 
 
    .0001***   .0000 
 
  .0001***   .0000 
Number of murders    -.0003  .0003     -.0003   .0003 
 
    -.0003   .0003    -.0004   .0003 
1 if 1970    -.9291***  .2570     -.3935   .3055      -.9289***   .2910    -.3463   .3333 
1 if 1980     .1427  .1271 
 
   .1927   .1333 
 
     .1453   .1261     .2002   .1366 
1 if percent Black ≥ state median -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
     .1682   .4241    -.1930   .4776 
Number of Blacks -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
-- -- 
Ln percent Hispanic 
  --                 --  
-- -- 
 
     .1082   .1353 
 
   .0791   .1512 
1 if Republican governor 
 
-- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
-- -- 
Percent Republicans in legislature -- --   -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
-- -- 
1 if Midwest   -.9478*  .4133    -1.0288   .6136 
 
    -.9843*   .4281 
 
  -1.003*   .5120 
1 if West -1.1418**  .4159    -1.3740*   .6352 
 
  -1.2321*   .5027 
 
-1.5748*   .6549 
1 if South -1.0737*  .4790    -1.2083   .6059 
 
  -1.1439*   .4834 
 
-1.1636*   .4987 
Intercept -1.6265 1.1535    -1.8840 1.3164     -1.1498 1.1476   -1.4610 1.1815 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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TABLE 4: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 1971-1972, 1981-1982, AND 1991-1992 (N = 150 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 1 (J&C) 
 
Model 1 (Amidon) 
 
Model 2 (J&C) 
 
Model 2 (Amidon) 
  b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
Death Sentence Absence 
           1 if percent Black ≥ state median  -1.8164***   .4638 
 
  -1.9988*** .5266 
 
 -1.7883***   .4615 
 
 -2.0184***   .5047 
Ln percent Hispanic          -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
-- --  -- -- 
Liberalism-conservatism     .0670*   .0292 
 
     .0670* .0287        .0660*   .0282        .0639**   .0234 
Ln religious fundamentalism          -- --   -- -- 
 
-- --   -- -- 
1 if Republican governor    -.7500*   .4155       -.0006 .3548       -.7571   .4265 
 
.0196   .3196 
Percent Republicans in legislature     .0116   .0199        .0091 .0210 
 
.0104   .0200   .0072   .0179 
1 if 1970     .0175   .8261       -.3713 1.1559   .0522   .8049       -.2383   .9250 
1 if 1980     .6702*   .3088        .6062 .3401     .6631*   .3108   .5723   .3021 
1 if Midwest    .1010   .7556       -.1077 .7130 
 
.0872   .7571       -.1246   .6866 
1 if West -1.3476   .8141 
 
 -1.4330 1.0481 
 
  -1.3121   .7793 
 
  -1.3750   .9091 
1 if South   -.9867   .9271 
 
   -.8826 .7796 
 
  -1.3121   .9797 
 
    -.8542   .7804 
Intercept -2.7138 2.3729 
 
 -2.7927 2.2944 
 
  -2.6190 2.3000 
 
  -2.5406 1.8856 
Log-likelihood   -298.2 
  
   -316.8 
  
    -297.7 
  
    -316.7 
 X²   334.6***        393.65***         624.9***         724.3***   
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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TABLE 4: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 1971-1972, 1981-1982, AND 1991-1992 (N = 150 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 3 (J&C) 
 
Model 3 (Amidon) 
 
Model 4 (J&C) 
 
Model 4 (Amidon) 
  b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
1 + Death Sentences 
           Ln religious fundamentalism       .5089***   .1111 
 
   .5417***   .1053 
 
        .5555***   .1192 
 
 .5852***   .1048 
Liberalism-conservatism      -.0113   .0082 
 
  -.0075   .0100 
 
-.0086   .0091   -.0052   .0094 
Ln violent crime rate      .8327***   .2583 
 
   .9254***   .2577           .6881**   .2308    .8694***   .2358 
Percent unemployed       .0728   .0577      .0159   .0578 
 
 .0766   .0630     .0289   .0588 
Population      .0001***   .0000      .0001**   .0000          .0001***   .0000     .0001**   .0000 
Number of murders      -.0003   .0003     -.0003   .0003 
 
-.0003   .0003    -.0003   .0003 
1 if 1970  -1.0016***   .2868     -.3711   .3071        -1.0263***   .3151    -.3167   .3112 
1 if 1980       .1312   .1351 
 
   .2191   .1398 
 
  .1322   .1324 
 
  .2215   .1438 
1 if percent Black ≥ state median -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
  .1792   .4093 
 
 -.1719   .4992 
Number of Blacks -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
           -- -- 
 
         -- -- 
Ln percent Hispanic -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
  .1475   .1392 
 
   .0836   .1327 
1 if Republican governor      .1678   .1968       .0303   .1514 
 
  .1821   .1850 
 
   .0183   .1509 
Percent Republicans in legislature     -.0046   .0068       .0039   .0066 
 
  -.0066   .0070 
 
   .0026   .0062 
1 if Midwest   -1.0095*   .4671    -1.0998   .6312 
 
     -1.0465*   .4589     -1.055*   .5226 
1 if West   -1.1271**   .4326   -1.4719*   .6029   -1.2498   .4896     -1.633*   .6466 
1 if South   -1.1570*   .4998   -1.2187   .6551 
 
     -1.2582*   .5095 
 
  -1.185*   .5177 
Intercept   -1.4389 1.2584   -1.9755 1.3461      -.6321 1.2779   -1.6154 1.1526 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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TABLE 4: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 1971-1972, 1981-1982, AND 1991-1992 (N = 150 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 3 (J&C) 
 
Model 3 (Amidon) 
 
Model 4 (J&C) 
 
Model 4 (Amidon) 
  b SE           b SE   b SE   b SE 
Death Sentence Absence 
           1 if percent Black ≥ state median   -1.8310***  .4701 
 
   -2.0015***  .5268 
 
 -1.7650***  .5026 
 
  -2.262***  .5891 
Ln percent Hispanic -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
    -.0504   .3073       .2533   .2681 
Liberalism-conservatism       .0689*   .0300          .0664**   .0278    .0672*   .0298      .0694***   .0206 
Ln religious fundamentalism -- --          -- -- 
 
-- --   -- -- 
1 if Republican governor      -.7260*   .4262          .0139   .3558   -.7545*   .4483       .0740   .3299 
Percent Republicans in legislature .0106   .0204 
 
       .0103   .0187 
 
      .0085   .0214 
 
    .0102   .0139 
1 if 1970      -.0712   .9616         -.3364 1.0803 
 
     -.0659 1.0891 
 
   -.0839   .6570 
1 if 1980       .6791*   .3249          .6078   .3275 
 
 .6582*   .3170       .7009*   .2782 
1 if Midwest .1056   .7732         -.1288   .7133   .0670   .7561      -.0081   .6876 
1 if West    -1.3841   .8553 
 
    -1.4257 1.0207 
 
   -1.2921   .8840 
 
 -1.6562   .9500 
1 if South    -1.0099   .9443 
 
      -.8462   .7646 
 
   -1.1313   .9346 
 
   -.5615   .7441 
Intercept    -2.7657 2.4254 
 
    -2.8213 2.1330 
 
   -2.5527 2.3270 
 
 -3.1870 1.5073 
Log-likelihood      -297.3 
  
      -316.8 
  
     -296.5 
  
   -315.9 
 X²      330.0***          700.11***          752.6***       908.49***   
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
           
 69 
 
 
TABLE 4: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS 
OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN    
1971-1972,  1981-1982, AND 1991-1992 (N = 150 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 5 (J&C) 
 
Model 5 (Amidon) 
  b SE         b       SE 
1 + Death Sentences 
     Ln religious fundamentalism     .5476***   .1491 
 
 .5771***    .1342 
Liberalism-conservatism     -.0132   .0097     -.0141    .0202 
Ln violent crime rate      .9185***   .2967    1.1677**    .4256 
Percent unemployed       .0851   .0672      .0268    .0815 
Population       .0002**   .0000      .0002    .0000 
Number of murders      -.0005   .0003     -.0004    .0005 
1 if 1970      -.9747***   .2769     -.3716    .5449 
1 if 1980        .1188   .1437 
 
   .1514    .2207 
1 if percent Black ≥ state median -.0875   .1578 
 
  -.2678    .5280 
Number of Blacks  .0000   .0000 
 
   .0000    .0000 
Ln percent Hispanic  .1028   .1503 
 
   .0312    .1753 
1 if Republican governor  .1832   .1848 
 
   .0012    .1550 
Percent Republicans in legislature -.0096   .0089     .0008    .0080 
1 if Midwest       .9746*   .4922   -1.0116    .5554 
1 if West     1.4390**   .4895   -1.8529*    .6820 
1 if South    -1.1000   .5682 
 
  -.9999    .6220 
Intercept    -1.5270 1.4523  -2.8422  1.5306 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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TABLE 4: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS 
OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 
1971-1972, 1981-1982, AND 1991-1992 (N = 150 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 5 (J&C) 
 
Model 5 (Amidon) 
  b SE   b SE 
Death Sentence Absence 
     1 if percent Black ≥ state median  -.7007*    .3796 
 
-2.9210* 1.6014 
Ln percent Hispanic   -.0872    .4503      .3885   .3767 
Liberalism-conservatism    .0728**    .0295       .0957*   .0473 
Ln religious fundamentalism    .0569    .4688       .7101        .7770 
1 if Republican governor   -.8972    .5150       .2933        .3885 
Percent Republicans in legislature    .0040    .0215       .0145        .0221 
1 if 1970    .0472    .6674      -.6367      2.7935 
1 if 1980    .6855*    .2938 
 
    .8760*        .4355 
1 if Midwest    .4909    .9143     -.6720 1.2857 
1 if West -1.1345 1.1345 
 
 -3.5776 3.6600 
1 if South -1.0508 1.0508 
 
 -1.7518 1.6682 
Intercept -2.2177  2.3597 
 
 -2.0112 2.3357 
Log-likelihood   -298.8 
  
   -313.2 
 X²    626.5***      701.39***   
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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TABLE 5: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 1981-1982 AND 1991-1992 (N = 100 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1 (J&C) 
 
Model 1 (Amidon) 
 
Model 2 (J&C) 
 
Model 2 (Amidon) 
  b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
1 + Death Sentences 
           Ln religious fundamentalism       .5446***    .1161 
 
      .5862***   .1212 
 
   .5633***   .1063 
 
 .5858***   .1235 
Liberalism-conservatism      -.0134    .0097 
 
     -.0105   .0124 
 
  -.0125   .0100 
 
-.0116   .0128 
Ln violent crime rate       .7763***    .1931 
 
      .6871***   .2063 
 
   .7308***   .2038 
 
 .7313***   .2267 
Percent unemployed .0423    .0710 
 
.0055   .0626 
 
   .0292   .0762 
 
  .0046   .6412 
Population       .0002*    .0001 
 
      .0001*   .0007 
 
   .0002   .0001     .0001*   .0001 
Number of murders      -.0005    .0005 
 
     -.0006   .0006 
 
  -.0007   .0006 
 
 -.0004   .0005 
1 if 1980 .1877    .1290 
 
.1664   .1459 
 
   .2038   .1285 
 
  .1876   .1494 
1 if percent Black ≥ state median .2219    .3865 
 
.3122   .4347 
 
   .3118   .4081 
 
  .2995   .4158 
Ln percent Hispanic .1732    .1204 
 
.1703   .1244 
 
   .2167   .1339 
 
  .1302   .1230 
1 if Republican governor -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
   .2201   .1895 
 
-.0928   .1899 
Percent Republicans in legislature -- -- 
 
-- -- 
 
  -.0019   .0071 
 
  .0067   .0067 
1 if Midwest     -.9798*    .4412 
 
     -.9494*   .4380 
 
-1.0911**   .3882    -.9512*   .4142 
1 if West   -1.3287*    .6129 
 
   -1.2564*   .5909 
 
-1.2923*   .6096 
 
-1.3542*   .5918 
1 if South   -1.1384*    .5697 
 
   -1.1653*   .5633 
 
-1.1609*   .5207 
 
-1.1086*   .5236 
Intercept   -1.1494 1.1967   -.5456 1.1915     -.8979 1.1190     -.9440 1.2996 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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TABLE 5: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN THE STATES IN 1981-1982 AND 1991-1992 (N = 100 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
  
 
Model 1 (J&C) 
 
Model 1 (Amidon) 
 
Model 2 (J&C) 
 
Model 2 (Amidon) 
    b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
  Death Sentence Absence 
             1 if percent Black ≥ state median   -3.0619***  .8364 
 
  -3.2851*** 1.0127 
 
  -3.0681***  .8411 
 
  -3.2784*** 1.0170 
Ln percent Hispanic .3427   .3890 
 
.4717   .5066 
 
 .3598   .3937 
 
.4645   .5110 
Liberalism-conservatism     .0891**   .0321 
 
    .0998**   .0324 
 
      .0893**   .0316 
 
    .0990**   .0335 
 
1 if Republican governor       -.2531   .3865 
 
.3923   .4468 
 
-.2201   .3861        .3861             .3723 
 
Percent Republicans in legislature       -.0044   .0223 
 
       .0024   .0167 
 
 .0052   .0225 
 
       .0032   .0165 
1 if 1980  .9150*   .3753 
 
.9941   .4960 
 
       .9228*   .3690 
 
       .9915   .5071 
1 if Midwest       -.4343   .8419 
 
      -.5606   .8415 
 
-.4469   .8401 
 
      -.5661   .8302 
1 if West     -2.8652* 1.1840 
 
    -3.0632* 1.4893 
 
    2.8927* 1.1871 
 
    -3.0290* 1.5296 
1 if South     -1.5095   .9932 
 
    -1.2832   .8053 
 
   -1.5390 1.0057 
 
    -1.2885   .8041 
Intercept     -2.6047 2.7584 
 
    -3.6087 
  
   -2.6099 2.7504 
 
    -3.7679 2.6960 
Log-likelihood     -219.90  
  
    -219.30 
  
   -218.90 
 
 
    -218.60 
 X²    -730.8***          82.13***         1271.3***           83.15***   
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
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indicators.
23
 Regarding the estimation for one or more death sentences, there are 
discrepancies in our degree of significance for the violent crime variable and the dummy 
indicator designed to measure the western region. Also, there are discrepancies regarding 
significance for the population measure and the degree of significance for the    
liberalism-conservatism scale. Although there are some differences in all of the models 
contained in Table 4, it is likely that these differences are due to the slight discrepancies 
between the unemployment and governor variables outlined above. 
In addition to the models for 1970 to 1992, Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) also 
performed a more stringent analysis of the relationship between the key theoretical 
variables and jurisdictional death sentences using data from the 1980s and 1990s. Table 5 
contains both of our results from these supplemental analyses. Overall, my results in 
Models 1 and 2 fully support the findings from Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) article in 
regards to the theoretical variables of interest. The largest discrepancy between our 
findings in Table 5 concerns the degree of significance for our Midwest variables and the 
non-significant influence of the population variable in my results for Model 2. Besides 
the continued discrepancy in our coefficient values for certain variables, the findings 
from this replication project indicate that my results closely mirror Jacobs and 
Carmichael’s (2004) in terms of the key theoretical measures.  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Based on the findings from the replication project, this study proceeded to build 
upon the variables used in Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2004) article. Table 6 contains both 
the expected directional signs for each variable based on the theoretical propositions  
                                                          
23
 In order to try to account for the discrepancies between our results and the measurement of key variables, 
I reached out to Dr. Jacobs to see if he could help. Unfortunately, he was unable to assist in terms of 
resolving the discrepancies reported in this dissertation. 
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TABLE 6: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN MODELS 
Variables 
Expected 
Post-Furman 
Sign Mean/Percent 
Overall 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cross-State 
Standard 
Deviation 
Over-Time 
Standard 
Deviation 
Death sentences (Dependent variable)  5.863 11.271 8.194 7.906 
Executions  2.449 5.474 3.304 4.387 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate + 48.437 9.955 5.535 8.309 
1 if Republican governor + 46.528 49.937 20.328 45.696 
Percent Republicans in state legislature + 43.214 23.790 19.004 14.545 
Percent religious fundamentalists + 21.551 22.417 22.086 4.875 
Welfare expenditures - 14.221 7.501 3.108 6.840 
Institutionalization rate  + 198.910 172.517 56.087 163.324 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 + 66.175 122.788 46.001 114.050 
Percent African American + 9.554 10.695 10.467 2.617 
Percent African American² - 205.390 386.958 368.949 127.042 
Percent unemployed + 6.197 2.314 1.072 2.056 
Lynching rate + 5.146 7.450 7.520 0.00 
Homicide rate + 6.346 5.018 3.948 3.143 
Violent crime rate + 262.013 216.719 121.045 180.519 
State surplus or deficits/10
9
 + 3.055 24.206 9.296 22.385 
Total population/10
5 
+ 42.554 47.980 42.552 22.913 
Percent born in state
 
- 63.497 17.744 13.757 5.625 
SMSAs + 26.953 16.228 13.629 9.002 
Number of homicides + 255.407 424.570 314956 287.930 
Death sentences (Independent variable)  + 3.050 5.773 4.546 3.745 
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examined in Chapter Two and the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables used in this study. The first column of this table contains the expected sign of 
the coefficient for all of the variables according to post-Furman hypotheses. Even though 
most of the empirical literature examines the propositions within these theories using 
one-tailed tests (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; 
Jacobs et al., 2007), this study evaluates the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables using two-tailed tests. This approach is preferred because scholars 
have yet to address the nature of the relationship between these variables and capital 
punishment practices in the pre-Furman time period. Without specific hypotheses 
dictating the expected direction of the relationships between variables over the course of 
the entire time period under analysis, this study adopts a two-tailed approach so as not to 
discount significant relationships that contradict post-Furman hypotheses.    
The remainder of Table 6 focuses on the descriptive statistics for the key variables 
included in this study. These results indicate that the average number of death sentences 
and executions from 1930 to 2012 is 5.86 and 2.45, respectively. In terms of the partisan 
politics variables, the average percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates is 48.44, the average percentage of Republican governors is 46.53, and the 
average percentage of Republicans in state legislatures is 43.21. Turning to the political 
ideology variables, the average percentage of individuals that reported religious 
fundamentalist affiliations is 21.55, the average percentage of state expenditures 
dedicated to welfare is 14.22, the average incarceration rate is 66.18, and the average 
institutionalization rate is 198.91. Finally, the descriptive statistics for the social threat 
variables indicate that the average percentage of African Americans in each state is 9.55, 
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the average lynching rate is 5.15, and the average percentage of unemployed individuals 
in each state is 6.20. Overall, every dependent and independent variable in Table 6 
demonstrates considerable variation over both space and time, with the exception of the 
lynching rate variable, which was measured on a one-time basis. 
BIVARIATE CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES 
This section examines the bivariate relationship between the dependent variables, 
the key theoretical indicators, and the control variables. The findings in Table 7 indicate 
that there are a number of theoretical indicators significantly associated with both 
execution and death sentence practices. Focusing on the findings associated with the 
partisan politics variables, the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature was the 
only significant predictor of state-level death sentences. According to this finding, the 
number of jurisdictional death sentences decreases as the percentage of Republicans in 
the state legislature increases. No support is shown for the significant relationship 
between the number of death sentences and the percentage of the vote for Republican 
presidential candidates and the presence of Republican governors. With respect to the 
findings associated with state-level executions, all three partisan politics variables 
demonstrate a significant negative relationship with this dependent variable. The negative 
relationship between the partisan politics variables and capital punishment practices are 
likely attributed to the strong Democratic presence in the southern United States before 
the mass conversion of southerners to the Republican Party in the 1970s. 
Turning to the findings associated with the four political ideology variables, the 
results in Table 7 demonstrate support for a number of indicators within this perspective. 
Consistent with prior research (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 
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TABLE 7: CORRELATION MATRIX                  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Death sentences (Dependent variable)         
2. Executions  .408**        
3. Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate -.059 -.325**       
4. 1 if Republican governor -.041 -.116*  .290**      
5. Percent Republicans in state legislature -.177** -.229**  .600**  .429**     
6. Percent religious fundamentalists  .273**  .266** -.235** -.306** -.629**    
7. Welfare expenditures -.038 -.140** -.022 -.081 -.047 -.018   
8. Institutionalization rate -.112*  .133** -.027  .009  .143** -.183** -.079  
9. Incarceration rate per 1,000 -.064  .109* -.188**  .026 -.030  .033 -.291**  .087 
10. Percent African American  .236**  .315** -.496** -.306** -.654**  .757** -.063 -.125** 
11. Percent unemployed  .067  .045 -.072  .034  .042 -.133**  .356** -.038 
12. Lynching rate  .258**  .228** -.196** -.182** -.448**  .639** -.112* -.120* 
13. Homicide rate  .352**  .308** -.425** -.276** -.647**  .656** -.268** -.151** 
14. Violent crime rate  .424** -.061 -.048 -.061 -.237**  .282**  .148** -.569** 
15. Surplus/Deficits/10
9  .153**  .000 -.039  .031  .007 -.038  .126** -.121* 
16. Total population/10
5  .556**  .235** -.065  .034 -.034  .017  .259** -.144** 
17. Percent born in state -.089  .148** -.270** -.127** -.293**  .355**  .010  .149** 
18. Percent living in cities of 50,000+  .287**  .145**  .067  .067   .065 -.202**  .211** -.020 
19. 1 if Post-Furman  .107* -.304**  .218**  .068 -.006  .067 .258** -.778** 
20. 1 if South  .266**  .289** -.263** -.285** -.645**  .824** -.094 -.103* 
21. 1 if Midwest -.166** -.147**  .198**  .169**  .389** -.291** .049  .030 
22. 1 if West -.035 -.113*  .153**  .055  .178** -.271** -.089 -.099* 
23. Number of homicides  .632**  .057 -.012 -.001 -.146**  .152** .175** -.242** 
24. Death sentences (Independent variable)  .867** .376** -.027  .035 -.129**  .240** .006 -.117 
*p = .05; **p = .01 
        
 78 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: CORRELATION MATRIX CONT.              
    9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Death sentences (Dependent variable)  
      
 
2. Executions 
       
 
3. Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate 
       
 
4. 1 if Republican governor 
       
 
5. Percent Republicans in state legislature 
       
 
6. Percent religious fundamentalists 
       
 
7. Welfare expenditures 
       
 
8. Institutionalization rate 
       
 
9. Incarceration rate per 1,000 
       
 
10. Percent African American  .091        
11. Percent unemployed -.074 -.110*       
12. Lynching rate  .119*  .601** -.048      
13. Homicide rate  .246**  .707** -.146**  .537**     
14. Violent crime rate -.184**  .360**  .063  .178**  .411**    
15. Surplus/Deficits/10
9 
-.030 -.002  .209** -.001 -.019  .126**   
16. Total population/10
5 
-.141**  .147**  .166** -.050  .116*  .457**  .430**  
17. Percent born in state  .072  .388** -.164**  .011 .242** -.159** -.138**  .012 
18. Percent living in cities of 50,000+ -.281** -.105*  .157** -.236** -.055  .299**  .167**  .539** 
19. 1 if Post-Furman -.325**  .028  .024  .000 -.035  .606**  .094 .230** 
20. 1 if South  .089  .755** -.107* .586**  .606**  .245** -.034  .001 
21. 1 if Midwest -.078 -.249** -.156** -.326** -.256** -.127** -.084  .024 
22. 1 if West -.001 -.384**  .179** -.015 -.127** -.019  .110* -.104* 
23. Number of homicides -.154**  .237**  .067  .096*  .321**  .639**  .294**  .827** 
24. Death sentences (Independent variable) -.029  .216**  .067  .226**  .306**  .409**  .237**  .632** 
*p = .05; **p = .01 
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TABLE 7: CORRELATION MATRIX CONT.              
    17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1. Death sentences (Dependent variable) 
       2. Executions 
       3. Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate 
       4. 1 if Republican governor 
       5. Percent Republicans in state legislature 
       6. Percent religious fundamentalists 
       7. Welfare expenditures 
       8. Institutionalization rate 
       9. Incarceration rate per 1,000 
       10. Percent African American 
       11. Percent unemployed 
       12. Lynching rate 
       13. Homicide rate 
       14. Violent crime rate 
       15. Surplus/Deficits/10
9 
       16. Total population/10
5 
       17. Percent born in state        
18. Percent living in cities of 50,000+ -.226**       
19. 1 if Post-Furman -.150**  .148**      
20. 1 if South  .318** -.206**  .000     
21. 1 if Midwest  .261**  .039  .000 -.408**    
22. 1 if West -.656**  .094  .000 -.386** -.305**   
23. Number of homicides  -.015 .411** .327**  .138**  -.051 -.073  
24. Death sentences (Independent variable)  -.138** .338**  .118*  .224** -.159**  .012 .638** 
*p = .05; **p = .01 
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2005; McCann, 2008), these findings denote that an increase in the percentage of 
religious fundamentalists within jurisdictions is associated with a larger number of     
state-level death sentences and executions. In addition, the findings within this table also 
indicate that the percentage of jurisdictional welfare expenditures is significantly and 
negatively associated with execution practices. Furthermore, the findings for the 
institutionalization rate variable denote that this indicator demonstrates a significant 
negative relationship with state-level death sentences and a significant positive 
relationship with execution practices.
 24
  Finally, consistent with the hypothesis outlined 
in the last chapter, the results indicate that state-level incarceration rates are significantly 
and positively associated with jurisdictional executions. 
                                                          
24
 In order to further examine the nature of the relationship between institutionalization rates and the two 
stages involved with capital punishment practices, trends in all three variables were examined. In relation to 
trends in institutionalization practices, these rates primarily increased in every state from the 1930s to the 
1950s. Following deinstitutionalization, which began in the mid-1950s and was accelerated in the late 
1960s, institutionalization rates have decreased across every jurisdiction from the 1970s into the              
21
st
 century.  
        With respect to trends in death sentences, Figure 4 in Chapter Two illustrates these trends over the 
course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. According to this figure, reliance on death sentence practices 
decreased from the mid-1930s until the gap in the reporting of state-level death sentences from 1951 
through 1959. After this gap, state-level death sentences continued to decrease until the Furman decision, 
at which point reliance on death sentences dramatically increased. Following the Furman decision, the 
imposition of state-level death sentences continued to increase until the beginning of the 21st century, at 
which point reliance on death sentences has primarily decreased leading up to 2012. Based on these trends, 
it would appear that reliance on death sentences was greater in the post-Furman time period in comparison 
to the earlier era, and the bivariate findings between the two variables support this conclusion. Given this 
finding, the negative relationship between institutionalization rates and death sentence practices is likely 
accounted for by the high number of death sentences and the lower institutionalization rates in the         
post-Furman era.  
        Concerning trends in executions, Figure 1 in Chapter One contains the graphical depiction of these 
trends over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. According to this figure, jurisdictional executions 
increased from the beginning of the 1930s until the mid-point of that decade when reliance on this 
punishment practice then decreased substantially leading up until the moratorium in the late 1960s. After 
the Gregg decision in 1976, states slowly began to execute offenders again in the early 1980s, and trends in 
the use of executions increased until the turn of the millennium. After the beginning of the 21
st
 century, 
jurisdictional executions have primarily decreased. In accordance with the overall trends in executions just 
highlighted, it would appear as though reliance on executions was greater in the pre-Furman time period. 
Again, the bivariate finding for the negative relationship between the post-Furman dummy indicator and 
the execution practices confirms this conclusion. Since both jurisdictional institutionalization rates and the 
use of executions were higher in the pre-Furman time period, it is likely that this factor accounts for the 
positive relationship between the two variables. 
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With respect to the findings associated with the social threat perspective, these 
results indicate that two out of the three variables within this perspective are significantly 
correlated with both dependent variables. Consistent with prior research (Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2007; McCann, 
2008), the percentage of African Americans in the state population demonstrates a 
significant and positive relationship with both stages involved with this form of 
punishment. The findings in Table 7 also indicate that as past lynching rates increase 
across jurisdictions, the number of death sentences and executions also increases, which 
appears to support Zimring’s (2003) theoretical contentions. However, no support was 
demonstrated for the relationship between jurisdictional unemployment and both 
dependent variables.  
Finally, the bivariate findings in Table 7 indicate that a number of the control 
variables are significantly associated with both stages in the punishment process. These 
findings indicate that the homicide rate, the total state population, the percentage of the 
population living in cities greater than 50,000 inhabitants, the post-Furman dummy 
indicator, the South and Midwest regions of the United States, and jurisdictional death 
sentences are all significantly associated with both dependent variables. In addition, these 
findings also denote that the violent crime rate, state surpluses and deficits in yearly 
spending, and the number of state-level homicides were significantly related to death 
sentence practices. Finally, the percentage of the population born in the state in which 
they currently reside and the western region of the United States are both significantly 
associated with state-level executions.  
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These findings are important to this dissertation because they indicate that there is 
a significant bivariate relationship between a number of the key theoretical variables and 
capital punishment practices, even when the temporal scope is expanded beyond the   
post-Furman time period. This chapter now turns to the examination of the findings from 
the primary multivariate models that are used to determine the social and political factors 
associated with death sentence practices from 1930 to 2012. 
RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL RESULTS 
This section focuses on the results from the random effects negative binomial 
estimations. Table 8 contains the findings from the models that focus on direct effects. In 
these analyses, the first three models contain the results when all of the variables within 
each theoretical perspective are examined separately. In the fourth model, all of the key 
theoretical variables are entered into the analysis, and the fifth model contains the 
findings when all of the control and theoretical indicators are included in the analysis. 
Due to the presence of autocorrelation and the need to account for the population at risk 
of receiving a death sentence, a one-period lag in the dependent variable and the number 
of jurisdictional homicides are included in all of these models. 
In the first model in Table 8, the number of state-level death sentences was 
regressed on the partisan politics variables. In contrast to post-Furman predictions, the 
results from Model 1 indicate no support for the three partisan politics variables. Both the 
lagged dependent variable and the number of state-level homicide indicators demonstrate 
a positive relationship with the number of jurisdictional death sentences in this model. 
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TABLE 8: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 
DEATH SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 372 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
       b SE     b SE        b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate     .013 .009 
      
1 if Republican governor    -.065 .138 
      
Percent Republicans in state legislature    -.005 .004 
      
Percent religious fundamentalists 
   
    .025*** .005 
   
Welfare expenditures 
   
   -.047*** .010 
   
Institutionalization rate 
   
   -.000 .000 
   
Incarceration rate per 1,000 
   
   -.002 .002 
   
Percent African American 
      
     .025 .026 
Percent African American² 
      
    -.002 .001 
Percent unemployed 
      
     .008 .024 
Lynching rate 
      
     .048** .018 
Violent crime rate 
        
Surplus/Deficits/10
9
 
        
Total population/10
5
 
        
Percent born in state 
        
Percent living in cities of 50,000+ 
        
1 if Post-Furman 
        
1 if South 
        
1 if Midwest 
        
1 if West 
        
Number of homicides†     .027* .131      .041** .014      .034* .014 
Lagged death sentences     .022*** .004 
 
    .018*** .004 
 
    .015** .004 
Constant    -.704 .408     -.043 .316     -.574 .240 
Log-likelihood -834.097 
  
-810.893 
  
-830.460 
 
X²  46.15*** 
  
 91.92*** 
  
 57.31*** 
 
AIC  1684.194 
  
 1639.787 
  
 1678.919 
 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001                                                                         
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100.                           
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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TABLE 8: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 
DEATH SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 372 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
              b SE     b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate          -.018* .008 
 
          -.015 .009 
1 if Republican governor          -.129 .121 
 
          -.134 .116 
Percent Republicans in state legislature           .008 .005 
 
           .005 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .034*** .006 
 
        .040*** .008 
Welfare expenditures      -.066*** .010 
 
       -.075*** .011 
Institutionalization rate           .000 .000 
 
           .000 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000          -.003 .002 
 
          -.005* .002 
Percent African American          -.018 .026 
 
          -.004 .028 
Percent African American²          -.001 .001 
 
          -.000 .001 
Percent unemployed        .107*** .028 
 
           .097** .028 
Lynching rate           .030 .020 
 
           .012 .020 
Violent crime rate† 
   
           .080* .040 
Surplus/Deficits/10
9
 
   
          -.008 .004 
Total population/10
5
 
   
           .005* .002 
Percent born in state 
   
          -.021* .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+ 
   
           .018** .006 
1 if Post-Furman 
   
          -.496 .253 
1 if South 
   
           .339 .450 
1 if Midwest 
   
           .504 .395 
1 if West 
   
           .234 .467 
Number of homicides†           .050*** .013            .026 .017 
Lagged death sentences           .015*** .004 
 
           .009 .005 
Constant          -.104 .494            .469 .995 
Log-likelihood      -798.201 
  
     -781.863 
 X²    149.57*** 
  
   236.16*** 
 AIC       1628.401 
  
 1613.726 
 *p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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The second model contains the results when the number of state-level death 
sentences was regressed on the political ideology variables. The findings contained in this 
model provide support for two out of the four political ideological measures. More 
specifically, these findings indicate that as the percentage of religious fundamentalists 
within jurisdictions increases, so too does the number of death sentences. In addition, the  
results also denote that in states where there are higher expenditures on welfare, there are 
also fewer death sentences. Similar to findings in Model 1, the number of jurisdictional 
homicides and the lagged dependent variable are positively and significantly associated 
with the number of state-level death sentences. 
The third model examines the relationship between the four social threat variables 
and the number of state-level death sentences. The results from this model indicate 
support for one of the four social threat variables. In particular, as state-level lynching 
rates increase, so too does the number of jurisdictional death sentences. This is an 
important finding because it indicates that lynching rates are significantly associated with 
death sentence practices, whereas Zimring (2003) had only hypothesized about the 
relationship between past lynching acts and executions. Again, the lagged dependent 
variable and the number of jurisdictional homicides are significantly related to death 
sentence practices. 
In Model 4, the number of state-level death sentences was regressed on all of the 
theoretical indicators of interest. Consistent with the first three models, the percentage of 
religious fundamentalists and the percentage of a state’s expenditure on welfare are still 
significantly related to state-level death sentences. However, with the inclusion of all of 
the theoretical variables, the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates 
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and the percentage of unemployed individuals now demonstrate a significant relationship 
with the number of death sentences within jurisdictions, which signifies suppressor 
effects.
 25
 In contrast to the post-Furman partisan politics hypothesis, Model 4 indicates 
that when the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates within states 
is higher, there are fewer death sentences. These findings also indicate that as the 
percentage of unemployed individuals within jurisdictions increases, the number of    
state-level death sentences also increases. The lagged death sentence variable and the 
number of homicides again demonstrate a significant positive relationship with the 
number of state-level death sentences. 
Finally, the fifth model in Table 8 contains the findings when the number of   
state-level death sentences was regressed on all of the theoretical and control variables. 
Consistent with the findings from the last model, the percentage of religious 
fundamentalists, the percentage of state expenditures on welfare, and the percentage of 
unemployed individuals within jurisdictional populations still maintain a significant 
relationship with the number of jurisdictional death sentences. However, with the 
inclusion of the control variables, the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates, the number of jurisdictional homicides, and the lagged dependent variable are 
no longer significant predictors of the number of state-level death sentences. 
                                                          
25
 In order to determine the third variable that increases the predictive value of the percentage of the vote 
for Republican presidential candidates and the unemployment measures, these indicators were included in 
the respective theoretical models; the alternative theoretical variables were then added one at a time. 
Results from these analyses (not shown) indicated that the incarceration rate variable was responsible for 
increasing the predictive value of the percentage of the vote for the Republican presidential candidate 
measure. Furthermore, these analyses also indicated that the predictive value of the unemployment measure 
was increased with the introduction of the percentage of state expenditures spent on welfare variable. Given 
these findings, additional analyses were performed to determine the nature of the relationship between both 
sets of variables. In these supplemental models, interaction terms were created from both sets of variables, 
and these interaction terms were then introduced into the full model. The results from these analyses (not 
shown) indicated that neither interaction term was significantly related to jurisdictional death sentence 
practices. 
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Furthermore, the incarceration rate is now a significant and negative predictor of death 
sentence practices in the full model, which again indicates a suppressor effect.
26
 In terms 
of the findings for the control variables, Model 5 indicates that as the violent crime rate, 
the total state population, and the percentage of residents living in cities larger than 
50,000 increases, so too does the number of death sentences within states. Lastly, the 
findings from Model 5 indicate that as the percentage of residents who are born in the 
state in which they currently reside increases, the number of state-level death sentences 
decreases. According to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistic across the five 
models, the full model demonstrates the lowest value, which indicates that this is the 
preferred model.
27
 
The findings contained within Table 8 are of particular importance to this study 
because they demonstrate support for the propositions within two out of the three 
political perspectives. In regards to the propositions in the political ideology perspective, 
the findings in the full model indicate that the percentage of religious fundamentalists and 
the percentage of state-level expenditures on welfare are both significant predictors of 
jurisdictional death sentence practices in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. These findings are 
important because they indicate that the relationship between death sentence practices 
                                                          
26
 Similar to the procedures used to examine the previous suppressor effects, each control variable was 
entered one at a time into Model 4. The results from these supplemental analyses (not shown) indicated that 
the inclusion of the post-Furman dummy variable increased the predictive value of the incarceration rate 
measure. In order to further investigate the relationship between variables, an interaction term was created 
using the two variables; the findings from this analysis are contained in Model 7 of Table 9 in this chapter. 
The results from this model indicated that the relationship between jurisdictional incarceration rates and the 
number of state-level death sentences was moderated by time period specific factors. Figure 9 in this 
chapter contains the graphical representation of this interactive relationship. 
 
27
 One restriction when using the AIC statistic to assess model fit across analytic strategies is that all of the 
models must rely on the same cases and the same dependent variable. Due to this limitation, model fit 
comparisons using the AIC statistic cannot be made across analytic procedures when there are differences 
in the sample analyzed. Based on this restriction, comparisons cannot be drawn between the primary model 
and the supplemental procedures because these analytic strategies all rely on a different number of cases or 
a different measurement technique for jurisdictional death sentences. 
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and religious fundamentalists and welfare expenditures are not mere proximate 
manifestations associated with the post-Furman time period. Furthermore, the welfare 
expenditure finding is also significant because researchers have yet to examine the 
relationship between this variable and capital punishment practices. Based on this 
finding, it would appear that state expenditures on welfare is also a significant predictor 
of capital punishment practices, in addition to other forms of societal punishment 
identified in previous research (Beckett & Western, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; 
Stucky, Heimer & Lang, 2005). 
 Focusing on the results from the social threat variables, the findings from the full 
model indicate support for the propositions within the economic threat hypothesis. This is 
an interesting finding because previous studies have failed to demonstrate a significant 
relationship between state-level death sentences and unemployment in the post-Furman 
time period. Despite the null findings in previous research (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; 
Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2007), the results from the full model 
indicate that the percentage of unemployed individuals within jurisdictions is a 
significant predictor of death sentence practices when the temporal scope is expanded 
beyond the post-Furman time period. Finally, the findings from the full model indicate 
that the violent crime rate, the total state population, the percentage of residents born in 
the state in which they currently reside, and the percentage of state residents residing in 
cities larger than 50,000 are all significant predictors of death sentence practices.  
There are also a number of theoretical implications associated with the null 
findings in Model 5. First, the findings from the full model fail to show support for all 
three of the variables designed to measure the presence of Republican officials. These 
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null findings would appear to indicate that the relationship between Republican officials 
and death sentence practices is a proximate manifestation associated with the              
post-Furman time period. This finding also appears to support the contention by theorists 
that the massive southern conversion to the Republican Party in the 1970s effectively 
shifted the relationship between political party and this stage in the capital punishment 
process (Garland, 2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). Second, the findings in the full model 
also fail to show support for the propositions within the racial threat and the vigilante 
tradition hypotheses. The non-significant finding regarding the racial threat hypothesis is 
an important result because post-Furman studies have demonstrated a significant 
relationship between the size of minority populations and state-level death sentences. The 
null finding in this study would appear to indicate that the significant relationship 
between the two variables is a proximate manifestation associated with the last third of 
the 20
th
 century. Lastly, the non-significant finding regarding the lynching rate variable in 
the full model affirms what Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent (2005) found in their study, 
namely that the lynching rate variable failed to demonstrate a significant direct 
relationship with death sentence practices. This section now turns to the examination of 
the findings when the interaction terms highlighted in Chapter Three are introduced into 
the full models. 
In Table 9, each of the interaction terms is entered into the models one at a time. 
The results contained within Models 1 through 7 examine whether the relationship 
between the variables in the partisan politics and the political ideology perspectives and 
the number of state-level death sentences is conditioned by time period specific factors. 
In order to produce accurate scaling on the y-axis when plotting significant interaction  
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TABLE 9: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 372 STATE-YEARS) 
 
  Model 1 
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
          b SE          b SE          b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate    -.025* .010 
 
      -.015 .009 
 
    -.015 .009 
1 if Republican governor    -.105 .116 
 
      -.282 .273 
 
    -.134 .116 
Percent Republicans in state legislature     .002 .005 
 
       .005 .005 
 
     .006 .007 
Percent religious fundamentalists    .039*** .007 
 
      .040*** .008 
 
    .039*** .008 
Welfare expenditures   -.072*** .011 
 
     -.075*** .011 
 
   -.075*** .011 
Institutionalization rate     .000 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
 
     .000 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000    -.005 .002 
 
      -.005* .002 
 
    -.005* .002 
Percent African American     .002 .026 
 
      -.006 .028 
 
    -.002 .029 
Percent African American²    -.001 .001 
 
      -.000 .001 
 
    -.000 .001 
Percent unemployed   .098*** .028 
 
      .098*** .028 
 
  .096** .029 
Lynching rate     .008 .019 
 
       .012 .020 
 
     .012 .020 
Violent crime rate†     .079* .039 
 
  .082* .040 
 
     .079 .041 
Surplus/Deficits/109    -.007 .004 
 
      -.008 .004 
 
    -.008 .005 
Total population/105     .006* .002 
 
       .005* .002 
 
     .005* .002 
Percent born in state    -.023* .010 
 
      -.022* .011 
 
    -.020 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+     .018** .006 
 
       .018** .006 
 
     .018** .006 
1 if Post-Furman    -.548* .257 
 
      -.447* .266 
 
    -.534 .297 
1 if South     .225 .469 
 
       .334 .480 
 
     .332 .480 
1 if Midwest     .460 .382 
 
       .500 .395 
 
     .489 .398 
1 if West     .140 .448 
 
       .210 .468 
 
     .242 .467 
Number of homicides†     .026 .016         .026 .017       .026 .017 
Lagged death sentences     .010* .005 
 
       .009 .005 
 
     .009 .005 
President*Post-Furman     .031* .015 
 
  
 
  
Governor*Post-Furman   
 
       .178 .295 
 
  
Legislature*Post-Furman   
 
  
 
    -.002   .006 
Constant    -.272 .210        -.231 .219      -.213 .219 
Log-likelihood -779.757  
 
  -781.678  
 
-781.834  
X² 260.86***  
 
   237.48***  
 
236.37***  
AIC 1611.514  
 
 1615.356  
 
1615.668  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
   Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.        
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TABLE 9: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 372 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
       b SE          b SE           b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate     -.017 .009 
 
     -.014 .009 
 
     -.015 .009 
1 if Republican governor     -.150 .117 
 
     -.128 .117 
 
     -.128 .117 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      .004 .005 
 
      .006 .005 
 
      .004 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists      .026** .010 
 
    .040*** .007 
 
  .039*** .008 
Welfare expenditures  -.077*** .011 
 
-.045** .016 
 
-.075*** .011 
Institutionalization rate     -.001 .001 
 
     -.000 .001 
 
     .001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000     -.004* .002 
 
     -.004 .002 
 
    -.005* .002 
Percent African American      .011 .028 
 
      .012 .026 
 
     .001 .028 
Percent African American²     -.001 .001 
 
     -.001 .001 
 
    -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed .078** .030 
 
   .099*** .027 
 
     .091** .030 
Lynching rate      .007 .018 
 
      .001 .018 
 
     .014 .020 
Violent crime rate†      .074 .041 
 
      .076 .041 
 
     .079 .041 
Surplus/Deficits/109     -.009 .005 
 
     -.009 .005 
 
    -.008 .005 
Total population/105      .005* .002 
 
      .005* .002 
 
     .004* .002 
Percent born in state     -.015 .011 
 
     -.018 .010 
 
    -.019 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+      .020** .006 
 
      .018** .006 
 
     .017** .006 
1 if Post-Furman    -.822** .287 
 
      -626* .353 
 
    -.455 .264 
1 if South     .227 .471 
 
      .227 .460 
 
     .289 .483 
1 if Midwest     .392 .383 
 
      .304 .370 
 
     .493 .394 
1 if West     .290 .454 
 
      .167 .439 
 
     .274 .471 
Number of homicides†     .026 .017       .029 .016      .027 .017 
Lagged death sentences     .010* .005 
 
      .010* .005 
 
     .009 .005 
Religious*Post-Furman     .015* .007 
 
  
 
  
Welfare*Post-Furman   
 
    -.050* .020 
 
  
Institutionalization*Post-Furman   
 
  
 
    -.001 .002 
Constant    -.233 .207     -.249 .204     -.277 .240 
Log-likelihood -779.472  
 
-778.866  
 
-781.651  
X²  247.58***  
 
274.98***  
 
236.09***  
AIC  1610.944  
 
 1609.733  
 
 1615.303  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
   Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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TABLE 9: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
NUMBER OF DEATH SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012                                   
(N = 372 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
  b SE         b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate      -.012 .009 
 
      -.013 .009 
1 if Republican governor      -.106 .115 
 
      -.155 .117 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       .004 .005 
 
       .005 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists     .045*** .008 
 
      .036*** .007 
Welfare expenditures   -.072*** .010 
 
    -.074*** .011 
Institutionalization rate      -.000 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000      -.001 .002 
 
      -.004 .002 
Percent African American      -.018 .029 
 
       .004 .029 
Percent African American²      -.000 .001 
 
      -.003 .002 
Percent unemployed     .107*** .028 
 
    .085** .030 
Lynching rate       .016 .021 
 
      -.012 .021 
Violent crime rate†       .083* .038 
 
       .109* .042 
Surplus/Deficits/109      -.007 .004 
 
      -.008 .005 
Total population/105       .007** .002 
 
       .005* .002 
Percent born in state      -.027* .011 
 
      -.020 .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .021** .006 
 
       .014* .007 
1 if Post-Furman      -.958** .323 
 
      -.496 .257 
1 if South       .339 .491 
 
       .664 .518 
1 if Midwest       .612 .406 
 
       .506 .396 
1 if West       .099 .483 
 
       .474 .470 
Number of homicides†       .007 .017         .023 .016 
Lagged death sentences       .006 .005 
 
       .008 .005 
Incarceration*Post-Furman      -.011* .005 
 
  
African American*Lynching   
 
      .003* .001 
Constant      -.320 .225       -.181 .215 
Log-likelihood -779.101  
 
-778.987  
X² 244.73***  
 
255.88***  
AIC  1610.203  
 
 1609.974  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
   Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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terms, all of the covariates in this table have been mean centered.  Overall, the results 
from these models denote that there are five significant interaction terms, and the lower 
AIC statistics reported for the models containing the interaction terms indicate they are 
preferred to the full model in Table 8.  
The findings in Model 1 of Table 9 indicate that the relationship between the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and death sentence 
practices is moderated by time period specific factors. Figure 6 graphically displays this 
relationship. In this figure, the solid line represents the pre-Furman time period, and the 
dashed line represents the post-Furman time period. In order to detect how the changing 
nature of Republican Party affiliation influences death sentence practices across the two 
time periods, this variable is set to both one standard deviation below (low) and above 
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FIGURE 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF THE 
VOTE FOR REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND 
PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL DEATH SENTENCES BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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(high) the mean.
28
 This graph indicates that as the percentage of the vote for Republican 
presidential candidates increases from one standard deviation below to one standard 
deviation above the mean in the pre-Furman time period, the predicted number of death 
sentences within jurisdictions decreases. As mentioned in the last section, this finding is 
likely attributed to the strong Democratic presence in the Southern United States before 
the punitive turn in crime control policies that occurred in the 1970s. Conversely, the 
very slight upward slope in the post-Furman line indicates that the percentage of the vote 
for Republican presidential candidates had little impact on state-level death sentences 
during this time period. This finding is particularly interesting given that the partisan 
politics perspective contends that there should be a strong positive relationship between 
conservative candidates and the adoption of harsh punishment practices in the            
post-Furman time period.  
Model 4 contains the results when the interaction term comprised of the 
percentage of religious fundamentalists and the post-Furman dummy variable is 
introduced into the full model. The findings from this model indicate that time period 
specific factors moderate the relationship between fundamentalist ideologies and the 
number of state-level death sentences. Figure 7 contains the graphical representation of 
this relationship. According to this figure, as the percentage of religious fundamentalists 
within states increases from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation 
above the mean, the predicted number of jurisdictional death sentences also increases in 
both the pre- and post-Furman time periods. In addition, this finding also indicates that 
the positive relationship between the percentage of religious fundamentalists in a state  
                                                          
28
 The same procedures are adopted for all graphical representations of interactive relationships that rely on 
the binary post-Furman dummy indicator. 
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and death sentence practices was stronger in the pre-Furman time period, regardless of 
the size of the fundamentalist population. This finding is interesting given the emphasis 
that recent scholars have placed on the importance associated with the rise to political 
prominence of the religious right in the post-Furman time period. 
Model 6 contains the results when the interaction term comprised of the 
percentage of state expenditures spent on welfare and the post-Furman dummy variable 
was introduced into the analysis. The findings from this model indicate that there is a 
significant negative relationship between this interaction term and the number of       
state-level death sentences, and Figure 9 graphically depicts the nature of this 
relationship. According to this graph, as the percentage of state-level expenditures on 
welfare increases from one standard deviation below the mean, jurisdictional death  
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FIGURE 7: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISTS AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL 
DEATH SENTENCES BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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sentences decrease in both the pre- and post-Furman time periods. In addition, this graph 
also indicates that the negative relationship between welfare expenditures and death 
sentence practices was stronger in the post-Furman time period. This result is consistent 
with previous studies that have found that higher expenditures on welfare are associated 
with the adoption of less punitive penal punishments in the post-Furman era (Beckett & 
Western, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Stucky, Heimer & Lang, 2005). 
Model 8 contains the findings when the interaction term comprised of the 
incarceration rate and the post-Furman dummy variable was included in the analysis. The 
results from this model indicate that the relationship between this interaction term and 
jurisdictional death sentences is both significant and negative. According to the graphical 
representation contained in Figure 9, as jurisdictional incarceration rates in the            
pre-Furman time period increase from one standard deviation below the mean to one  
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FIGURE 8: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
WELFARE EXPENDITURES AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL DEATH 
SENTENCES BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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standard deviation above the mean, the predicted number of state-level death sentences 
slightly decreases. The relatively flat angle of the pre-Furman slope would appear to 
indicate that the variation in incarceration rates across jurisdictions only had a slight 
impact on state-level death sentence practices in this era. However in the post-Furman 
time period, as the incarceration rate increases, the predicted number of jurisdictional 
death sentences decreases. This finding is particularly interesting because it suggests that 
the punitive nature of jurisdictional punishment practices is not uniform across the 
correctional landscape.
29
 In other words, this finding would appear to suggest that the 
                                                          
29
 In order to further examine the nature of the relationship between incarceration rates and death sentence 
practices in the post-Furman time period, trends in these variables were examined. In terms of incarceration 
rates, this variable was constructed based on the number of annual prison admissions and the total number 
of Index I offenses. When examining trends in admissions from 1970 to 2010, the number of individuals 
admitted to state prisons consistently increased in almost every state in each decade over the entire time 
period. When examining trends in offenses, the number of Index I crimes increased in nearly every state 
between 1970 and 1990, and the total number of offenses then declined in both 2000 and 2010. Due to the 
growing number of admissions and the declining number of offenses in the 21
st
 century, the 50 highest 
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FIGURE 9: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INCARCERATION 
RATE AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL DEATH SENTENCES BY TIME 
PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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political and social factors associated with punitive death sentence practices may differ 
from those associated with punitive incarceration practices.  
The final model in Table 9 contains the results when the interaction term 
comprised of the lynching rate and the percentage of African Americans in the state 
population was introduced into the full model. According to Jacobs, Carmichael, and 
Kent’s (2005) hypothesis, past lynching rates moderate the relationship between the size 
of the African American population and death sentence practices. Based on the 
hypothesized curvilinear relationship between the African American population and 
punishment practices, Jacobs and colleagues contend that the size of the African 
American population must be greater in high lynching rate states before these 
jurisdictions reach the inflection point at which the relationship turns from positive to 
negative. On the opposite side, Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent (2005) argue that a smaller 
percentage of African Americans in the state population is required in low lynching rate 
states for these jurisdictions to reach the inflection point. Since both of these are 
continuous variables, the two indicators were mean centered before this interaction term 
was created, and all of the covariates are mean centered as well. 
The findings in Model 8 indicate that there is a significant positive relationship 
between this interaction term and the number of death sentences within jurisdictions. Due 
to the hypothesized non-linear relationship between the size of the African American  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
post-Furman incarceration rates were all reported in 2000 and 2010. In terms of post-Furman trends in 
death sentences, reliance on this capital punishment practice generally increased between 1970 and 1990 
(72% of the top 50 death sentence states were from this period), and the number of jurisdictional death 
sentences then declined in the 21
st
 century. This decline in capital punishment practices is likely attributed 
to both the increasing number of abolitionist states and the decreased reliance on the practice in death 
penalty states. Given the higher incarceration rates and the lower number of death sentences imposed in the 
21
st
 century, these factors appear to explain the significant negative relationship between the two variables 
in the post-Furman time period. 
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population and death sentence practices, this study relies on the same procedures adopted 
by Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent (2005) for investigating this relationship. First, the 
number of death sentences is predicted based on the coefficient for the interaction term 
and the coefficients for the quadratic terms using the point estimates contained within 
Model 8. Since Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent’s (2005) hypothesis is interactive in nature, 
the relationship between predicted death sentences and the size of the African American 
population should vary according to the lynching rate. To account for this interaction, 
two graphs are depicted in Figure 10. The first graph (the solid line in Figure 10) 
illustrates the relationship between the percentage of African Americans and predicted 
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FIGURE 10: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND PREDICTED DEATH SENTENCES WHEN 
LYNCHINGS ARE AT THE 25TH AND 95TH PERCENTILE 
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death sentences when the lynching rate is set to the 25
th
 percentile.
30
 The second graph 
(the dotted line in Figure 10) depicts the relationship between the percentage of African 
Americans and predicted death sentences when the lynching rate is set at the                
95
th
 percentile. Consistent with Jacobs and colleagues’ (2005) post-Furman predictions, 
these graphs indicate that there is a curvilinear relationship between the size of the 
African American population and jurisdictional death sentences, and the tipping point at 
which the relationship turns from positive to negative is slightly greater in states where 
lynching rates are higher. In addition, the findings from this graph also indicate that this 
interactive relationship is not restricted to the post-Furman era.  
The findings from Table 9 are of particular importance to this dissertation because 
they indicate that the relationship between a number of the political variables and the 
imposition of state-level death sentences is moderated by time period specific factors. 
These findings are significant because they denote that the movement from the pre- to the 
post-Furman time period did have an influence on the nature of the relationship between 
the theoretical variables and death sentence practices. In the case of the interaction terms 
that examined religious fundamentalism, welfare expenditures, and incarceration rates, 
the findings from these models indicate that the movement across the two time periods 
either strengthens or weakens the preexisting nature of the relationship between these 
variables and jurisdictional death sentence practices.  
The results from these models also indicate that the relationship between the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and state-level death 
sentences shifted when moving from the pre- to the post-Furman time period. This 
                                                          
30
 The truncated line for lynching rates in the 25
th
 percentile is due to the low percentage of African 
Americans in states with low lynching rates. 
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finding is important because it indicates that there was a stronger relationship between 
death sentence practices and party affiliation in the pre-Furman time period in contrast to 
the post-Furman era. Finally, the results from Table 9 indicate that the relationship 
between the size of the African American population and the imposition of death 
sentences within jurisdictions is conditioned by past lynching rates. This finding has 
important theoretical implications because it provides support for Jacobs, Carmichael, 
and Kent’s (2005) hypothesis and it demonstrates that this interactive relationship is able 
to account for death sentence practices beyond the post-Furman time period. The 
remainder of this chapter now focuses on the findings from four supplemental analyses 
that examine the robustness of the findings reported in the main models above. 
RESULTS FROM SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimations Excluding Non-Death Penalty      
State-Years 
 
The first alternative strategy examines the relationship between the key theoretical 
variables and the number of state-level death sentences when non-death penalty         
state-years are removed from the analyses. Due to the potential bias associated with 
including states where the punishment was not legal, this strategy determines whether the 
exclusion of non-death penalty states produces findings that differ from those reported in 
the primary models. For this alternative approach, 69 state-years where the penalty was 
not legal for at least one out of the two pooled years were excluded from the models. 
Given the structure of the data when non-death penalty state-years are removed from the 
analyses, the incorporation of one-period lags in the dependent variable was not possible 
using this analytic strategy. With the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable, the data 
for the 1930s are incorporated back into the sample. Consistent with the procedures  
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TABLE 10: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (EXCLUSION OF NON-DEATH PENALTY STATES)                   
(N = 353 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
     b SE       b SE            b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate       -.014 .009 
 
     -.018 .010 
 
    -.013 .009 
1 if Republican governor       -.123 .115 
 
     -.113 .115 
 
    -.386 .226 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       -.000 .004 
 
     -.001 .004 
 
    -.000 .004 
Percent religious fundamentalists        .033*** .007 
 
      .033*** .007 
 
     .033*** .007 
Welfare expenditures    -.061*** .008 
 
   -.061*** .008 
 
 -.064*** .009 
Institutionalization rate        .001* .001 
 
 .001* .001 
 
     .001* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000       -.001 .001 
 
     -.001 .001 
 
    -.001 .001 
Percent African American       -.024 .019 
 
     -.022 .019 
 
    -.029 .019 
Percent African American²        .000 .001 
 
      .000 .001 
 
     .000 .001 
Percent unemployed     .093*** .025 
 
    .094*** .025 
 
     .099*** .025 
Lynching rate        .002 .014 
 
      .000 .014 
 
     .001 .014 
Violent crime rate†        .115** .036 
 
      .116** .035 
 
     .113** .035 
Surplus/Deficits/109       -.010 .005 
 
     -.009 .005 
 
    -.010 .005 
Total population/105        .007*** .002 
 
      .007*** .002 
 
     .007*** .002 
Percent born in state -.026** .009 
 
 -.027** .009 
 
    -.028** .009 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+        .013** .005 
 
      .013* .005 
 
     .013** .005 
1 if Post-Furman        .005 .212 
 
     -.024 .216 
 
     .054 .215 
1 if South        .626 .368 
 
      .577 .371 
 
     .585 .370 
1 if Midwest        .855** .298 
 
      .835** .298 
 
     .812** .301 
1 if West       -.033 .348 
 
     -.059 .345 
 
    -.157 .357 
Number of homicides†        .022 .015       .022 .015      .024 .015 
President*Post-Furman   
 
      .012 .014 
 
  
Governor*Post-Furman   
 
  
 
     .338 .250 
Constant       .104 .937      -.178 .172     -.189 .175 
Log-likelihood    -870.174  
 
 -869.832  
 
 -869.255  
X²       228.66***  
 
    234.56***  
 
    232.14***  
AIC    1788.348  
 
1789.663  
 
1788.510  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
 Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 10: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (EXCLUSION OF NON-DEATH PENALTY STATES)                 
(N = 353 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
   b SE    b SE     b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate      -.014 .009 
 
     -.016 .009 
 
      -.015 .009 
1 if Republican governor      -.123 .115 
 
     -.139 .116 
 
      -.104 .115 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      -.000 .005 
 
     -.002 .004 
 
       .002 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .033*** .007 
 
      .024** .008 
 
      .033*** .007 
Welfare expenditures    -.061*** .009 
 
   -.059*** .009 
 
      -.041*** .008 
Institutionalization rate       .001 .001 
 
      .001 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000      -.001 .001 
 
     -.001 .001 
 
      -.001 .001 
Percent African American      -.024 .019 
 
     -.016 .019 
 
      -.016 .018 
Percent African American²       .000 .001 
 
      .000 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
Percent unemployed      .093*** .026 
 
  .080** .027 
 
     .100*** .025 
Lynching rate       .002 .014 
 
      .001 .013 
 
      -.003 .014 
Violent crime rate†       .114** .035 
 
  .115** .036 
 
       .109** .036 
Surplus/Deficits/109      -.010 .005 
 
     -.011 .006 
 
      -.012 .006 
Total population/105       .007*** .002 
 
      .007*** .002 
 
       .008*** .002 
Percent born in state      -.026** .009 
 
     -.023** .009 
 
      -.025** .009 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .013** .005 
 
      .014** .005 
 
       .013** .005 
1 if Post-Furman      -.003 .227 
 
     -.114 .223 
 
      -.229 .229 
1 if South       .624 .368 
 
      .558 .359 
 
       .525 .367 
1 if Midwest       .854** .298 
 
 .834** .290 
 
       .696 .295 
1 if West      -.029 .350 
 
      .043 .343 
 
      -.148 .343 
Number of homicides†       .000 .000       .021 .015        .025 .015 
Legislature*Post-Furman      -.001 .005 
 
  
 
  
Religious*Post-Furman   
 
      .010 .006 
 
  
Welfare*Post-Furman   
 
  
 
      -.046** .017 
Constant     -.170 .175      -.207 .171       -.129 .168 
Log-likelihood  -870.169  
 
 -868.736  
 
 -866.695  
X²     228.89***  
 
    242.01***  
 
    258.68***  
AIC 1790.338  
 
1787.472  
 
  1783.39  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 10: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (EXCLUSION OF NON-DEATH PENALTY STATES)                    
(N = 353 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
  b SE   b SE      b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate         -.014 .009 
 
      -.011 .009 
 
   -.016 .009 
1 if Republican governor         -.114 .115 
 
      -.128 .114 
 
   -.143 .114 
Percent Republicans in state legislature         -.002 .005 
 
      -.001 .004 
 
    .001 .004 
Percent religious fundamentalists          .031*** .007 
 
      .036*** .007 
 
          .030*** .007 
Welfare expenditures      -.064*** .009 
 
    -.056*** .008 
 
         -.060*** .009 
Institutionalization rate          .002 .001 
 
       .001 .001 
 
      .001* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000         -.001 .001 
 
      -.001 .001 
 
   -.001 .001 
Percent African American         -.021 .019 
 
      -.029 .018 
 
   -.024 .020 
Percent African American²         -.000 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
 
          -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed      .084** .026 
 
     .111*** .025 
 
        .084** .026 
Lynching rate          .003 .014 
 
       .001 .013 
 
    -.012 .017 
Violent crime rate†          .104** .037 
 
       .115** .035 
 
           .139*** .037 
Surplus/Deficits/109         -.011 .006 
 
      -.008* .004 
 
   -.010 .006 
Total population/105          .007*** .002 
 
       .010*** .002 
 
           .007*** .002 
Percent born in state         -.025** .009 
 
      -.028** .009 
 
      -.025** .009 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+          .012* .005 
 
       .016** .005 
 
   .010 .005 
1 if Post-Furman         -.013 .219 
 
      -.630* .297 
 
           .007 .214 
1 if South          .559 .372 
 
       .638 .361 
 
           .866* .387 
1 if Midwest          .830** .300 
 
       .859** .290 
 
       .858** .301 
1 if West         -.036 .348 
 
      -.118 .336 
 
           .144 .362 
Number of homicides†          .025 .015       -.004 .002     .018 .015 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman         -.002 .001 
 
  
 
  
Incarceration*Post-Furman   
 
      -.012** .004 
 
  
African American*Lynching   
 
  
 
     .003* .001 
Constant         -.260 .192       -.432 .202          -.128 .183 
Log-likelihood    -869.339  
 
 -865.437  
 
     -867.073  
X²       229.07***  
 
    257.06***  
 
        237.16***  
AIC   1788.678  
 
1780.873  
 
    1784.145  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012.   
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adopted in the primary models, all of the covariates are mean centered in models that  
contain interaction terms. 
The results from Model 1 in Table 10 indicate support for a number of the key 
theoretical variables of interest. These findings indicate that three out of the four 
significant theoretical predictors in the primary models are also significant using this 
analytic strategy. Particularly, the percentage of religious fundamentalists, the percentage 
of states’ overall expenditures spent on welfare, and the percentage of unemployed 
individuals are all significantly associated with jurisdictional death sentences. In terms of 
the control variables, the violent crime rate, the total state population, the percentage of 
residents born within the state in which they currently reside, and the percentage of 
citizens living in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are also still significant 
predictors of state-level death sentences.   
However, there are also a few discrepancies between the findings from the 
primary model and those reported in the first model of Table 10. With the exclusion of 
non-death penalty state-years, there is now a significant and positive relationship between 
the institutionalization rate and jurisdictional death sentences. Consistent with the 
predictions outlined in Chapter Three, this finding denotes that reliance on death sentence 
practices is greater in jurisdictions with higher institutionalization rates.
31
 Furthermore, 
                                                          
31
 There are two potential reasons why the positive relationship between institutionalization rates and death 
sentence practices is significant using this analytic strategy. First, with the removal of the lagged dependent 
variable, the time period for the 1930s is introduced back into the analyses. The reintroduction of this 
period likely contributes to the positive relationship between the two variables because reliance on death 
sentences in the pre-Furman time period was greatest in the early 1930s. In addition, 76 % of states during 
the measurement period for 1930 reported higher than average institutionalization rates based on the entire 
period from 1930 to 2012. Given that there were higher than average institutionalization rates and a large 
number of death sentences in the early 1930s, it is likely that the reintroduction of this period into the 
analyses is partially responsible for the significant findings using this analytic strategy. 
        The second reason for the significant finding pertains to the exclusion of non-death penalty           
state-years. Since institutionalization rates were highest in the pre-Furman time period, the impact 
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the incarceration rate is no longer a significant predictor of death sentence practices using 
this analytic strategy. Finally, the number of death sentences in the midwestern region is 
significantly higher than the number of state-level death sentences reported in the 
northeastern region of the United States.  
Models 2 through 9 in Table 10 contain the findings when each of the interaction 
terms is introduced individually into the models. Consistent with the findings reported in 
the primary models, the results in Model 6 denote that the relationship between 
expenditures on welfare and the number of jurisdictional death sentences is conditioned 
by time period specific factors.
32
 Furthermore, the findings in Model 8 also indicate that 
time period specific factors moderate the relationship between state-level incarceration 
rates and jurisdictional death sentences.
33
 Finally, the findings in Model 9 indicate that 
past lynching rates in states moderate the relationship between the size of the African 
American population and state-level death sentence practices.
34
 No support was shown 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
associated with the removal of non-death penalty state-years for this time period is examined. Out of the 18 
non-death penalty state-years removed in the pre-Furman time period, 66% of these states reported above 
average institutionalization rates based on the mean for the entire period from 1930 to 2012. Given this 
finding, it is likely that the removal of non-death penalty state-years also assists in clarifying the positive 
and significant relationship between death sentence practices and institutionalization rates.  
       
32
 The graphical representation of this relationship (not shown) confirms that reliance on death sentences 
decreases in both the pre- and post-Furman time periods when the percentage of jurisdictional welfare 
expenditures is set to both one standard deviation above and below the mean. However, the gap between 
death sentence practices in the pre-and post-Furman time periods when welfare expenditures were low in 
this graph was more narrow than the gap reported in the previous section.   
 
33
 The plotted interaction term (not shown) demonstrates that the pre- and post-Furman slopes are similar to 
those reported in the primary models. The only significant difference between the two graphs is that the 
post-Furman slope is steeper and more dramatic in the primary model reported in Figure 9. Since 
incarceration rates and the number of abolitionist states are highest in the 21
st
 century, it is likely that the 
tempering of the negative slope in the post-Furman period was due to the exclusion of a greater number of 
states with high incarceration rates and zero death sentences. 
 
34
 The nature of the relationship between variables using this alternative strategy is similar to the 
relationship reported in the graphical representation for the primary models. However, there are two 
distinct differences in the nature of the relationship between variables. First, the line representing the 
lynching rate at the 25
th
 percentile is even more truncated when non-death penalty states are removed, but 
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for the remaining interaction terms in these models, and the models containing the three 
significant interaction terms reported the lowest AIC statistics, which denotes that these 
specifications are preferred over the remaining models within Table 10.  
Overall, the findings from this supplemental strategy indicate support for most of 
the significant findings reported in the primary models. The results from Model 1 are 
particularly important because they demonstrate support for three out of the four key 
theoretical variables of interest that were identified in the primary models. No support 
was shown for the significant relationship between incarceration rates and death sentence 
practices.  In addition, with the exclusion of non-death penalty state-years, the 
institutionalization rate is now a significant and positive predictor of jurisdictional death 
sentences. The results from Model 1 are also important because they indicate that the 
relationship between these variables remains significant, regardless of whether non-death 
penalty state-years are included in the analyses. Finally, in terms of findings from the 
models that examine moderating influences, this alternative strategy indicates support for 
three of the five significant interaction terms from the primary models.  
           Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations 
The second analytic strategy focuses on the findings associated with the adoption 
of a zero-inflated negative binomial estimation procedure. As mentioned, the presence of 
zero death sentences in the data could result from either the penalty not being legal in a 
state or the failure of jurors to impose the sentence; therefore, this estimation procedure is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the overall shape of the relationship is maintained between analytic strategies. This finding is likely due to 
the low number of jurisdictions with low lynching rates and a high percentage of African Americans in the 
population. The second difference between the graphical representations using the two strategies is that the 
line representing lynching rates at the 95
th
 percentile in the non-death penalty states model takes on more of 
a linear shape in comparison to the representation depicted when these state-years are incorporated into the 
analyses. 
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appropriate for examining this dependent variable. This estimation procedure is also 
appropriate when there is an excess of zeros in the data, which is the case for this 
outcome measure. The adoption of this supplemental analytic strategy is designed to 
determine whether alternative estimation procedures produce findings that differ from 
those reported in the main models.  
Zero-inflated negative binomial procedures rely on two separate models for 
estimating the number of death sentences equal to or greater than one and the absence of 
a death sentence within jurisdictions. The general primary equation reported below 
focuses on jurisdictions that reported one or more death sentences: 
 
Number of Death Sentences = b0 + b1Percent Republican Presidential Candidate 
+ b2Republican Governor + b3Percent Republicans Legislature + b4Percent 
Fundamentalists + b5Percent Welfare Expenditures + b6Institutionalization Rate + 
b7Incarceration Rate + b8Percent African American + b9Percent African 
American
2 
+  b10Percent Unemployed +  b11Lynching Rate + b12Violent Crime 
Rate + b13 Surplus/Deficits + b14Total  Population + b15Born in State +  
b16Percent Living in Cities with 50,000+ Inhabitants + b17Post-Furman + 
b18South+ b19Midwest + b20West + b21Number of Homicides 
 
In addition to the primary equation, this procedure also estimates a secondary equation 
that predicts the occurrence of zero death sentences within jurisdictions. Since there is no 
statistical rationale behind including the same variables from the primary equation in the 
secondary equation (Long & Freese, 2001), this study adopts a more concise specification 
for the secondary equation. The secondary probit based equation that estimates the 
absence of a death sentence within jurisdictions is specified as follows:  
Death Sentence Absence = b0 + b1Percent Republican Presidential Candidate +                     
b2 Republican Governor + b3Percent Republicans Legislature +b4Post-Furman + 
b5South + b6Midwest + b7West  
 
In this equation, the absence in the use of this form of punishment is coded as 0 and the 
presence of one or more death sentences is coded as 1. In an effort to maintain the 
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TABLE 11: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 423 STATE-YEARS)  
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
        b SE           b SE   b SE 
1 + Death Sentences    
      Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate -.018* .008    -.021 .010   -.018* .008 
1 if Republican governor -.131 .118     -.129 .116    -.087 .200 
Percent Republicans in state legislature -.005 .007     -.006 .007    -.006 .007 
Percent religious fundamentalists  .023*** .004      .022*** .004    .022*** .004 
Welfare expenditures -.045*** .010    -.044*** .010  -.045*** .011 
Institutionalization rate -.001 .001     -.001 .001    -.001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 -.001 .001     -.001 .001    -.001 .001 
Percent African American  .029 .027      .030 .028     .029 .027 
Percent African American² -.001 .001     -.001 .001    -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed  .099** .032      .099** .032     .099** .032 
Lynching rate  .006 .009      .005 .009     .006 .009 
Violent crime rate†  .180*** .039      .182*** .039  .179*** .039 
Surplus/Deficits/109 -.019 .010     -.019* .010    -.019 .010 
Total population/105  .012*** .003      .012*** .003  .012*** .003 
Percent born in state -.001 .008     -.004 .008   -.004 .008 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+  .023** .008      .023** .008    .023** .007 
1 if Post-Furman -.660* .266     -.682* .279   -.667** .007 
1 if South -.599 .425     -.631 .419   -.590 .427 
1 if Midwest -.250 .376     -.275 .376   -.245 .378 
1 if West -.544 .404     -.562 .394   -.545 .406 
Number of homicides† -.000 .000     -.000 .000   -.000 .000 
President*Post-Furman        .009 .019    
Governor*Post-Furman        -.069 .198 
Intercept 1.247 .112   1.231 .118  1.249 .113 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 11: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 423 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
        b SE         b SE         b SE 
Zero Death Sentences  
        Percent vote for Republican Presidential candidate      -.044 .024      -.043 .024 -.044 .024 
1 if Republican Governor      -.004 .297       -.005 .301  -.001 .299 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      -.008 .014       -.008 .014  -.007 .013 
1 if Post-Furman       .100 .382        .096 .705   .098 .383 
1 if South  -1.774*** .476  -1.785*** .484      -1.768*** .472 
1 if Midwest       .065 .498       .058 .502         .063 .498 
1 if West    -1.463* .677    -1.493* .735     -1.465* .676 
Intercept     2.237 .951     2.237 .957      2.236 .951 
Log-pseudolikelihood -898.258    -898.095    -898.222  
X² 591.47***    651.01***   603.71***  
AIC 1858.516    1860.189    1860.443  
McFadden's Adjusted R²      .126        .125         .125  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001         
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012.   
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TABLE 11: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 423 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
  b SE       b SE   b SE 
1 +  Death Sentences  
        Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate    -.018* .009    -.025** .010     -.020* .008 
1 if Republican governor    -.130 .114      -.141 .119      -.114 .117 
Percent Republicans in state legislature    -.006 .007      -.006 .007      -.005 .007 
Percent religious fundamentalists     .023*** .004       .013* .006       .022*** .004 
Welfare expenditures    -.045*** .011     -.044*** .010   -.034** .011 
Institutionalization rate    -.001 .001      -.001 .001      -.001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000    -.001 .001      -.001 .001      -.001 .001 
Percent African American     .029 .027       .026 .026       .030 .027 
Percent African American²    -.001 .001      -.001 .001      -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed   .100** .032       .077* .034     .099** .032 
Lynching rate     .006 .009       .008 .009       .005 .009 
Violent crime rate†     .181*** .039      .184*** .041       .177*** .039 
Surplus/Deficits/109    -.019 .010     -.019 .010      -.020 .012 
Total population/105     .012 .003      .012*** .003       .013*** .003 
Percent born in state    -.004 .008     -.003 .008      -.004 .008 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+     .023** .008      .023** .007       .023** .008 
1 if Post-Furman    -.653* .284     -.771** .279     -.749* .302 
1 if South    -.605 .426     -.563 .435     -.648 .436 
1 if Midwest    -.255 .382     -.206 .400     -.306 .381 
1 if West    -.548 .393     -.526 .420     -.618 .418 
Number of homicides    -.000 .000     -.000 .000     -.000 .000 
Legislature*Post-Furman     .001 .007       
Religious*Post-Furman       .012 .007    
Welfare*Post-Furman           -.027 .023 
Intercept   1.245 .112   1.241 .111    1.271 .111 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
   Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 11: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 423 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
        b SE   b SE       b SE 
Zero Death Sentences 
        Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate      -.043 .024         -.045 .025       -.044 .024 
1 if Republican governor      -.005 .300           .014 .283         .004 .295 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      -.008 .014          -.006 .011        -.008  .013 
1 if Post-Furman       .102 .386     .043 .373         .090 .382 
1 if South   -1.778*** .482       -1.737*** .426     -1.776*** .466 
1 if Midwest       .062 .505           .111 .494         .067 .495 
1 if West   -1.466* .676        -1.452* .693     -1.469* .686 
Intercept    2.236 .953          2.260 .954      2.259 .927 
Log-pseudolikelihood  -898.250       -896.338     -897.423  
X²  656.78***        513.55***     633.74***  
AIC   1860.499        1856.676     1858.845  
McFadden's Adjusted R²       .125          .127        .126  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 11: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 423 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8  
 
Model 9  
  b SE      b SE   b SE  
1 + Death Sentences  
        
 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate    -.018* .008     -.013 .008     -.022** .008 
 
1 if Republican governor    -.151 .108      -.091 .112        -.140 .118 
 
Percent Republicans in state legislature    -.004 .007      -.002 .007         .004 .007 
 
Percent religious fundamentalists    .023*** .004      .021*** .004        .023*** .004 
 
Welfare expenditures   -.042*** .012  -.034** .010       -.047*** .010 
 
Institutionalization rate    -.001 .001      -.002* .001        -.001 .001 
 
Incarceration rate per 1,000    -.000 .001      -.000 .001        -.000 .001 
 
Percent African American     .028 .027       .032 .027         .024 .028 
 
Percent African American²    -.001 .001      -.001 .001        -.002 .001 
 
Percent unemployed    .109*** .030       .117*** .033         .088** .033 
 
Lynching rate     .005 .009       .003 .008         .006 .011 
 
Violent crime rate†   .190*** .041    .166*** .037        .196*** .039 
 
Surplus/Deficits/109   -.019* .008    -.015*** .004         .020 .011 
 
Total population/105  .012*** .003     .014*** .003        .012*** .003 
 
Percent born in state   -.004 .008     -.006 .007        -.005 .008 
 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+    .024** .008      .024** .007     .022** .008 
 
1 if Post-Furman   -.618 .264   -1.439** .544  -.649* .260 
 
1 if South   -.572 .420     -.378 .411       -.489 .445 
 
1 if Midwest   -.261 .376     -.195 .354       -.219 .379  
1 if West   -.570 .410     -.635 .384       -.500 .401  
Number of homicides   -.000 .000     -.000 .000       -.000 .000  
Institutionalization*Post-Furman    .002 .002        
Incarceration*Post-Furman       -.015 .008    
 
African American*Lynching              .001 .001 
 
Intercept  1.353 .168      .967 .206       1.186 .108 
 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 11: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 423 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8  
 
Model 9  
    b SE         b SE      b SE 
 
Zero Death Sentences 
        
 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate -.043 .024        -.043 .022 -.045 .024 
 
1 if Republican governor  .006 .292    .062 .275   .008 .289 
 
Percent Republicans in state legislature -.007 .013  -.004 .010  -.007 .012 
 
1 if Post-Furman        .097 .375    .061 .345   .079 .374 
 
1 if South     -1.747*** .460      -1.567*** .407      -1.763*** .435 
 
1 if Midwest   .052 .499    .070 .478         .083 .492  
1 if West     -1.501* .734      -1.596 .876     -1.476* .666  
Intercept       2.197 .969        2.091 .959       2.266 .920  
Log-pseudolikelihood  -897.746     -893.022     -897.204   
X²  578.50***      661.87***     613.01***   
AIC   1859.491      1850.043     1858.408   
McFadden's Adjusted R²      .125       .130          .126   
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012.         
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parsimonious nature of the secondary equation, the interaction terms are introduced only 
into the primary equation. Finally, the standard errors in these models are adjusted using 
a clustering procedure to account for the likelihood that the measurements within states 
across time are not independent.   
The findings in Table 13 contain the results from the zero-inflated negative 
binomial estimations. The results for the primary equation in Model 1 indicate support for 
a number of the key theoretical variables of interest. Consistent with the findings reported 
in the previous strategy, the results in Model 1 indicate that the percentage of religious 
fundamentalists, the percentage of state-level expenditures dedicated to welfare, and the 
percentage of unemployed individuals are all significant predictors of the number of 
death sentences equal to or greater than one. In terms of the control variables, the violent 
crime rate, the total state population, and the percentage of citizens residing in cities 
larger than 50,000 are also still significant predictors of the imposition of death sentences 
using this alternative specification.  
In contrast to the main models, the incarceration rate is no longer a significant 
predictor of death sentences equal to or greater than one. Using this analytic technique, 
the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates is now significantly and 
negatively associated with death sentence practices. In addition, there are also a number 
of new control variables that are now significant predictors of death sentence practices 
using this analytic strategy. More specifically, there is a higher likelihood that death 
sentences will be imposed in jurisdictions with larger yearly deficits. There were also 
fewer states with death sentences equal to or greater than one in the post-Furman era in 
comparison to the pre-Furman time period. In terms of the findings in the secondary 
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equation that predicts the absence of death sentences, states in the southern and western 
regions of the United States were less likely to report zero death sentences in comparison 
to those in the northeastern region. Overall, the primary and secondary equations in 
Model 1 account for 12.4% of the variance in jurisdictional death sentence practices. 
 Models 2 through 9 in Table 13 contain the results when the interaction terms are 
introduced into the primary equation. Similar to the procedures adopted in previous 
strategies, all of the covariates are mean centered in every model. The findings from all 
of these models indicate no support for any of the eight interaction terms. In addition, the 
inclusion of the interaction terms in the final eight models does little to improve the 
percentage of variance accounted for between the two equations. 
Consistent with the findings from the first alternative strategy, the results from the      
zero-inflated negative binomial estimates demonstrate support for a number of the 
findings presented in the primary models. In particular, this alternative strategy indicates 
that three out of the four significant theoretical variables identified in the primary models 
are associated with the imposition of death sentences equal to or greater than one. No 
support is demonstrated for the significant relationship between death sentences and 
jurisdictional incarceration rates reported in the primary models; however, the percentage 
of the vote for Republican presidential candidates is a significant predictor of state-level 
death sentences using this technique. The findings from the secondary equation that 
predicts the occurrence of zero death sentences indicate that the only significant 
predictors are the dummy variables designed to account for regional differences. Finally, 
the findings from this alternative strategy indicate that none of the interaction terms are 
significantly related to jurisdictional death sentences.  
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Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimations Using Two-Year Pooled Data Without 
1950  
 
The third alternative strategy relies on the same negative binomial procedures 
used in the main models, but the data for the 1950s are removed from the analyses. This 
alternative specification strategy examines whether the exclusion of the contemporaneous 
measurement for the 1950s from the analysis influences the findings reported in the 
primary models. Due to the removal of the 48 state-years for 1950, the data structure does 
not permit for the inclusion of the one-period lag in the dependent variable to account for 
autocorrelation; therefore, the data for the 1930s is incorporated back into the analyses.  
Model 1 in Table 12 contains the findings when the number of state-level death 
sentences was regressed on all of the theoretical and control variables. Similar to the 
findings from the primary models, the percentage of religious fundamentalist adherents, 
the percentage of states’ overall expenditures dedicated to welfare, and the percentage of 
the working age population that is unemployed are all still significant theoretical 
predictors of the number of state-level death sentences. In contrast to the primary models, 
the findings in this model indicate that the incarceration rate is not a significant predictor 
of death sentences using this strategy. The results also indicate that state-level 
institutionalization rates are significantly and positively related to the number of 
jurisdictional death sentences.
35
 In terms of the control variables, the violent crime rate, 
                                                          
35
 This significant finding is likely attributed to two factors specific to this analytic strategy. First, the measurement 
period for 1930 is reintroduced into the analyses when the lagged dependent variable is excluded from the models. 
As mentioned, this significant positive finding is likely partially attributed to the higher than average 
institutionalization rates and the large number of death sentences occurring in the measurement period for 1930. The 
second explanation involves the potential bias introduced when using a one-year contemporaneous measurement for 
the 1950s in the primary models. Since the average institutionalization rate was higher in the early 1950s than any 
other period in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries and death sentences are likely underestimated for this period in comparison 
to the pooled measurements for the other decades, this factor also potentially contributes to the significant findings 
for the institutionalization rate variable using this analytic strategy. 
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TABLE 12: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (TWO-YEAR POOLED DATA WITHOUT 1950)                                  
(N = 378 STATE-YEARS)  
 
 Model 1  
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3  
  b SE   b SE          b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate  -.015 .009        -.023* .010   -.014 .009 
1 if Republican governor        -.129 .115        -.104 .115         -.397 .247 
Percent Republicans in state legislature         .004 .005         .002 .005          .004 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists        .041*** .008         .041*** .007         .041*** .008 
Welfare expenditures        -.053*** .009        .053*** .009         -.057*** .010 
Institutionalization rate         .002** .001         .002** .001          .002** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        -.001 .001        -.001 .001         -.001 .001 
Percent African American        -.019 .022        -.015 .021         -.023 .022 
Percent African American²         .000 .001         .000 .001          .000 .001 
Percent unemployed         .058* .029         .058* .029          .063* .029 
Lynching rate         .006 .018         .003 .018          .005 .019 
Violent crime rate†         .138*** .037         .137*** .037          .137*** .037 
Surplus/Deficits/109        -.008 .004        -.007 .004         -.008 .004 
Total population/105         .007*** .002         .007*** .002          .007*** .002 
Percent born in state        -.032** .009        -.034*** .010         -.034*** .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+         .015** .006         .015** .005          .016** .006 
1 if Post-Furman        -.220 .215        -.278 .220         -.158 .220 
1 if South         .743 .420         .651 .420          .715 .422 
1 if Midwest         .764* .358         .725* .354          .727* .362 
1 if West         .514 .440         .428 .432          .388 .450 
Number of homicides†         .000 .000         .000 .000          .000 .000 
President*Post-Furman           .023 .015    
Governor*Post-Furman               .329 .268 
Constant        -.065 .952     -.414 .185         -.396 .192 
Log-likelihood   -835.081   -833.909     -834.325  
X²    213.50***    225.11***      218.01***  
AIC    1718.162    1717.818      1718.65  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012 (minus 1950).       
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TABLE 12: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (TWO-YEAR POOLED DATA WITHOUT 1950)                                 
(N = 378 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
 Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
         b SE   b SE         b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate -.015 .009        -.016 .009  -.017 .009 
1 if Republican governor        -.129 .115        -.139 .116         -.088 .114 
Percent Republicans in state legislature         .003 .006         .002 .005          .007 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists        .041*** .008         .034*** .009         .042*** .007 
Welfare expenditures       -.054*** .010      -.052*** .010         -.020 .013 
Institutionalization rate         .002** .001         .002* .001          .001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        -.001 .001        -.001 .001         -.001 .001 
Percent African American        -.020 .022        -.012 .022         -.006 .021 
Percent African American²         .000 .001         .000 .001          .000 .001 
Percent unemployed         .059* .029         .048 .030          .057* .028 
Lynching rate         .006 .019         .004 .018         -.003 .017 
Violent crime rate†         .139*** .037         .137*** .038          .130*** .037 
Surplus/Deficits/109        -.008 .004        -.008 .004          .011 .006 
Total population/105         .007*** .002         .007*** .002          .007*** .002 
Percent born in state        -.032** .010        -.029** .010         -.030** .009 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+         .015** .006         .016** .005          .015** .006 
1 if Post-Furman        -.199 .232       -.347 .234         -.603* .236 
1 if South         .751 .422         .682 .417          .603 .420 
1 if Midwest         .767* .359         .720* .352          .538 .343 
1 if West         .500 .444         .565 .437          .362 .423 
Number of homicides†         .000 .000         .000 .000          .000 .000 
Legislature*Post-Furman         .001 .006       
Religious*Post-Furman          .008 .006    
Welfare*Post-Furman              -.068*** .018 
Constant        -.392 .193       -.440 .190         -.322 .175 
Log-likelihood   -835.054    -834.144     -828.203  
X²    213.67***     218.34***      248.40***  
AIC    1720.107     1718.288      1706.406  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012 (minus 1950). 
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TABLE 12: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (TWO-YEAR POOLED DATA WITHOUT 1950)                                       
(N = 378 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
    Model 7  
 
  Model 8 
 
  Model 9 
   b SE   b SE         b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate      -.014 .009   -.013 .009        -.015 .009 
1 if Republican governor      -.118 .115          -.133 .113        -.147 .116 
Percent Republicans in state legislature        .002 .005    .003 .005         .004 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists        .040*** .008          .046*** .008        .039*** .008 
Welfare expenditures      -.057*** .010         -.049*** .009       -.052*** .010 
Institutionalization rate        .003*** .001           .001* .001      .002** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000       -.001 .001          -.001** .001        -.001 .001 
Percent African American       -.015 .022  -.028 .022        -.020 .023 
Percent African American²        .000 .001   .000 .001        -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed        .047 .030       .077** .028         .050 .030 
Lynching rate        .008 .019           .010 .019        -.007 .020 
Violent crime rate†        .127** .038         .135*** .035         .154*** .039 
Surplus/Deficits/109       -.008 .005         -.006 .003        -.008 .005 
Total population/105        .006** .002          .010*** .002         .007*** .002 
Percent born in state       -.030** .010         -.035*** .009         .031** .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+        .014* .006          .018** .006         .014* .006 
1 if Post-Furman       -.150 .226         -.761** .280        -.238 .216 
1 if South        .679 .422          .751 .424         .962* .441 
1 if Midwest        .734 .360          .819 .364         .753* .355 
1 if West        .517 .441          .433 .444         .620 .445 
Number of homicides†        .000 .000         -.000 .000         .000 .000 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman      -.002 .001       
Incarceration*Post-Furman          -.012** .004    
African American*Lynching              .002 .001 
Constant      -.478 .207        -.609 .211       -.405 .197 
Log-likelihood  -834.030      -830.597    -833.919  
X²   214.52***       227.49***     222.96***  
AIC   1718.060       1711.195     1717.839  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012 (minus 1950).         
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the total state population, the percentage of citizens born in the state in which they 
currently reside, and the percentage of state inhabitants living in cities larger than 50,000 
residents all demonstrate a significant relationship with jurisdictional death sentences. In 
addition, this model also indicates that states within the southern and midwestern regions 
of the United States reported a higher number of death sentences in comparison to those 
in the northeastern region.  
Models 2 through 9 contain the findings when the interaction terms are 
individually entered into the models. The findings from these models indicate that there 
were two significant interaction terms. The first significant interaction term in Model 6 is 
comprised of the welfare expenditures and the post-Furman dummy indicators. 
Consistent with the results reported in the primary model, the graphical representation of 
this interactive relationship (not shown) indicates that the predicted number of death 
sentences declined in both the pre- and post-Furman time period as the percentage of 
state-level expenditures on welfare increased.  
The second significant interaction term in Model 8 indicates that time period 
specific factors moderate the relationship between incarceration rates and jurisdictional 
death sentence practices. Consistent with the results reported in the primary models, the 
graphical representation (not shown) indicates that there was still a significant decline in 
predicted state-level death sentences in the post-Furman time period. However, with the 
exclusion of data from the 1950s, the pre-Furman line has a steeper negative slope using 
this alternative strategy. No support is shown for the remaining interaction terms using 
this alternative specification strategy, and the models containing the two significant 
interaction terms reported the lowest AIC statistics.  
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Similar to the findings reported in the previous two supplemental models, the 
results from this alternative strategy show support for three out of the four theoretical 
variables of interest that were identified in the primary models. The findings from     
Table 12 also denote that there was no support for the significant relationship between 
incarceration rates and jurisdictional death sentences. In addition, this alternative strategy 
also indicates that the institutionalization rate is a significant predictor of state-level death 
sentences when the data for 1950 is removed from the analyses. Furthermore, the 
findings from Model 1 also demonstrate support for all of the control variables identified 
in the primary models as being significantly associated with death sentence practices. The 
findings from this alternative strategy also demonstrate support for two out of the five 
significant interactive relationships that were identified as significant predictors of     
state-level death sentences in the main models. Particularly, this strategy indicates that 
time period specific factors moderate the relationship between jurisdictional death 
sentences and the percentage of welfare expenditures and the incarceration rate.  
Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimations Using Contemporary Measurements 
The final supplemental strategy focuses on the relationship between the 
theoretical variables and the number of jurisdictional death sentences when all of the 
independent and dependent variables are measured contemporaneously. This strategy is 
adopted to determine whether the three perspectives are able to predict contemporary  
death sentence practices, as opposed to the one-year lag used in the previous 
specifications. Since there are no gaps between the decade measurements using this  
strategy, the lagged dependent variable is incorporated into these models to account for 
autocorrelation. 
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TABLE 13: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2010 (CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATIONS)(N = 371 STATE-YEARS)  
 
   Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
       b SE         b SE           b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate .001 .010 
 
     -.006 .012    .002 .010 
1 if Republican governor .178 .129 
 
      .191 .129        -.200 .297 
Percent Republicans in state legislature        .000 .005 
 
     -.001 .005         .001 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .037*** .008 
 
      .036*** .008        .038*** .008 
Welfare expenditures      -.046*** .013 
 
     -.044** .013      -.047*** .013 
Institutionalization rate .001 .001 
 
      .001 .001         .001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 .000 .002 
 
     -.000 .002         .000 .002 
Percent African American .034 .027 
 
      .034 .026         .028 .027 
Percent African American²       -.002 .001 
 
     -.002 .001        -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed        .038 .031 
 
      .038 .031         .043 .030 
Lynching rate       -.002 .018 
 
     -.005 .018        -.004 .018 
Violent crime rate†        .060 .040 
 
      .061 .040         .060 .040 
Surplus/Deficits/109       -.004 .003 
 
    -.004 .003        -.004 .003 
Total population/105        .004 .002 
 
     .005* .002         .004* .002 
Percent born in state       -.018 .011 
 
    -.019 .011        -.020 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+        .018** .007 
 
     .017* .007      .018** .007 
1 if Post-Furman       -.263 .271 
 
    -.280 .274        -.130 .288 
1 if South       -.006 .482 
 
     .042 .477        -.056 .488 
1 if Midwest        .045 .349 
 
    -.053 .345        -.092 .354 
1 if West        .076 .454 
 
     .043 .447         .009 .457 
Number of homicides        .000 .000       .000 .000         .000 .000 
Lagged death sentences        .023 .012 
 
     .022 .012         .023 .012 
President*Post-Furman   
 
     .016 .016    
Governor*Post-Furman   
 
          .449 .317 
Constant       -.347 1.056     -.081 .229        -.077 .234 
Log-likelihood -626.563  
 
-626.073   -625.543  
X²  189.17***  
 
 198.21***    191.41***  
AIC  1303.127  
 
 1304.146    1303.087  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001         
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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TABLE 13: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2010 (CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATIONS)(N = 371 STATE-YEARS) 
CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
 
  b  SE   b SE   b SE 
 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate       -.001 .010 
 
      -.002 .010 
 
       .001 .010 
 
1 if Republican governor        .179 .129 
 
       .168 .128 
 
.197 .128 
 
Percent Republicans in state legislature        .005 .006 
 
      -.001 .005 
 
.002 .005 
 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .036*** .008 
 
    .027** .010 
 
      .036*** .008 
 
Welfare expenditures      -.045*** .013 
 
     -.045*** .013 
 
      -.011 .016 
 
Institutionalization rate        .000 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        .000 .002 
 
       .000 .002 
 
       .001 .002 
 
Percent African American        .038 .028 
 
       .039 .027 
 
       .045 .026 
 
Percent African American²       -.002 .001 
 
      -.002 .001 
 
      -.002 .001 
 
Percent unemployed        .033 .032 
 
       .025 .033 
 
.048 .030 
 
Lynching rate       -.002 .018 
 
      -.003 .018 
 
      -.005 .017 
 
Violent crime rate†        .055 .040 
 
       .056 .040 
 
       .060 .040 
 
Surplus/Deficits/109       -.004 .003 
 
      -.004 .003 
 
     -.006 .004 
 
Total population/105        .004 .002 
 
       .004 .002 
 
       .005 .002 
 
Percent born in state       -.017 .011 
 
      -.015 .011 
 
     -.014 .010 
 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+        .018** .007 
 
       .018** .007 
 
       .019** .007 
 
1 if Post-Furman       -.420 .314 
 
      -.474 .299 
 
       .446 .281 
 
1 if South        .019 .484 
 
      -.048 .475 
 
      -.111 .460 
 
1 if Midwest       -.066 .352 
 
      -.064 .347 
 
      -.216 .340 
 
1 if West        .140 .462 
 
       .136 .451 
 
      -.043 .435 
 
Number of homicides†        .000 .000         .000 .000         .000 .000  
Lagged death sentences        .024 .012 
 
       .025* .012 
 
       .024* .012 
 
Legislature*Post-Furman       -.007 .007 
 
  
 
  
 
Religious*Post-Furman   
 
       .011 .007 
 
  
 
Welfare*Post-Furman   
 
  
 
  -.065** .022 
 
Constant      -.015 .236        -.040 .227      - .417 .217  
Log-likelihood -626.095  
 
-625.367  
 
-622.198  
 
X²  185.99***  
 
 194.60***  
 
 223.18***  
 
AIC  1304.190  
 
 1302.734  
 
 1296.397  
 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
        
 
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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TABLE 13: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF DEATH 
SENTENCES IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2010 (CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATIONS)(N = 371 STATE-YEARS) 
CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
         b   SE    b SE    b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate        .001 .010 
 
       .004 .010 
 
         .003 .010 
1 if Republican governor        .182 .128 
 
       .181 .128 
 
         .170 .130 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       -.001 .006 
 
      -.000 .005 
 
         .000 .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .036*** .008 
 
       .040*** .008 
 
        .035*** .007 
Welfare expenditures       -.045*** .013 
 
      -.044** .013 
 
        -.044** .013 
Institutionalization rate        .001 .001 
 
       .000 .001 
 
         .001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        .000 .002 
 
       .002 .002 
 
         .000 .002 
Percent African American        .038 .027 
 
       .030 .027 
 
         .042 .027 
Percent African American²       -.002 .001 
 
      -.001 .001 
 
        -.003 .002 
Percent unemployed        .029 .033 
 
       .045 .031 
 
         .029 .032 
Lynching rate        .000 .018 
 
      -.005 .018 
 
        -.020 .021 
Violent crime rate†        .052 .040 
 
       .058 .040 
 
         .078 .042 
Surplus/Deficits/109      -.004 .003 
 
      -.004 .003 
 
        -.004 .003 
Total population/105       .004 .002 
 
       .006* .003 
 
         .005* .002 
Percent born in state      -.016 .011 
 
      -.020 .011 
 
        -.016 .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .017* .007 
 
       .020** .007 
 
         .015* .007 
1 if Post-Furman      -.210 .282 
 
     -.586 .342 
 
       -.280 .273 
1 if South      -.046 .480 
 
     -.047 .476 
 
        .096 .466 
1 if Midwest      -.060 .350 
 
     -.024 .348 
 
       -.049 .335 
1 if West       .127 .458 
 
      .000 .454 
 
        .257 .451 
Number of homicides†       .000 .000      -.000 .000        -.000 .000 
Lagged death sentences       .023 .012 
 
      .022 .012 
 
        .025 .013 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman      -.002 .002 
 
  
 
  
Incarceration*Post-Furman   
 
     -.007 .005 
 
  
African American*Lynching   
 
  
 
        .002 .002 
Constant      -.129 .250     -.178 .246        -.078 .223 
Log-likelihood -626.103  
 
-625.313  
 
-625.192  
X²  187.32***  
 
 196.71***  
 
 210.94***  
AIC  1304.205  
 
 1302.626  
 
 1302.385  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001         
†The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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The findings from this supplemental analytic strategy are presented in Table 13. 
The results in Model 1 indicate support for two of the theoretical variables of interest. 
Particularly, the percentage of religious fundamentalists and the percentage of state 
budgets dedicated to welfare are both significant predictors of death sentence practices. 
This is an important finding because it indicates that both of these variables are able to 
predict death sentence practices, regardless of the temporal measurement strategy used to 
examine the relationship between the predictors and the outcome variable. In  
addition, the percentage of citizens residing in cities larger than 50,000 inhabitants is 
significantly and positively associated with jurisdictional death sentences.  
Models 2 through 9 in Table 13 contain the findings when the interaction terms 
are introduced into the models. According to the findings contained in these models, the 
only significant interaction term in Model 6 indicates that the relationship between 
welfare expenditures and jurisdictional death sentence practices is conditioned by time 
period specific factors. The nature of this relationship using this alternative strategy (not 
shown) closely resembles the graphical depiction illustrated in Figure 8. No support is 
shown for the relationship between state-level death sentences and the remaining 
interaction terms, and the model containing the significant interaction term reported the 
lowest AIC statistic. 
The findings in Table 13 demonstrate support for two of the three significant 
theoretical variables identified in the primary models. The findings from Model 1 
indicate that the percentage of jurisdictional expenditures on welfare and the percentage 
of religious fundamentalists are both robust predictors of death sentence practices using 
contemporaneous measurements. The null finding for the unemployment and 
 127 
 
incarceration rate measures denotes that the predictive power of both of these variables is 
limited to models that examine the delayed impact of the independent variables on death 
sentences. Finally, the findings from these models demonstrate support for one of the five 
significant interaction terms identified in the primary models. According to the results in 
Model 6, the relationship between welfare expenditures and jurisdictional death sentences 
is conditioned by time period specific factors. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the political and social factors associated with state-level 
death sentences from 1930 to 2012.  The findings from the primary model that focused on 
direct effects indicated support for two out of the three theoretical perspectives examined 
in this study. More specifically, the percentage of religious fundamentalists within 
jurisdictions, the percentage of state budgets dedicated to welfare, the percentage of 
unemployed individuals within states, and the incarceration rate were all significantly 
associated with the number of jurisdictional death sentences. These findings are of 
particular importance because they demonstrate that the propositions within these 
theories are able to predict death sentence practices when the temporal scope is expanded 
beyond the post-Furman time period. However, no support was demonstrated for the 
partisan politics perspective, which appears to indicate that the direct relationship 
between the party affiliation of elected officials and state-level death sentences is a 
proximate manifestation associated with the post-Furman era. Finally, the violent crime 
rate, the total state population, the percentage of residents born in states in which they 
currently reside, and the percentage of state inhabitants that live in cities larger than 
50,000 were also all significant predictors of death sentence practices. 
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The findings from the primary models also indicated that the relationship between 
four of the key theoretical variables of interest and jurisdictional death sentences were 
conditioned by time period specific factors. In the case of the interaction terms that 
examined the percentage of religious fundamentalists within jurisdictions, the percentage 
of state budgets dedicated to welfare, and the incarceration rate, the movement across the 
two time periods acted to either strengthen or weaken the preexisting nature of the 
relationship between these variables and state-level death sentences. In addition, these 
findings also indicated that the strength of the negative relationship between the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and death sentence 
practices was significantly tempered when moving from the pre- to the post-Furman time 
period. All of these findings are important to this study because they indicate that the 
relationship between these variables and death sentence practices remained fairly 
consistent, despite the social and political changes that were occurring during the last 
third of the 20
th
 century. Finally, this study found that the relationship between the size of 
the African American population and the number of death sentences within jurisdictions 
was conditioned by past lynching rates.  
This chapter also examined a number of alternative methods for specifying the 
primary models.  In order to assist with the summation of these findings, Table 14 
contains the results for the key theoretical variables of interest and the interaction terms  
across the five different analytic strategies. In this table, the first column contains the 
expected directional sign of the coefficients for these variables based on post-Furman 
theoretical propositions. The actual directional sign in each of the analytic strategies is 
then presented in the next five columns. Finally, the last column in Table 14 contains a
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TABLE 14: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE KEY THEORETICAL VARIABLES AND INTERACTION 
TERMS ACROSS DEATH SENTENCE ANALYTIC STRATEGIES 
Variables 
Expected 
Post-Furman 
Sign 
Primary 
Models 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#1 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#2 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#3 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#4 Robustness  
Percent vote for Republican presidential 
candidate 
+ N.S. N.S. - N.S. N.S.       Low 
1 if Republican governor + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Percent Republicans in state legislature + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Percent religious fundamentalists + + + + + + High 
Welfare expenditures - - - - - - High 
Institutionalization rate  + N.S. + N.S. + N.S. Low 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 + - N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. Low 
Percent African American + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Percent African American² - N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Percent unemployed + + + + + N.S. High 
Lynching rate + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
President*Post-Furman + - N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. Low 
Governor*Post-Furman + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Legislator*Post-Furman + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Religious*Post-Furman + + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. Low 
Welfare*Post-Furman - - - N.S. - - High 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman + N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.A. 
Incarceration*Post-Furman + - - N.S. - N.S. Moderate 
African American*Lynching + + + N.S. N.S. N.S. Low 
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determination of the robustness of each of the findings based on the results from the 
various analytic strategies. In this column, “high” denotes findings that were supported in 
at least three out of the four supplemental strategies, “moderate” indicates that at least 
two of the alternative specifications supported the findings from the primary model, and 
“low” represents findings from the primary model that were supported in less than two of 
the alternative procedures. 
With respect to the findings that examined the direct relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, three out of the four analytic strategies 
demonstrated support for the significant relationship between death sentence practices 
and the percentage of religious fundamentalists, the percentage of welfare expenditures, 
and the percentage of unemployed individuals in the state population. In addition, the 
findings from the contemporaneous models also indicated that the percentage of religious 
fundamentalists and the percentage of welfare expenditures within jurisdictions were both 
significant predictors of state-level death sentences. The results associated with the three 
theoretical variables are important because they denote that these indicators are able to 
predict state-level death sentences, regardless of the analytic strategy used to assess these 
relationships.  
However, limited support was demonstrated for two of the theoretical variables in 
the supplemental procedures. In particular, the significant relationship between 
jurisdictional incarceration rates and death sentence practices in the primary models was 
not supported in any of the four supplemental strategies. Furthermore, two out of the four 
alternative specifications demonstrated support for the significant positive relationship 
between the institutionalization rate and state-level death sentences, which was not 
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significant in the primary models. Finally, one supplemental strategy indicated that there 
was a significant and negative relationship between death sentence practices and the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates. The inconsistency in the 
findings reported for these three variables indicates that the predictive power of these 
indicators is influenced by the analytic strategy adopted.  
The results from the supplemental strategies also indicated mixed support for the 
significant interaction terms identified in the primary models. In three out of the four 
alternative strategies, the results denoted that the relationship between welfare 
expenditures and jurisdictional death sentence practices was conditioned by time period 
specific factors. In terms of the relationship between the incarceration rate and state-level 
death sentences across periods, two out of the four alternative strategies supported the 
findings from the primary models. The relative consistency in these findings across 
analytic strategies would appear to indicate that these interactive relationships are robust 
predictors of death sentence practices, regardless of the analytic strategy adopted.  
In addition, the supplemental procedures demonstrated limited support for three 
of the interactive relationships. With regards to the interactive relationship that examined 
the moderating influence of past lynching rates on the relationship between the size of the 
African American population and jurisdictional death sentences, only one of the 
alternative specifications demonstrated support for the findings in the primary model. 
Finally, the findings from all four of the alternative specifications failed to demonstrate 
support for two out of the five significant interaction terms contained in the primary 
models. The lack of consistency in the findings across analytic strategies indicates that 
 132 
 
the relationship between these variables and death sentence practices is rather susceptible 
to the specification procedures adopted.  
Overall, the findings from this chapter are particularly important to this study 
because they indicated that the propositions within the political ideology and social threat 
perspectives are able to account for death sentence practices across the 20
th
 and            
21
st
 centuries. Although the time frame examined in this study is too narrow to declare 
these political and social factors ultimate causes, the findings associated with these 
variables do indicate that these factors are not mere proximate manifestations constrained 
to the post-Furman era. The results in this chapter also denoted that the movement across 
time periods significantly influenced the relationship between a number of the theoretical 
variables and death sentences, but these relationships were never completely redefined. 
This finding indicates that the nature of the relationship between the variables in the two 
perspectives and state-level death sentences primarily conformed to post-Furman 
theoretical expectations. However, the null findings associated with the partisan politics 
variables denote that the significant relationship between Republican elected officials and 
jurisdictional death sentences is likely a byproduct of the social and political changes 
occurring in the last third of the 20
th
 century.  
This study now turns to the examination of the political and social factors 
associated with the number of state-level executions from 1930 to 2012. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXECUTION RESULTS 
 This chapter begins with an examination of the findings from the primary models 
that examine the political and social factors associated with state-level executions from 
1930 to 2012. This chapter also examines the results from the primary models when each 
of the interaction terms is introduced into the analyses. The chapter then concludes with 
the examination of the findings from four supplemental analytic strategies that are 
designed to determine the robustness of the results presented in the primary models.  
RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL RESULTS 
 Consistent with the presentation of findings in the last chapter, this section first 
focuses on the results from the primary models that examine direct effects, followed by 
an examination of the findings when the interaction terms are introduced into the full 
model. The findings associated with the primary negative binomial models that examine 
direct effects are contained within Table 15. In this table, the first three models examine 
the results when the variables associated with each theoretical perspective are introduced 
separately. The fourth model presents the findings when jurisdictional executions are 
regressed on all of the theoretical variables, and the fifth model contains the results when 
all of the theoretical and control variables are introduced into the analysis. Due to the 
presence of autocorrelation and the need to account for the population at risk of being 
executed, a one-period lag in the dependent variable and a one-year lag in the number of 
state-level death sentences are both included in all of the models. 
 Model 1 in Table 15 contains the findings when the number of state-level 
executions was regressed on the partisan politics variables. The results within this model 
indicate that as the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates 
increases, reliance on executions at the state-level decreases. As mentioned in the 
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TABLE 15: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS IN 
JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 378 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
     b SE   b SE   b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate     -.029** .009       
1 if Republican governor        -.359 .187       
Percent Republicans in state legislature  .000 .005       
Percent religious fundamentalists           .023*** .004    
Welfare expenditures     .024 .013    
Institutionalization rate           .002*** .001    
Incarceration rate per 1,000           .004*** .001    
Percent African American               .037** .014 
Percent African American²           .000 .001 
Percent unemployed           .047 .032 
Lynching rate           .007 .012 
Homicide rate         
Violent crime rate         
Surplus/Deficits/109         
Total population/105         
Percent born in state         
Percent living in cities of 50,000+         
1 if Post-Furman         
1 if South         
1 if Midwest         
1 if West         
Number of death sentences     .041*** .010         .048*** .010         .036*** .010 
Lagged executions     .095*** .007         .074*** .008         .089*** .007 
Constant      -.176 .375      -3.235 .348  -2.132 .252 
Log-likelihood  -492.957     -474.990     -490.157  
X²  277.48***     252.92***      310.13  
AIC   1001.914      967.979      998.314  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
 135 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 15: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 
EXECUTIONS IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 378 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
                   b SE   b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate           -.037** .012          -.024* .012 
1 if Republican governor       -.222 .185         .073 .193 
Percent Republicans in state legislature              .023*** .006               .034*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists            .025** .007             .026** .009 
Welfare expenditures        .018 .014         .011 .014 
Institutionalization rate              .003*** .001          -.003* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000          .002* .001         .001 .001 
Percent African American          .046* .021           .071* .030 
Percent African American²       -.002 .001       -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed        .055 .032           .079* .033 
Lynching rate       .017 .016       -.006 .017 
Homicide rate         -.025 .034 
Violent crime rate         -.000 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109           .002 .005 
Total population/105         -.002 .002 
Percent born in state         -.010 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+               .025** .008 
1 if Post-Furman             -2.924*** .446 
1 if South          1.083* .515 
1 if Midwest          .488 .420 
1 if West          .738 .481 
Number of death sentences              .046*** .011              .066*** .013 
Lagged executions              .066*** .009              .057*** .011 
Constant    -2.387 .631     -1.369 1.156 
Log-likelihood -462.715         -424.572  
X²      258.61***          316.30***  
AIC  957.430    901.144  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.      
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previous chapter, this negative relationship is likely due to the strong Democratic 
presence in the southern United States and the greater use of executions in the             
pre-Furman time period. No support is demonstrated for the relationship between 
execution practices and the presence of Republican governors and the percentage of 
Republicans in the state legislature. Both the number of jurisdictional death sentences and 
the lagged dependent variable are positively and significantly related to state-level 
execution practices in this model. 
 The second model contains the findings when the number of executions was 
regressed on the four variables within the political ideology perspective. In this model, 
the findings indicate support for three out of the four theoretical variables of interest. 
More specifically, as the percentage of religious fundamentalists within states increases, 
the number of executions also increases. In addition, as jurisdictional institutionalization 
rates increase, there is greater reliance on executions. Finally, these findings also indicate 
that there is greater reliance on executions in states that reported high incarceration rates. 
No support is shown for the significant relationship between jurisdictional welfare 
expenditures and execution practices. Again, the number of jurisdictional death sentences 
and the lagged outcome variables are both significant predictors of executions within 
jurisdictions. 
 Turning now to the results contained in Model 3, these findings indicate support 
for one out of the four social threat variables. Particularly, the findings within this model 
denote that there is a significant relationship between the percentage of African 
Americans in the state population and execution practices. In order to explore this 
relationship, the coefficients for the linear and quadratic terms from Model 3 were used  
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to predict the number of state-level executions. Figure 11 contains the graphical depiction 
when the predicted number of executions is plotted against the percentage of African 
Americans within state populations. According to this graph, as the percentage of African 
Americans within jurisdictions increases, the predicted number of state-level executions 
also increases. However, in contrast to the predictions of racial threat theorists, the 
findings in this graph indicate no support for an inflection point at which the relationship 
between the two variables turns from positive to negative. The remainder of the findings 
in Model 3 indicate no support for the significant relationship between jurisdictional 
executions and the percentage of the working age population that reported being 
unemployed and the past lynching rate. The number of jurisdictional death sentences and 
the lagged outcome measure are also found to be positively and significantly related to 
the number of state-level executions in this model. 
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FIGURE 11: THE CURVILINEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE 
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL EXECUTIONS 
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 The fourth model examines the relationship between all of the theoretical 
variables within the three perspectives and state-level executions. Consistent with the 
findings in the first three models, the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates, the percentage of religious fundamentalists, the institutionalization rate, the 
incarceration rate, and the percentage of African Americans in state populations are all 
still significantly associated with jurisdictional executions. However, with the inclusion 
of all of the theoretical variables, the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature 
now demonstrates a significant relationship with the number of state-level executions, 
which indicates a suppressor effect.
36
 Consistent with the post-Furman hypotheses, as the 
percentage of the Republicans in the state legislature increases, so too does the number of 
jurisdictional executions. As mentioned, the difference between the directional signs for 
the two significant partisan politics variables is likely attributed to the interactive 
relationship between the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and the 
percentage of religious fundamentalists within jurisdictions. The results from this model 
                                                          
36
 Similar to the procedures used to examine suppressor effects in the previous chapter, supplemental 
analyses were conducted where each of the alternative theoretical variables was introduced individually 
into Model 1. The results from this analysis (not shown) indicated that the inclusion of the religious 
fundamentalist variable in the model increased the predictive value of the percentage of Republicans in the 
state legislature. To further explore the nature of the relationship between the two variables, an interaction 
term comprised of the indicators was introduced into the full model. In accordance with the nature of the 
suppressor effect, the hypothesis behind the interactive effect was that the size of the religious 
fundamentalist population will moderate the relationship between Republicans in the state legislature and 
execution practices. The results of this analysis (not shown) demonstrated support for the relationship 
between the interaction term and jurisdictional executions.  
        In order to explore the nature of this interactive relationship, a graphical representation (not shown) of 
the relationship between the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and execution practices was 
examined when the percentage of religious fundamentalists was set to one standard deviation both below 
and above the mean. This graph indicated that as the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature 
increased from one standard deviation below the mean, so too did the number of executions, regardless of 
the size of the religious fundamentalist population. This graph also indicated that the positive relationship 
between state-level executions and the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature became stronger 
when there was a larger than average percentage of religious fundamentalists in the state population. This 
finding is significant because it suggests that there will be greater reliance on executions within 
jurisdictions that report both a larger than average religious fundamentalist population and larger than 
average percentage of Republican officials in the state legislature.  
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also indicate that the lagged dependent variable and the number of state-level death 
sentences demonstrate a significant relationship with jurisdictional executions.  
 In Model 5, the number of jurisdictional executions was regressed on all of the 
theoretical and control variables. Similar to the findings reported in the fourth model, the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates, the percentage of 
Republicans in the state legislature, the percentage of religious fundamentalists, and the 
percentage of African Americans in the state population all demonstrate a significant 
relationship with execution practices.
37
 However, with the inclusion of the control 
variables, there are three discrepancies between the findings in this model and those 
reported in Model 4. First, the significant relationship between jurisdictional 
incarceration rates and execution practices is attenuated. Second, although the 
institutionalization rate is still a significant predictor of executions, the directional sign of 
this variable switches from positive to negative when the control variables are included in 
the model.
38
 Lastly, the percentage of working age adults that are unemployed in the state 
                                                          
37
 The nature of the curvilinear relationship between the percentage of African Americans and predicted 
executions from Model 5 is almost identical to the graph illustrated in Figure 11. However, since the 
quadratic component turns from positive in Model 3 to negative in the full model, the graph of the 
relationship (not shown) using point estimates in Model 5 contains a very slight concave downward curve, 
as opposed to the very slight concave upward curve reported in Figure 11. 
 
38
 In order to explore the third variable that is responsible for the change in the directional sign for the 
institutionalization rate variable, supplemental analyses were conducted where all of the theoretical 
variables were included in a model and the control variables were entered one at a time. The findings from 
these analyses (not shown) indicated that the inclusion of the post-Furman dummy indicator was 
responsible for the switching of the directional sign. Given this finding, additional analyses were conducted 
to determine whether the nature of the relationship between these variables was interactive. The findings 
contained within Model 6 of Table 16 in this chapter indicate that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between this interaction term and jurisdictional executions. The graphical representation of this 
relationship is contained in Figure 15 in this chapter.  
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population is now a significant predictor of jurisdictional executions, which again 
indicates a suppressor effect.
39
  
In addition to the findings associated with the theoretical variables, a number of 
the control variables demonstrate a significant relationship with state-level executions. 
The findings in Model 5 indicate that as the percentage of residents living within cities 
containing more than 50,000 inhabitants, the number of jurisdictional death sentences, 
and the lagged dependent variable all increase, so too does the number of state-level 
executions. The results within this model also indicate that there are more executions in 
the pre-Furman time period in comparison to the post-Furman time period, and the 
number of executions in the southern United States is higher when compared to the 
northeastern region. According to the AIC statistic across the five models, the full model 
demonstrates the lowest value, which indicates that this is the preferred model.
40
   
 The findings from Table 15 are of particular importance to this dissertation 
because they demonstrate support for the propositions within all three of the theoretical 
perspectives. When focusing on the variables designed to examine the partisan politics 
perspective, the findings in the full model indicate support for two out of the three 
                                                          
39
 To determine the variable responsible for increasing the predictive value of the unemployment measure, 
supplemental analyses were conducted where each of the control variables was introduced one at a time 
into the model containing all of the theoretical variables. The results from these analyses (not shown) 
indicated that the inclusion of the post-Furman dummy variable was responsible for the increased 
predictive value of the unemployment indicator. Again, the relationship between the two variables was 
further examined by including an interaction term comprised of the two variables in the full model. The 
results from this analysis (not shown) indicated that the interaction term was not a significant predictor of 
state-level execution practices. 
 
40
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to assess model fit across analytic strategies using the AIC 
statistic, all of the models must rely on the same cases and the same dependent variable. Similar to the 
restrictions outlined in the last chapter, model fit comparisons using the AIC statistic cannot be made across 
analytic procedures when there are differences in the sample analyzed. Based on this restriction, 
comparisons cannot be drawn between the primary models and the first two supplemental analytic 
strategies used for the execution dependent variable. However, the third and fourth supplemental strategy in 
this chapter rely on the same cases examined in the primary model; therefore, the AIC statistic can be used 
to assess model fit across these analytic procedures. 
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theoretical variables. Interestingly, the finding associated with the relationship between 
the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and state-level 
executions is negative, while the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature 
demonstrates a positive relationship with execution practices. As mentioned, the 
difference in directional signs between the two partisan politics variable is likely 
attributed to the interactive relationship between Republicans in the state legislature and 
the size of the religious fundamentalist population. These findings are also particularly 
interesting given the non-significant direct relationship between the partisan politics 
variables and state-level death sentence practices. The findings for both dependent 
variables would appear to suggest that the party affiliation of public officials is more 
strongly associated with the actual imposition of the penalty over the course of the entire 
period analyzed, as opposed to the sentencing phase of the punishment. Although the 
direction of the relationship for both significant variables does not conform to            
post-Furman theoretical expectations, these findings do suggest that the relationship 
between political party affiliation and the number of jurisdictional executions is not 
restricted to the post-Furman time period.  
In terms of the findings associated with the political ideology perspective, the 
results in the full model demonstrate support for two out of the four theoretical variables. 
More specifically, these findings indicate that the percentage of religious fundamentalists 
within jurisdictions is a significant and positive predictor of execution practices. This is 
an important finding because it signifies that the relationship between the size of the 
fundamentalist population within states and jurisdictional execution practices is not 
restricted to the last third of the 20
th
 century. Furthermore, the findings for this 
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perspective also indicate that there is a negative relationship between jurisdictional 
institutionalization rates and execution practices. As mentioned, the negative relationship 
between institutionalization rates and executions is likely attributed to the interactive 
relationship between the former indicator and the post-Furman dummy variable. This 
finding is particularly interesting given the positive relationship between this variable and 
death sentence practices reported in two of the supplemental models in the last chapter. 
According to this finding, reliance on executions is greatest in states that reported lower 
institutionalization rates, which refutes the hypothesis stipulated in the third chapter.  
Turning now to the results associated with the social threat perspective, the 
findings from the full model demonstrate support for two out of the four theoretical 
variables. Particularly, these findings indicate that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between the size of the African American population and execution practices. This 
finding is significant because it denotes that the percentage of African Americans within 
jurisdictions is able to account for execution practices beyond the post-Furman time 
period. Given the null findings reported in the last chapter, this is also an important 
finding because it suggests that the percentage of African Americans in the state 
population is associated with the actual imposition of the punishment, as opposed to the 
sentencing phase. However, no support is shown for an inflection point at which the 
relationship between the size of the African American population and execution practices 
turns from positive to negative.  
The findings from the full model also indicate that there is a significant positive 
relationship between state-level unemployment and the number of executions. This 
finding is particularly interesting because scholars have yet to examine the nature of the 
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relationship between these variables at the state level. This finding is also important 
because it indicates that the percentage of unemployed individuals within states is 
capable of predicting both death sentence and execution practices across the 20
th
 and    
21
st
 centuries. Finally, despite Zimring’s (2003) theoretical contentions, no support is 
shown for the relationship between past lynchings and execution practices in any of the 
models contained within Table 15. 
In addition to the findings associated with the key theoretical variables, there are 
also a number of control variables that demonstrate a significant relationship with 
execution practices. First, the percentage of state residents living in cities larger than 
50,000 inhabitants demonstrates a significant and positive relationship with state-level 
executions. This finding indicates that states with a greater percentage of residents living 
in more urbanized areas are more likely to rely on both stages involved with the capital 
punishment process. Second, the findings from the full model indicate that there are a 
greater number of executions in the pre-Furman time period in comparison to the       
post-Furman era. This result denotes that reliance on execution practices differs 
significantly across the two time periods. Third, the findings in Model 5 indicate that 
there is greater reliance on executions in the southern United States in comparison to the 
northeastern region. Lastly, the findings from the full model denote that the number of 
jurisdictional death sentences one year before the pooled measurement of the dependent 
variable and the number of executions enacted in the previous decade are both significant 
and positive predictors of this punishment practice. Overall, the findings from the 
primary full model indicate that the predictive power of post-Furman political variables 
is not limited to the last third of the 20
th
 century.  
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TABLE 16: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 
EXECUTIONS IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 378 STATE-YEARS) 
 
  Model 1 
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
               b SE          b SE             b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate       -.035** .012        -.022 .012       -.020 .012 
1 if Republican governor    .097 .191        -.174 .265        .088 .195 
Percent Republicans in state legislature          .029*** .008        .034*** .007    .028** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists        .023** .008      .026** .009    .027** .009 
Welfare expenditures    .013 .014  .010 .014        .010 .014 
Institutionalization rate       -.003** .001   -.003* .001       -.002 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000    .001 .001  .001 .001        .001 .001 
Percent African American      .073* .030    .065* .030        .064* .030 
Percent African American²         -.002 .001        -.001 .001       -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed     .077* .032    .078* .032        .084* .032 
Lynching rate         -.009 .016        -.007 .017       -.009 .017 
Homicide rate         -.026 .032        -.025 .034       -.020 .034 
Violent crime rate          .000 .001        -.000 .001        .000 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109          .002 .005         .003 .005        .002 .005 
Total population/105         -.000 .003        -.002 .002       -.002 .002 
Percent born in state         -.014 .010        -.010 .011       -.011 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .024** .008      .025** .008    .024** .008 
1 if Post-Furman      -3.185*** .460     -2.841*** .448   -2.732*** .463 
1 if South          .949 .500       1.048* .512      1.054* .518 
1 if Midwest          .450 .403         .476 .419         .537 .423 
1 if West          .558 .466         .690 .476         .675 .482 
Number of death sentences         .060*** .012         .063 .013       .066*** .013 
Lagged executions         .047*** .011       .056*** .011       .052*** .011 
President*Post-Furman          .067* .028       
Governor*Post-Furman          .555 .391    
Legislature*Post-Furman       .019 .011 
Constant      -1.176 .250     -1.155 .249      -1.149 .247 
Log-likelihood   -421.732    -423.543    -423.135  
X²  340.39***    327.18***    320.49***  
AIC    897.464     901.085     900.270  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.        
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TABLE 16: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 
EXECUTIONS IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 378 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
       b SE              b SE              b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate      -.030* .012   -.024* .012         -.019 .012 
1 if Republican governor       .067 .189   .062 .191   .115 .193 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      .033*** .008         .035*** .008         .028*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .017 .009       .027** .008     .022* .009 
Welfare expenditures       .012 .014   .025 .015   .010 .015 
Institutionalization rate    -.003*** .001      -.003** .001         -.001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000       .001 .001   .002 .001   .001 .001 
Percent African American       .071* .031     .072* .031    .077* .031 
Percent African American²      -.001 .001         -.001 .001        -.002 .001 
Percent unemployed       .055 .035     .085* .033  .053 .033 
Lynching rate      -.005 .017         -.011 .016        -.005 .018 
Homicide rate      -.014 .034  -.041 .034  .008 .035 
Violent crime rate      -.000 .001   .000 .001        -.001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109       .003 .005   .001 .006         .006 .007 
Total population/105      -.002 .002        -.000 .003        -.004 .002 
Percent born in state      -.009 .011        -.010 .010        -.007 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+   .026** .008      .024** .008    .018* .008 
1 if Post-Furman   -3.214*** .462     -2.968*** .437      -4.151*** .730 
1 if South    1.020* .508       1.186* .522         .956 .538 
1 if Midwest      .457 .415         .489 .406         .599 .443 
1 if West      .770 .483         .701 .477         .912 .498 
Number of death sentences   .066*** .013       .061*** .013        .077*** .014 
Lagged executions   .057*** .011         .061 .011        .057*** .011 
Religious*Post-Furman      .020* .009       
Welfare*Post-Furman    -.071* .032    
Institutionalization*Post-Furman        -.014** .005 
Constant    -1.158 .254      -1.131 .249     -2.093 .457 
Log-likelihood -422.374    -422.010   -419.531  
X² 310.87***    340.04***    304.65***  
AIC  898.748      898.019    893.061  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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TABLE 16: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 378 STATE-YEARS) 
CONT. 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
                     
  b SE         b SE 
                     
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate  -.026* .012   -.031* .012 
                     
1 if Republican governor .077 .192  .068 .192 
                     
Percent Republicans in state legislature       .035*** .008        .036*** .008 
                     
Percent religious fundamentalists     .024** .009      .029** .008 
                     
Welfare expenditures  .011 .015         .007 .015 
                     
Institutionalization rate       -.002 .001    -.003** .001 
                     
Incarceration rate per 1,000        .000 .001         .001 .001 
                     
Percent African American        .075* .030    .062* .030 
                     
Percent African American²       -.002 .001        -.002 .001 
                     
Percent unemployed        .063 .033         .070* .033 
                     
Lynching rate       -.005 .018        -.037 .026 
                     
Homicide rate       -.001 .034        -.029 .034                      
Violent crime rate        .000 .001         .000 .001 
                     
Surplus/Deficits/109        .001 .007         .002 .005 
                     
Total population/105       -.004 .002        -.002 .002 
                     
Percent born in state       -.011 .011        -.014 .011 
                     
Percent living in cities of 50,000+        .021** .008         .022** .008 
                     
1 if Post-Furman    -2.280*** .499    -3.008*** .449 
                     
1 if South        .955 .517      1.300* .516 
                     
1 if Midwest        .434 .426        .499 .416 
                     
1 if West        .725 .485        .702 .481 
                     
Number of death sentences       .071*** .013      .068*** .013                      
Lagged executions       .056*** .011      .061*** .011 
                     
Incarceration*Post-Furman     .016** .005    
                     
Lynching*African American         .003 .002 
                     
Constant      -.781 .271   -1.156 .249                      
Log-likelihood -420.056   -422.909  
                     
X² 313.12***   325.06***  
                     
AIC  894.111    899.812  
                     
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.      
 
 147 
 
The remainder of this section now turns to the examination of the findings when the 
interaction terms are included in the analyses. 
In Table 16, each of the interaction terms is entered into the full model one at a 
time. Similar to the procedures used in the previous chapter, all of the covariates in these  
models have been mean centered to ensure accurate plotting of the interactive 
relationships. The results in Models 1 through 7 examine whether time period specific 
factors moderate the relationship between execution practices and the partisan politics 
and the political ideology variables. Similar to the procedures adopted in the last chapter 
for significant interaction terms, the relationship between the theoretical indicators and 
predicted executions is examined across time periods when the independent variables are 
set to both one standard deviation below (low) and above (high) the mean. The results in 
Model 8 examine whether the relationship between jurisdictional executions and the size 
of the African American population is conditioned by past lynching rates. Overall, the 
findings from these models demonstrate support for five of the interactive relationships, 
and the lower AIC statistics reported for the models containing the interaction terms 
indicate they are preferred to the full model in Table 15. 
 The findings contained within Model 1 indicate that the relationship between the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and execution practices is 
conditioned by period effects. Figure 12 contains the graphical depiction of this 
relationship. Consistent with the findings in the last chapter, as the percentage of the vote 
for Republican presidential candidates increases from one standard deviation below the 
mean, the predicted number of executions decreases. Again, this finding is likely 
attributed to the strong allegiance to the Democratic Party in the southern United States  
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during this time period. Furthermore, there is also a very slight increase in the predicted 
number of executions when the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates increases in the post-Furman period. Although the strength of the positive 
relationship in the post-Furman era is negligible, it does indicate that the relationship 
between execution practices and the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates is redefined when moving across the two time periods. This is an important 
finding because it indicates that shifts in the political landscape in the 1970s effectively 
changed the nature of the relationship between execution practices and political party 
affiliation. 
Model 4 contains the results when the interaction term comprised of the 
percentage of religious fundamentalists and the post-Furman dummy variable is included 
in the analyses. The findings within this model indicate that there is a significant and  
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FIGURE 12: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF THE 
VOTE FOR REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND 
PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL EXECUTIONS BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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positive relationship between this interaction term and state-level execution practices, and 
Figure 13 plots the nature of this interactive relationship. According to this graph, the 
predicted number of state-level executions in the pre-Furman era increases as the 
percentage of religious fundamentalists within jurisdictions increases from one deviation 
below the mean. In addition, the slight increase in the post-Furman slope indicates that 
the size of the religious fundamentalist population only has a marginal positive impact on 
the number of jurisdictional executions in this era. Consistent with the relationship 
between this interaction term and death sentence practices, the relationship between the 
size of the religious fundamentalist population and execution practices is stronger in the 
pre-Furman time period. 
 The findings in Model 5 also indicate that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between jurisdictional executions and the interaction term comprised of the  
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FIGURE 13: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISTS AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL 
EXECUTIONS BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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welfare expenditures and the post-Furman dummy variables. According to the graphical 
representation in Figure 14, the predicted number of state-level executions increases in 
the pre-Furman time period when the percentage of expenditures dedicated to welfare 
increases from one standard deviation below the mean. This is an interesting finding 
given that the nature of the interactive relationship between these variables and state-level 
death sentences is negative in the pre-Furman time period.
41
 This graph also indicates 
                                                          
41
 Since the nature of the relationship between welfare expenditures and both dependent variables differs in 
the pre-Furman time period, trends in these practices were examined. With respect to trends in welfare 
expenditures, these practices generally decreased from the 1940s to the 1960s, though there is some 
variation across jurisdictions in regards to this pattern. In terms of trends in executions, reliance on this 
form of punishment primarily decreased from the mid-1930s until the moratorium. Based on the general 
decline in the trends for both executions and welfare expenditures across this time period, it is likely that 
this factor accounts for the positive relationship between these variables in the pre-Furman time period.  
        In regards to death sentence trends, reliance on these practices was highest in the 1940s, and the use of 
this form of punishment generally decreased leading up to the Furman decision. Since death sentence 
practices and welfare expenditures appear to follow the same general trend as the relationship between the 
latter variable and jurisdictional executions, there are two potential explanations that could account for the 
difference in directional signs across the two dependent variables.     
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FIGURE 14: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
WELFARE EXPENDITURES AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL EXECUTIONS 
BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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that when jurisdictional expenditures on welfare increase in the post-Furman time period, 
the predicted number of executions decreases. This finding is particularly important 
because it indicates that the movement from the pre- to the post-Furman era redefines the 
nature of the relationship between welfare expenditures and execution practices. This 
finding is also important because it supports the results from post-Furman studies 
(Beckett & Western, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Stucky, Heimer & Lang, 2005), 
which indicate that welfare expenditures are negatively associated with punishment 
practices during this time period. 
The results associated with the inclusion of the interaction term comprised of the 
institutionalization rate and the post-Furman dummy variable are contained in Model 6. 
The findings in this model denote that time period specific factors moderate the 
relationship between jurisdictional institutionalization rates and the number of 
executions. Figure 15 contains the graphical representation of this relationship. 
According to this graph, the number of state-level executions decreases in both the  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
        The first explanation focuses on the nature of the decline for both stages associated with this form of 
punishment. From 1940 until 1960, reliance on death sentences and executions in the United States 
declined 23% and 55%, respectively. Since the decline in death sentences was not as substantial as the 
decrease in executions, there are far more states in the 1960s that reported high death sentences than there 
are jurisdictions that reported high executions. More specifically, out of the highest 46 death sentence states 
in this time period, 47% are cases from 1960, whereas 22% of the 47 highest execution states are cases 
from 1960. Based on the low percentage of welfare expenditures and the rather large proportion of high 
death sentence states in the 1960s, this factor likely partially explains the negative finding for the 
relationship between these two variables. 
         The second explanation focuses on the likely underestimation of death sentences in 1950. Given the 
one-year measurement of state-level death sentences in this decade, the potential bias involved with 
adopting this strategy is not introduced when examining jurisdictional executions. In order to further 
explore the differences between the two dependent variables in 1950, the states with the greatest reliance on 
these practices across the pre-Furman era are examined. With respect to the 46 highest death sentence 
states, 11% of these cases are from 1950. When examining the 47 highest execution states, 34% of the 
cases are from this decade. Due to the underrepresentation of cases from the 1950s among states that 
reported the highest number of death sentences, it is likely that this factor contributes to the higher 
representation of cases from the 1960s for this dependent variable. Given the potential bias associated with 
the inclusion of the one-year death sentence measurement for 1950, this finding also partially accounts for 
the opposite pre-Furman findings regarding the relationship between welfare expenditures and both stages 
in the capital punishment process. 
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pre- and the post-Furman time period as state-level institutionalization rates increase 
from one standard deviation below the mean. This graph also indicates that the negative 
relationship between institutionalization rates and execution practices is stronger in the 
post-Furman era, in comparison to the pre-Furman time period. The findings within this 
graph are important because they provide evidence in direct opposition to the hypothesis 
stipulated in Chapter Three, which postulated that high institutionalization rates should be 
associated with a stronger reliance on executions.
42
 Based on these findings, it would 
appear as though reliance on executions is highest in jurisdictions with the least punitive  
                                                          
42
 In order to further explore the nature of the interactive relationship between institutionalization rates and 
the post-Furman dummy variable, trends in executions and institutionalization rates were examined across 
both eras. With respect to trends in institutionalization rates in the pre-Furman time period, reliance on this 
practice increased primarily from 1930 until the mid-1950s and then slowly began to decline up until the 
late 1960s. Since the number of executions within jurisdictions decreased primarily from the mid-1930s 
leading up to the moratorium, the oppositional nature of the trends in executions and institutionalization 
rates in the pre-Furman time period likely accounts for the negative relationship between the two variables 
in this era.  
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FIGURE 15: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION RATE AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL 
EXECUTIONS BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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institutionalization practices in both the pre- and post-Furman time periods.    
The final significant interaction term within Model 7 is comprised of the 
incarceration rate and the post-Furman dummy variable. The results in this model 
indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between this interaction term 
and the number of jurisdictional executions. According to the graphical representation of 
this interactive relationship contained in Figure 16, the relatively flat angle of the  
pre-Furman slope indicates that variation in incarceration practices have little influence 
on state-level executions. This graphical depiction also indicates that as incarceration 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
        When examining trends in institutionalization rates in the post-Furman time period, reliance on this 
practice substantially decreased from the 1970s until 2012.  In terms of trends in executions, due to the 
moratorium and the amount of time it took jurisdictions to comply with stipulations contained within the 
Gregg decision, zero executions were reported in the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1980s, trends in 
executions slowly started to increase until the turn of the millennium, at which point jurisdictional 
executions declined. Since executions were highest in the 1990s through 2012 and institutionalization rates 
were at their lowest, this factor appears to account for the negative relationship between institutionalization 
rates and execution practices in the post-Furman time period. 
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FIGURE 16: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INCARCERATION 
RATE AND PREDICTED STATE-LEVEL EXECUTIONS BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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rates increase from one standard deviation below the mean in the post-Furman time 
period, predicted jurisdictional death sentences also increase. This is an important finding 
because it provides partial support for the hypothesis outlined in previous chapters, which 
argues that high incarceration rates should be associated with greater reliance on capital 
punishment practices. The finding associated with this interaction term is also interesting 
given the negative relationship between incarceration rates and state-level death sentence 
practices in the post-Furman era.
43
 
 The findings in Table 16 are of particular importance to this dissertation because 
they indicate that the relationship between a number of the theoretical variables and 
execution practices is influenced by period effects. In the case of the interaction terms 
comprised of the post-Furman dummy variable and the percentage of religious 
fundamentalists and the institutionalization rate, the findings associated with these 
interactive relationships indicate that the movement across the two eras acted to either 
strengthen or weaken the preexisting nature of the relationship between these variables 
and execution practices.  
 The findings from these models also denote that the movement across the two 
time periods altered the nature of the relationship between three theoretical variables and 
                                                          
43
 Based on opposite directional signs for the relationship between post-Furman incarceration rates and the 
two different stages involved with the capital punishment process, trends in these relationships are 
examined. With respect to trends in incarceration rates in the post-Furman time period, reliance on this 
punishment generally increased from 1970 until 2012.  As mentioned in the last chapter, the negative 
relationship between incarceration rates and death sentences is likely attributed to the high incarceration 
rates and the low number of death sentences in the 21
st
 century.  
        When focusing on the nature of the relationship between executions and incarceration rates in the 
post-Furman time period, executions increased primarily in the 1980s until the end of the millennium, at 
which point reliance on this stage of the capital punishment process decreased. Although executions 
declined in the 21
st
 century, reliance on this punishment is still higher in comparison to the 1970s and early 
1980s. Of the 48 states that executed at least one offender in the post-Furman era, 67% of these 
jurisdictions relied on this practice in the 21
st
 century. Given the high percentage of states that executed 
offenders and the high incarceration rates in the 21
st
 century, this finding appears to account for the positive 
relationship in the post-Furman time period, as well as the opposite directional signs for the two capital 
punishment stages. 
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execution practices. Particularly, in the case of the interaction terms containing the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and the percentage of 
welfare expenditures, the relationship between these variables and execution practices 
changes direction across the pre- and post-Furman time periods. In addition, the findings 
for the interaction term containing the incarceration rate variable denote that the 
relationship between this indicator and jurisdictional executions is much stronger in the 
post-Furman era in comparison to the earlier time period. All three of these results are 
important to this study because they indicate that the social and political changes 
occurring in the last third of the 20
th
 century effectively redefined the relationship 
between these indicators and jurisdictional executions. The remainder of this chapter now 
turns to the examination of the results from four supplemental strategies designed to 
determine the robustness of the findings presented in the primary models.  
RESULTS FROM SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimations Excluding Non-Death Penalty     
State-Years 
 
 The first alternative specification examines the nature of the relationship between 
the theoretical variables and the jurisdictional executions when non-death penalty     
state-years are removed from the analyses. Consistent with the justification outlined in 
the last chapter, the inclusion of non-death penalty state-years in the primary models 
could bias the results of the analyses due to the penalty being illegal within these 
jurisdictions. Based on this argument, 61 individual state-years are removed from the 
analyses. In addition to these measurement points, the 48 state-years for the 1970s are 
also removed since the imposition of the penalty was not possible during the moratorium. 
Due to the removal of these state-years from the analyses, the data structure does not
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TABLE 17: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (EXCLUSION OF NON-DEATH PENALTY STATES) (N = 313 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
     b SE       b SE            b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate        -.012 .010    -.034** .010        -.020 .010 
1 if Republican governor         .028 .176         .059 .171        -.225 .217 
Percent Republicans in state legislature        .019*** .005     .016** .005        .020*** .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists      .022** .008         .018 .007      .022** .008 
Welfare expenditures        -.007 .011        -.003 .012        -.006 .012 
Institutionalization rate   -.002* .001    -.003** .001    -.002** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 -.001 .001       -.000 .001         .000 .001 
Percent African American -.002 .034        .042 .023         .039 .023 
Percent African American²  .001 .001       -.000 .001         .000 .001 
Percent unemployed      .087** .032    .104** .031     .108** .031 
Lynching rate  .002 .016       -.015 .015       -.013 .016 
Homicide rate        .038 .027       -.008 .025       -.003 .027 
Violent crime rate        .001 .001       -.001 .001       -.001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109       -.018 .014       -.017 .013       -.033* .016 
Total population/105       .016*** .003       .008*** .002   .006* .002 
Percent born in state       -.015 .009       -.017 .013       -.014 .009 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .026*** .006       .023*** .006     .022** .007 
1 if Post-Furman    -2.770*** .411     -3.233*** .435   -2.569*** .403 
1 if South    1.129** .422  .847* .395  .863* .427 
1 if Midwest  .572 .343  .642* .319        .644 .352 
1 if West  .081 .389       -.013 .360        .111 .385 
Number of death sentences    -.001** .000      .045*** .013      .053*** .014 
President*Post-Furman        .108*** .025    
Governor*Post-Furman             .660 .360 
Constant     -1.247 1.007       -.733 .216      -.699 .360 
Log-likelihood   -532.373    -507.033    -513.606  
X²  247.32***    286.44***    247.18***  
AIC   1114.746     1066.067     1079.212  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-1960 and 1980-2012.         
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TABLE 17: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF 
EXECUTIONS IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (EXCLUSION OF NON-DEATH PENALTY STATES)                                                 
(N = 313 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
   b SE       b SE     b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate        -.016 .010  -.024* .011       -.022* .010 
1 if Republican governor   .038 .178       -.011 .176       -.002 .177 
Percent Republicans in state legislature    .013* .006     .018** .005       .021*** .006 
Percent religious fundamentalists      .022** .008         .015 .008     .022** .008 
Welfare expenditures       -.010 .012       -.001 .012        .001 .013 
Institutionalization rate  -.002* .001    -.003** .001   -.003** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        .000 .001        .000 .001        .000 .001 
Percent African American        .033 .023        .041 .024        .044 .024 
Percent African American²        .000 .001        .000 .001       -.000 .001 
Percent unemployed       .110*** .031    .096** .032      .116*** .032 
Lynching rate      -.016 .016       -.010 .016       -.013 .016 
Homicide rate      -.004 .027        .002 .028       -.011 .028 
Violent crime rate      -.001 .001       -.001 .001       -.001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109      -.032* .016       -.030 .016       -.034* .015 
Total population/105       .006* .002      .007** .002     .008** .003 
Percent born in state      -.012 .009       -.013 .009       -.013 .009 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+      .023*** .007       .023*** .007     .022** .007 
1 if Post-Furman   -2.444*** .406   -2.786*** .431    -2.722*** .416 
1 if South       .914* .427  .919* .424    .959* .423 
1 if Midwest       .736* .350  .699* .345  .663 .342 
1 if West       .142 .384        .183 .386  .121 .385 
Number of death sentences      .062*** .014      .052*** .014      .050** .015 
Legislature*Post-Furman    .033** .010       
Religious*Post-Furman          .013 .009    
Welfare*Post-Furman             -.036 .033 
Constant       -.702 .212       -.731 .214        -.673 .209 
Log-likelihood  -509.858    -514.243    -514.706  
X²  267.40***   239.56***    245.23***  
AIC   1071.717     1080.486     1081.413  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-1960 and 1980-2012. 
        
 158 
 
TABLE 17: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (EXCLUSION OF NON-DEATH PENALTY STATES)                                                 
(N = 313 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
      b SE   b SE      b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate       -.019 .010        -.021* .010     -.022* .011 
1 if Republican governor       -.003 .180        -.029 .180           .003 .178 
Percent Republicans in state legislature     .018** .006        .020*** .006          .020*** .005 
Percent religious fundamentalists   .020* .008    .019* .008        .021** .008 
Welfare expenditures       -.007 .013        -.005 .012          -.003 .012 
Institutionalization rate       -.002* .001        -.002* .001        .002** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000       -.000 .001        -.000 .001           .000 .001 
Percent African American        .040 .024         .041 .024    .041 .024 
Percent African American²        .000 .000        -.000 .001          -.000 .001 
Percent unemployed     .099** .032      .094** .032        .107** .032 
Lynching rate      -.009 .016        -.010 .017   -.015 .019 
Homicide rate      -.001 .027         .004 .027   -.006 .027 
Violent crime rate      -.001 .001        -.000 .001   -.001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109      -.032* .016       -.035* .015    -.034* .016 
Total population/105  .005* .003    .005* .002       .006** .002 
Percent born in state      -.011 .010        -.013 .010   -.013 .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+    .021** .007      .020** .007       .022** .007 
1 if Post-Furman  -3.684*** .934    -2.064*** .457      -2.600*** .404 
1 if South  .859* .435  .858 .439    .954* .428 
1 if Midwest  .698* .354  .648 .360     .705* .347 
1 if West       .164 .390  .097 .397   .170 .387 
Number of death sentences      .059*** .015        .058*** .014         .056*** .014 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman      -.008 .006       
Incarceration*Post-Furman       .013* .005    
Lynching*African American†         .000 .000 
Constant     -1.239 .472        -.407 .239   -.687 .210 
Log-likelihood -514.336     -512.577     -515.249  
X²  243.35***     245.56***    245.62***  
AIC  1080.671   1077.153      1082.498  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-1960 and 1980-2012.         
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permit for the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable to account for autocorrelation. 
 The findings in Model 1 of Table 17 demonstrate support for a number of the key 
theoretical variables of interest. Consistent with the results reported in the primary 
models, the findings from Model 1 indicate that the percentage of Republicans in the 
state legislature, the percentage of religious fundamentalists, institutionalization rates, 
and the percentage of unemployed individuals within states are all significant predictors 
of state-level executions using this alternative strategy. In regards to the significant  
control variables, the percentage of individuals living in cities with 50,000 or more 
inhabitants, the post-Furman dummy variable, and the lagged dependent variable are also 
significantly associated with jurisdictional executions. All of these significant findings 
are important to this study because they indicate support for the findings in the primary 
models.  
However, there are also a number of discrepancies in the results reported between 
the two analytic strategies. First, with the exclusion of non-death penalty state-years, the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and the percentage of 
African Americans within state populations are no longer significant predictors of 
executions. Second, the dummy variable for the southern region also fails to demonstrate 
a significant relationship with jurisdictional executions. Finally, there are also two new 
control variables that demonstrate a significant relationship with execution practices 
using this analytic strategy. Particularly, the findings from Model 1 indicate that as yearly 
revenue surpluses increase within jurisdictions, reliance on executions decreases. The 
findings within this model also indicate that there is a greater number of executions in 
jurisdictions that report a higher overall state population.  
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 Models 2 through 9 in Table 16 contain the results when the interaction terms are 
introduced into the models. Overall, the findings from these models indicate that there are 
three significant interactive relationships. In Model 2, the findings indicate that the 
relationship between the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates 
and jurisdictional execution practices is moderated by time period specific factors. 
Furthermore, the findings in Model 7 indicate that there is a significant positive 
relationship between execution practices and the interaction term comprised of 
jurisdictional incarceration rates and the post-Furman dummy variable. The graphical 
representations of these interactive relationships (not shown) are identical to those 
presented in the previous section. 
In addition to the support for two of the interactive relationships identified in the 
primary models, there is also now a new significant interaction term using this analytic 
strategy that was not found in the main models. The results in Model 4 denote that the 
relationship between state-level executions and the percentage of Republicans in the state 
legislature is moderated by time period specific factors.
 44
 The graphical representation of 
this interactive relationship is contained in Figure 17. According to this graph, the 
predicted number of executions increases as the percentage of Republicans in the state 
legislature also increases in both time periods. In addition, this illustration also denotes 
that the relationship between the percentage of Republican legislators and execution 
practices is stronger in the pre-Furman time period. This finding is particularly 
                                                          
44
 Due to the non-significant findings reported in the primary models for this interactive relationship, the 
values for the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature variable were examined for the 61          
non-death penalty state-years that were removed from the analyses. Overall, 85% of the cases removed 
using the current analytic strategy reported an above average percentage of Republicans in the state 
legislature. Given the high proportion of Republican legislators and the inability of these states to impose 
an execution, it is likely that the removal of these cases, as well as all of the cases in the 1970s, contributed 
to clarifying the significant and positive nature of this interactive relationship. 
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interesting given the strong Democratic presence in the southern United States in the    
pre-Furman time period.
45
 Overall, the models containing the three significant interaction 
                                                          
45
 Since the pre-Furman finding for this interactive relationship appears to contradict previous results for 
this theoretical perspective, further analyses were conducted to examine this relationship. As mentioned in 
the section with the primary models, the significant relationship between the percentage of Republicans in 
the state legislature and execution practices is contingent upon the inclusion of the religious fundamentalist 
indicator in the analyses. In order to determine whether this suppressor effect is influencing the               
pre-Furman findings for the current interactive relationship, the results associated with the inclusion and 
exclusion of the religious fundamentalist variable were examined. To isolate the impact of the religious 
fundamentalist indicator, this variable was introduced into a model containing all of the partisan politics 
indicators, the post-Furman dummy variable, the number of death sentences to account for the population 
at risk of receiving the punishment, and the interaction term. The results when the religious fundamentalist 
variable was excluded from the analyses (not shown) indicated that there was a significant and positive 
relationship between the interaction term and jurisdictional executions. However, the conditional 
relationship between the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and execution practices was not 
significant when the moderator was constrained to zero (or the pre-Furman time period). The graphical 
depiction of this relationship (not shown) indicated that the slope of the pre-Furman line was flatter than 
the slope of the line for this time period reported in Figure 17, which would indicate that the relationship 
between executions and the party affiliation of state legislators was relatively weak.                             
       The results associated with the inclusion of the religious fundamentalist variable in the model were 
also examined. With the introduction of this variable into the model, there was still a positive and 
significant relationship between the interaction term and state-level executions. However, with the 
inclusion of the religious fundamentalist variable, the conditional relationship between execution practices 
and the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature was now both positive and significant. The 
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FIGURE 17: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF 
REPUBLICANS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND PREDICTED                   
STATE-LEVEL EXECUTIONS BY TIME PERIOD  
Pre-Furman Post-Furman
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terms reported the lowest AIC statistics, which denotes that these specifications are 
preferred over the remaining models within Table 17. 
The findings associated with this analytic strategy demonstrate support for a 
number of the significant relationships reported in the primary models. With respect to 
the results within Model 1, these findings indicate that variables within all three 
perspectives are significantly related to the execution of offenders at the state level. 
However, no support is demonstrated for the relationship between execution practices 
and the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates and the size of the 
African American population. The findings from this alternative strategy also indicate 
support for two of the significant interactive relationships highlighted in the primary 
models. In addition, the results from this strategy also denote that the relationship 
between the percentage of the Republicans in the state legislature and state-level 
executions differs significantly across the pre- and post-Furman time period.   
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimations 
 The second supplemental strategy in this section focuses on the results associated 
with the adoption of zero-inflated negative binomial estimation procedures. Similar to the 
rationale behind the use of this procedure in the last chapter, zero-inflated negative 
binomial estimations are an appropriate estimation procedure when there is an excess of 
zeros in the data and the occurrence of zero executions within jurisdictions can be 
attributed to two potential reasons. This supplemental strategy is adopted to determine 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
graphical illustration (not shown) of this interactive relationship is nearly identical to the one reported in 
the full model. Based on these findings, it would appear that the pre-Furman result reported in Figure 17 is 
likely attributed to the nature of the interactive relationship between the percentage of Republicans in the 
state legislature and the percentage of religious fundamentalists within jurisdictions. An interaction term 
comprised of all three variables was not found to be a significant predictor of execution practices. 
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whether the findings reported in the main models are robust predictors across alternative 
estimation strategies. 
 Consistent with the procedures outlined in the last chapter, zero-inflated negative 
binomial procedures rely on two equations. The primary equation used to estimate the  
number of jurisdictional executions is as follows: 
Number of Executions = b0 + b1Percentage of the Vote for Republican 
Presidential Candidate + b2Republican Governor + b3Percent Republicans 
Legislature + b4Percent Fundamentalists + b5Percent Welfare Expenditures + 
b6Institutionalization Rate + b7Incarceration Rate + b8Percent African American + 
b9Percent African American
2 
+ b10Percent Unemployed + b11Lynching Rate + 
b12Homicide Rate + b13Violent Crime Rate + b14Surplus/Deficits + b15Total 
Population + b16Born in State + b17Percent Living in Cities with 50,000+ 
Inhabitants + b18Post-Furman + b19South+ b20Midwest + b21West + b22Number of 
Death Sentences 
 
In addition to the primary equation, the secondary probit based equation that predicts the 
absence of executions within jurisdictions is specified as follows: 
Execution Absence = b0 + b1Percentage of the Vote for Republican Presidential 
Candidate + b2 Republican Governor + b3Percent Republicans Legislature +                      
b4Post-Furman + b5South + b6Midwest + b7West  
 
In accordance with the procedures adopted for the death sentence dependent variable, all 
of the interaction terms are individually introduced into the primary equation in order to 
maintain the parsimonious nature of the secondary equation. Lastly, the likelihood that 
the measurements within states and across time are not independent is accounted for by 
adopting a clustering procedure to adjust standard errors.  
The findings from both equations in Model 1 of Table 18 indicate support for a 
number of the key theoretical variables of interest. In the primary equation, the 
percentage of religious fundamentalists, state-level institutionalization rates, and the 
percentage of unemployed individuals within states are all significant predictors of
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TABLE 18: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF 
EXECUTIONS IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 421 STATE-YEARS)  
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
             b SE            b SE           b SE 
+1 Executions    
      Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate        -.016 .012    -.026* .013     -.015 .012 
1 if Republican governor        -.192 .177     -.167 .166      -.062 .166 
Percent Republicans in state legislature   .006 .007      .003 .008       .006 .007 
Percent religious fundamentalists      .030** .010      .021* .009    .031** .011 
Welfare expenditures       -.006 .012     -.002 .011      -.006 .013 
Institutionalization rate      -.004*** .001    -.004*** .001     -.004*** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000  .001 .001      .000 .001       .001 .001 
Percent African American .046 .030      .057* .029       .043 .030 
Percent African American²       -.001 .001     -.001 .001      -.000 .001 
Percent unemployed       .134*** .032      .113** .037       .133*** .032 
Lynching rate       -.020 .010     -.023 .012      -.018 .011 
Homicide rate       -.030 .027     -.019 .032      -.028 .028 
Violent crime rate       -.001 .001     -.000 .001      -.001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109       -.004 .038     -.000 .038      -.006 .039 
Total population/105     .008** .003      .008** .003       .009** .003 
Percent born in state       -.008 .007     -.011 .008      -.007 .007 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .040*** .011      .033*** .009       .041*** .010 
1 if Post-Furman    -2.279*** .422  -2.654*** .456    -2.209*** .444 
1 if South .438 .445      .093 .393        .580 .410 
1 if Midwest .191 .384      .089 .358        .226 .377 
1 if West .055 .443     -.132 .473        .226 .377 
Number of death sentences .027 .019      .029 .020        .139 .472 
President*Post-Furman        .109 .067    
Governor*Post-Furman             .028 .018 
Intercept .580 1.183      .069 .217        .156 .154 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 18: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS   
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 421 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
        b SE         b SE             b SE 
Zero Executions  
        Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate  .032 .032      .092 .070      .032 .030 
1 if Republican Governor  -.758* .351      -.646* .310      -.941 .548 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      -.062*** .017      -.066** .024     -.062*** .016 
1 if Post-Furman     3.633*** .850    3.264*** .936    3.804*** .958 
1 if South   -4.207*** 1.015    -4.568** 1.517   -4.184*** 1.002 
1 if Midwest    -2.343* 1.005    -2.244* .899    -2.498* 1.206 
1 if West    -2.382 .963    -2.262** .851    -2.398* .978 
Intercept       .885 1.588    -1.053 .612    -1.201 .538 
Log-pseudolikelihood -531.037   -527.586    -530.536  
X²  744.36***    562.49***     791.81***  
AIC  1126.074    1121.172   1127.072  
McFadden's Adjusted R²  .180        .184        .179  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012.   
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TABLE 18: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 421 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
  b SE       b SE   b SE 
+1 Executions  
        Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate   -.013 .012     -.018 .013       -.014 .012 
1 if Republican governor   -.106 .164      -.217 .197        -.202 .192 
Percent Republicans in state legislature    .001 .007       .005 .008         .006 .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists    .032** .010    .026** .009      .030** .010 
Welfare expenditures   -.008 .012      -.004 .011        -.003 .011 
Institutionalization rate -.003*** .001     -.004*** .001       -.004*** .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000    .000 .001       .001 .001         .001 .001 
Percent African American    .044 .029       .046 .030         .049 .029 
Percent African American²   -.001 .001      -.001 .001        -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed  .130*** .034      .124*** .033        .142*** .038 
Lynching rate   -.019 .012      -.022* .009       -.021* .010 
Homicide rate   -.030 .029      -.021 .026       -.029 .026 
Violent crime rate   -.001 .001      -.001 .001       -.001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109   -.008 .032      -.002 .038       -.006 .039 
Total population/105    .007* .003    .009** .003     .009** .003 
Percent born in state   -.006 .007     -.009 .007       -.008 .007 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+  .040*** .011     .039*** .010       .040*** .010 
1 if Post-Furman -2.301*** .380  -2.357*** .446   -2.297*** .431 
1 if South    .224 .416      .439 .438        .437 .445 
1 if Midwest    .108 .364      .175 .384        .209 .383 
1 if West   -.069 .434      .041 .450        .072 .442 
Number of death sentences    .036 .020      .026 .018        .026 .019 
Legislature*Post-Furman    .037* .016       
Religious*Post-Furman        .010 .014    
Welfare*Post-Furman            -.023 .041 
Intercept    .121 .153      .107 .183  .170 .158 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 18: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 421 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
        b SE   b SE       b SE 
Zero Executions 
        Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate       .050 .039   .030 .032        .035 .034 
1 if Republican governor      -.583 .308          -.817 .449       -.758* .368 
Percent Republicans in state legislature  -.050** .018         -.064*** .018      -.064*** .016 
1 if Post-Furman    3.026*** .835        3.723*** .930     3.614*** .810 
1 if South   -3.986*** .979       -4.264*** 1.085    -4.197*** 1.006 
1 if Midwest    -1.940** .696        -2.535 1.306    -2.297* .979 
1 if West -2.009** .692  -2.509* 1.085    -2.302* .928 
Intercept     -.887 .464       -1.178 .520    -1.119 .420 
Log-pseudolikelihood  -528.132     -530.657    -530.824  
X²  781.63***    697.88***    873.83***  
AIC 1122.264      1127.314    1127.647  
McFadden's Adjusted R² .183           .179        .179  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 18: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 421 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8  
 
Model 9  
  b SE       b SE           b SE 
 
+1 Executions  
        
 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate     -.013 .012       -.021 .012       -.016 .012 
 
1 if Republican governor     -.141 .187       -.181 .162        -.194 .178 
 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      .005 .007        .006 .008  .006 .007 
 
Percent religious fundamentalists   .029** .010      .030** .010      .031** .010 
 
Welfare expenditures     -.013 .012       -.013 .012        -.006 .012 
 
Institutionalization rate     -.003** .001     -.003** .001       -.004*** .001 
 
Incarceration rate per 1,000      .000 .001        .000 .001  .000 .001 
 
Percent African American      .045 .031        .041 .030  .046 .031 
 
Percent African American²     -.001 .001       -.001 .001        -.001 .001 
 
Percent unemployed   .119** .034      .115** .034        .132*** .034 
 
Lynching rate     -.018 .010       -.021* .010        -.025 .018 
 
Homicide rate     -.014 .027       -.017 .027        -.029 .027  
Violent crime rate     -.001 .001       -.000 .001        -.001 .001 
 
Surplus/Deficits/109     -.008 .037       -.005 .042        -.004 .038 
 
Total population/105      .008** .003      .009** .003      .009** .003 
 
Percent born in state     -.008 .007      -.008 .007        -.008 .007 
 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+   .036** .011     .038** .011        .040*** .011 
 
1 if Post-Furman  -4.064*** .722   -1.682*** .422     -2.279*** .426 
 
1 if South      .445 .461       .456 .438  .458 .430 
 
1 if Midwest      .199 .399       .098 .407  .188 .388  
1 if West      .038 .440       .028 .446  .060 .443  
Number of death sentences      .034 .020       .031 .018  .027 .018  
Institutionalization*Post-Furman   -.014** .005        
Incarceration*Post-Furman        .027*** .006    
 
Lynching*African American             .000 .001 
 
Intercept  -1.028 .470      .422 .161        .151 .154 
 
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012. 
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TABLE 18: ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (N = 421 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8  
 
Model 9  
    b SE         b SE      b SE 
 
Zero Executions 
        
 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate  .025 .037       .020 .041         .032 .032  
1 if Republican governor  -.877* .434     -.881 .609  -.756* .350  
Percent Republicans in state legislature    -.060** .018        .066* .027       -.063*** .017  
1 if Post-Furman     3.677*** 1.012        3.874** 1.329      3.652*** .861  
1 if South    -4.266*** 1.111       -4.562** 1.426     -4.224*** 1.029  
1 if Midwest    -2.566* 1.253   -2.954 1.714      -2.359* 1.021  
1 if West    -2.447* 1.189     -2.881* 1.458      -2.401* .972  
Intercept    -1.250 .523    -1.425 .705      -1.117 .435  
Log-pseudolikelihood  -527.232      -522.022    -531.004   
X²  716.27***       946.77***   718.19***   
AIC 1120.465      1110.044     1128.013   
McFadden's Adjusted R² .184      .192          .179   
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1930-2012.         
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executions equal to or greater than one. In addition, the results in Model 1 provide 
support for a number of the control variables identified as significant predictors in the 
primary models. According to these findings, the total state population, the percentage of 
individuals living in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, and the post-Furman 
dummy indicator are all significantly related to executions equal to or greater than one.  
However, there are also a number of discrepancies between the findings reported 
in the primary models and those using this strategy. Particularly, no support is shown for 
the significant relationship between jurisdictional executions and the percentage of the 
vote for Republican presidential candidates, the percentage of Republicans in the state 
legislature, and the percentage of African Americans within jurisdictions. Finally, no 
support is shown for the significant relationship between the state-level executions and 
the southern region of the United States and the lagged number of death sentences in the 
primary equation. 
Turning now to the findings contained within the secondary equation, these 
results indicate support for two of the theoretical variables of interest. In particular, the 
findings from the secondary equation indicate that jurisdictions with Republican 
governors are less likely to report zero executions in comparison to states with 
Democratic governors. The results in the secondary equation also indicate that 
jurisdictions that report having a larger percentage of Republicans in the state legislature 
are less likely to report zero death sentences. Both of these findings indicate support for 
the partisan politics perspective and they denote that the party affiliation of elected 
officials is more strongly associated with the absence of executions, as opposed to the 
actual imposition of the punishment.  
 171 
 
In terms of the control variables, the findings in this model denote that there is a 
greater likelihood that jurisdictions would report zero executions in the post-Furman time 
period in comparison to the earlier era. Finally, the findings in the secondary equation 
indicate that states within the southern and midwestern regions of the United States were 
less likely to report zero executions in comparison to the northeast region. Overall, the 
primary and secondary equations in Model 1 account for 18% of the variance in 
jurisdictional execution practices. 
 The results in Models 2 through 9 contain the findings when the interaction terms 
are individually introduced into the models. The findings from all of these models 
indicate support for two of the significant interactive relationships identified in the 
primary models. The findings in Model 7 denote that the relationship between state-level 
executions and institutionalization rates differs significantly across the pre- and          
post-Furman time period. With the inclusion of this interactive relationship, the two 
equations in this model account for 18.4% of the variance in execution practices.  
 In addition, the results contained within Model 8 indicate that the relationship 
between jurisdictional executions and incarceration rates is moderated by time period 
specific factors. When this interaction term is included in the model, the two equations 
account for 19.2% of the variance in the dependent variable, which is the highest 
percentage accounted for across all of the models using this analytic strategy. 
 Finally, the results within Model 4 indicate that the relationship between the 
percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and execution practices differs 
significantly across the two eras, and the two equations in this model account for        
18.3% of the variance in this outcome measure. The graphical representations that 
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illustrate these three significant interactive relationships (not shown) are identical to those 
reported in the previous two sections.   
 Overall, the findings from both equations contained in Table 18 demonstrate 
support for the variables within all three of the theoretical perspectives. In terms of the 
findings from the primary equation in Model 1, these results indicate that most of the key 
theoretical variables identified in the primary models are significant predictors of 
executions using this analytic strategy. However, no support is shown for the relationship 
between executions equal to or greater than one and the percentage of the vote for 
Republican presidential candidates and the percentage of Republicans in the state 
legislature. With respect to the findings contained in the secondary equation, these 
findings indicate that jurisdictions with Republican governors and a greater percentage of 
Republicans in the state legislature were less likely to report zero executions. Finally, the 
findings within Table 17 demonstrate support for two of the significant interactive 
relationships reported in the primary models and they also indicate that the relationship 
between the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and execution practices 
differs significantly across the two eras.  
Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimations Using a 10-Year Lag in Death 
Sentences 
 
The third analytic strategy involves altering the temporal delay between the 
number of individuals eligible for this form of punishment within jurisdictions and the 
execution of offenders. In the primary models, the population at risk of being executed is 
accounted for by the number of death sentences one year before the pooled measurement 
of the dependent variable. Since the temporal delay between the sentencing phase and the 
actual imposition of the punishment varies significantly between the two eras, this
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TABLE 19: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (10-YEAR LAG IN DEATH SENTENCES) (N = 374 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
     b SE         b SE             b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate       -.023* .011        -.032** .012        -.022 .011 
1 if Republican governor        .078 .199     .117 .198        -.202 .254 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      .030*** .008         .026** .008        .031*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists    .029** .009         .027** .015      .030** .009 
Welfare expenditures        .004 .015     .006 .015         .004 .015 
Institutionalization rate       -.001 .001    -.001 .001        -.001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        .000 .002     .000 .002         .000 .002 
Percent African American        .050 .029     .055 .029         .047 .029 
Percent African American²       -.001 .001    -.001 .001        -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed     .091** .034      .086* .035      .089** .033 
Lynching rate        .002 .017   -.003 .016       -.000 .017 
Homicide rate        .024 .036    .017 .035         .023 .036 
Violent crime rate        .000 .001    .000 .001         .000 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109        .001 .004    .001 .004         .001 .004 
Total population/105        .001 .003    .003 .003         .001 .003 
Percent born in state       -.017 .011  -.020 .011        -.018 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+    .024** .008       .023** .008      .023** .008 
1 if Post-Furman   -2.657*** .451     -2.934*** .481    -2.574*** .455 
1 if South        .915 .496  .794 .490        .834 .497 
1 if Midwest        .451 .393  .399 .384        .405 .395 
1 if West        .603 .489  .469 .478        .582 .483 
Number of death sentences (10-year lag)        .009 .019  .009 .019        .007 .019 
Lagged executions      .053*** .013       .041** .014      .053*** .013 
President*Post-Furman      .064* .029    
Governor*Post-Furman             .678 .382 
Constant     -1.258 .238     -1.299 .240     -1.271 .240 
Log-likelihood  -426.066   -423.720    -424.456  
X²   293.15***    306.49***     299.68***  
AIC   904.133    901.441     902.913  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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TABLE 19: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (10-YEAR LAG IN DEATH SENTENCES) (N = 374 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
     b SE    b SE     b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate    -.019 .011  -.028* .012    -.024* .011 
1 if Republican governor    .100 .200  .068 .195   .037 .196 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       .024** .008        .030*** .008         .032*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists       .030** .009    .020* .010         .032*** .008 
Welfare expenditures   .005 .015  .004 .015   .017 .015 
Institutionalization rate  -.001 .001        -.002 .001    -.002* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000   .000 .002  .001 .002   .002 .002 
Percent African American   .046 .029  .049 .030   .047 .029 
Percent African American²  -.001 .001        -.001 .001         -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed       .095** .034  .071 .036      .100** .034 
Lynching rate -.000 .017        -.000 .017         -.003 .015 
Homicide rate  .030 .036  .035 .037         -.010 .038 
Violent crime rate  .000 .001  .000 .001   .001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109  .001 .004  .001 .004   .001 .004 
Total population/105  .001 .003  .002 .003   .005 .003 
Percent born in state -.017 .011        -.018 .011         -.017 .010 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+      .023** .008      .025** .008      .024** .008 
1 if Post-Furman     -2.422*** .473    -3.006*** .490     -2.763*** .441 
1 if South  .868 .501         .849 .494  1.072* .495 
1 if Midwest  .508 .399         .401 .390          .387 .375 
1 if West  .598 .488         .563 .493  .460 .474 
Number of death sentences (10-year lag)  .013 .019         .010 .019         -.003 .019 
Lagged executions        .049*** .013        .051*** .014        .059*** .013 
Legislature*Post-Furman .019 .011       
Religious*Post-Furman           .018 .010    
Welfare*Post-Furman              -.087* .034 
Constant           -1.269 .236     -1.297 .245       -1.257 .230 
Log-likelihood         -424.502   -424.454     -422.869  
X²   294.86***    286.17***      314.35***  
AIC          903.004    902.908      899.738  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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TABLE 19: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (10-YEAR LAG IN DEATH SENTENCES) (N = 374 STATE-YEARS)  CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
      b SE    b SE      b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate        -.020 .011  -.025* .011    -.026* .012 
1 if Republican governor         .110 .200  .075 .197    .062 .199 
Percent Republicans in state legislature      .025** .008        .031*** .008          .031*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists      .026** .009      .027** .009          .030*** .009 
Welfare expenditures         .003 .015  .004 .015    .002 .015 
Institutionalization rate         .000 .001        -.001 .001   -.001 .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000        -.001 .001        -.002 .002    .000 .002 
Percent African American         .049 .030   .051 .029    .043 .030 
Percent African American²        -.001 .001        -.001 .001   -.001 .001 
Percent unemployed    .070* .035     .075* .035      .082* .035 
Lynching rate        .004 .016   .003 .017          -.018 .024 
Homicide rate        .053 .037   .049 .037    .021 .036 
Violent crime rate       -.000 .001   .001 .001    .001 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109        .004 .004   .001 .004    .001 .004 
Total population/105        .001 .003        -.000 .003    .001 .003 
Percent born in state      -.015 .011        -.017 .011  -.019 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+       .018* .008    .019* .008     .021* .008 
1 if Post-Furman  -3.526*** .685     -2.002*** .512      -2.672*** .453 
1 if South       .821 .505  .834 .506  1.040* .501 
1 if Midwest       .538 .407  .408 .402  .455 .392 
1 if West       .708 .493  .607 .496  .612 .492 
Number of death sentences (10-year lag)       .013 .020         .014 .020  .010 .019 
Lagged executions     .053*** .013        .051*** .014         .055*** .014 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman     -.011* .004       
Incarceration*Post-Furman           .018** .006    
Lynching*African American        .002 .001 
Constant     -2.054 .436         -.935 .259       -1.283 .239 
Log-likelihood  -422.573    -422.110     -425.219  
X²  286.43***     284.98***      301.28***  
AIC   899.145     898.221      904.438  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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strategy adopts a 10-year lag in death sentences to account for the gap between the two 
phases of the punishment in the post-Furman time period. This analytic strategy is 
adopted to determine whether accounting for a different population at risk has an impact 
on the significant findings reported in the primary models; therefore, the one-year lag in 
death sentences is removed from the analyses for these models. With the reintroduction 
of non-death penalty state-years into the analyses, the lagged dependent variable is 
included in these models to account for autocorrelation. 
The results associated with this analytic strategy are contained in Table 19. With 
respect to the findings from the full model, the results within Model 1 indicate support for 
a number of the theoretical variables. In particular, the percentage of the vote for 
Republican presidential candidates, the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature, 
the percentage of religious fundamentalist adherents, and the percentage of unemployed 
individuals are all significantly associated with jurisdictional executions. The results in 
Model 1 also indicate that the percentage of individuals living in cities with over 50,000 
people and the lagged dependent variable are both significantly related to state-level 
executions. Furthermore, the findings within this model denote that there were more 
executions in the pre-Furman period in comparison to the later era.  
However, there are also a number of discrepancies between the findings reported 
in the primary full model and the results reported when relying on this analytic strategy. 
First, the significant relationship between executions and state-level institutionalization 
rates and the percentage of African Americans in the state population is attenuated. 
Second, no support is shown for greater reliance on executions in the southern United 
States, as opposed to the northeastern region. Finally, whereas the 1-year lag in death 
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sentences is a significant predictor of executions in the primary models, the 10-year lag in 
the state-level death sentences is not significantly associated with this phase of the 
punishment. Based on the AIC statistics for both this model and the primary full model, 
these statistics indicate that the adoption of the one-year lag in death sentences is the 
preferred specification over the 10-year lag in this variable. 
 In Models 2 through 9, all of the interaction terms are included in the analyses one 
at a time. Consistent with the findings reported in the main models, the results from these 
analyses indicate support for four out of the five significant interactive relationships 
identified in the primary models. Particularly, this analytic strategy demonstrates support 
for the interaction terms containing the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates, the percentage of expenditures dedicated to welfare, the institutionalization 
rate, and the incarceration rate variables. The only significant interaction term from the 
primary model that is not supported is the one containing the religious fundamentalist 
indicator. Consistent with the graphs contained in the section with the primary models, 
the graphical representations of these interaction terms (not shown) are nearly identical to 
those reported in the previous sections.
46
  
 The results associated with this analytic strategy demonstrate support for most of 
the significant findings identified in the primary models. In terms of the key theoretical 
variables of interest, the findings contained in Model 1 indicate support for all but two of 
the significant indicators identified in the primary models. With the inclusion of the      
10-year lag in death sentences, the institutionalization rate and the percentage of African 
                                                          
46
 The most significant discrepancy between the primary graphical representations and those relying on the 
current analytic strategy is in regards to the interaction term containing the incarceration rate. For this 
interactive relationship, the pre-Furman slope in the incarceration rate is slightly negative using this 
analytic strategy, in contrast to the relatively flat pre-Furman slopes reported in Figure 15 for the primary 
models.   
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Americans in the state legislature are no longer significant predictors of jurisdictional 
executions. Furthermore, no support is shown for the significant relationship between 
state-level executions and the 10-year lag in death sentences. With respect to the control 
variables, the findings within the full model denote that the percentage of residents living 
in cities larger than 50,000 inhabitants, the lagged dependent variable, and the dummy 
variable designed to account for period effects are significantly related to execution 
practices. Finally, regarding the results from the models containing the interaction terms, 
support is shown for four out of the five significant interactive relationships identified in 
the primary models.  
Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimations Using 1 and 10-Year Lags in Death 
Sentences 
 
 The final analytic strategy examines the social and political factors associated 
with state-level executions when 1 and 10-year lags in death sentences are both included 
in the models. Due to the varying temporal delays between the sentencing and execution 
phases of the punishment across the pre- and post-Furman time periods, this strategy 
controls for both populations at risk. The purpose of this strategy is to determine whether 
the findings reported in the primary model are influenced by accounting for two 
populations at risk of receiving the punishment simultaneously. Given the lack of gaps in 
the structure of the data, the lagged dependent variable is included in the analyses to 
account for autocorrelation. 
 Model 1 in Table 20 contains the findings when the number of jurisdictional 
executions was regressed on all of the theoretical and control variables. The results in this 
model indicate that all of the theoretical variables identified in the primary models are 
also significant predictors of executions using this analytic strategy. In particular, the
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TABLE 20: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (1-YEAR AND 10-YEAR LAGS IN DEATH SENTENCES)                                     
(N = 313 STATE-YEARS) 
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3  
     b SE       b SE             b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate -.028* .012        -.037** .012    -.027* .012 
1 if Republican governor .143 .195  .163 .194        -.076 .266 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       .037*** .008        .033*** .008        .036*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists     .026** .009      .024** .009      .027** .009 
Welfare expenditures .021 .015         .022 .015         .020 .015 
Institutionalization rate -.002* .001   -.002* .001  -.002* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 .002 .002  .002 .002         .002 .002 
Percent African American  .080* .031      .082** .031   .074* .031 
Percent African American²       -.002 .001  -.002* .001       -.002 .001 
Percent unemployed  .082* .032         .080 .032   .081* .031 
Lynching rate        .000 .018        -.004 .018       -.001 .018 
Homicide rate       -.003 .035        -.004 .035       -.005 .035 
Violent crime rate       -.000 .001        -.000 .001       -.000 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109        .004 .005         .003 .004        .004 .004 
Total population/105      -.005 .003        -.003 .003       -.005 .003 
Percent born in state      -.006 .012        -.010 .012       -.007 .012 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+   .027** .008      .025** .008    .026** .008 
1 if Post-Furman  -2.704*** .464     -2.950*** .485     -2.630*** .467 
1 if South     1.144* .536  .986 .527      1.111* .534 
1 if Midwest       .585 .444  .522 .431  .589 .444 
1 if West       .961 .528  .765 .518  .911 .524 
Number of death sentences (1-year lag)     .073*** .013        .067*** .013        .070*** .014 
Number of death sentences (10-year lag)       .007 .018  .006 .018  .006 .019 
Lagged executions     .055*** .013        .047*** .013        .055*** .012 
President*Post-Furman      .057* .028    
Governor*Post-Furman              .487 .391 
Constant    -1.969 1.242     -1.030 .271     -1.021 .271 
Log-likelihood -404.396   -402.396    -403.608  
X²   291.23***    307.28***    300.33***  
AIC   862.793    860.791     863.215  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012.         
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TABLE 20: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (1-YEAR AND 10-YEAR LAGS IN DEATH SENTENCES)                                                    
(N = 313 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5  
 
Model 6  
   b SE    b SE     b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate        -.024* .012     -.034** .012   -.029* .012 
1 if Republican governor         .165 .198  .130 .192  .013 .194 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       .029** .009        .036*** .008        .038*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists      .028** .009  .019 .010      .029** .009 
Welfare expenditures         .021 .015         .021 .015         .031* .016 
Institutionalization rate        -.001 .001  -.003* .001  -.003* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000         .002 .002         .003 .002         .003 .002 
Percent African American         .072* .031   .079* .032  .078* .032 
Percent African American²        -.002 .001       -.002 .001       -.002 .001 
Percent unemployed      .087** .031        .063 .034    .090** .032 
Lynching rate        .087** .031       -.001 .018       -.005 .017 
Homicide rate        .004 .035        .006 .035       -.027 .038 
Violent crime rate       -.000 .001       -.000 .001       -.000 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109        .003 .005        .004 .005        .003 .005 
Total population/105       -.005 .003       -.004 .003       -.002 .003 
Percent born in state       -.007 .012       -.007 .012       -.008 .011 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+     .026** .008    .028** .008    .025** .008 
1 if Post-Furman    -2.426*** .489     -3.014*** .497  -2.732*** .458 
1 if South 1.091* .542      1.059* .532      1.255* .540 
1 if Midwest .655 .452        .527 .439        .599 .432 
1 if West .909 .526        .934 .528        .910 .523 
Number of death sentences (1-year lag)       .072*** .013      .073*** .013      .068*** .014 
Number of death sentences (10-year lag) .011 .019        .005 .018       -.005 .019 
Lagged executions       .050*** .013     .055*** .012      .063*** .013 
Legislature*Post-Furman        .022 .011       
Religious*Post-Furman          .016     
Welfare*Post-Furman           -.065* .033 
Constant     -1.013 .269     -1.015 .274    -1.029 .272 
Log-likelihood -402.540   -403.057   -402.406  
X²  296.55***   285.97***    311.69***  
AIC  861.080     862.113    860.812  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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TABLE 20: RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
IN JURISDICTIONS, 1930-2012 (1-YEAR AND 10-YEAR LAGS IN DEATH SENTENCES)                                                   
(N = 313 STATE-YEARS) CONT. 
 
Model 7  
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
  b SE   b SE      b SE 
Percent vote for Republican presidential candidate  -.024* .012     -.033** .012       -.034** .012 
1 if Republican governor  .197 .194  .152 .193    .132 .194 
Percent Republicans in state legislature       .028*** .008        .036*** .008          .038*** .008 
Percent religious fundamentalists   .022* .009    .023* .009        .028** .009 
Welfare expenditures .020 .015  .021 .015    .018 .015 
Institutionalization rate .000 .001       -.001 .001     -.002* .001 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 .001 .002       -.000 .002    .002 .002 
Percent African American     .084** .032      .084** .031      .070* .031 
Percent African American² -.002* .001       -.002* .001     -.003* .001 
Percent unemployed .051 .032  .062 .032      .071* .032 
Lynching rate .004 .019  .001 .019   -.028 .027 
Homicide rate .027 .035  .016 .036   -.005 .035 
Violent crime rate       -.001 .001       -.000 .001   -.000 .001 
Surplus/Deficits/109        .009 .005        .004 .005    .004 .004 
Total population/105      -.006* .003       -.006* .003   -.005 .003 
Percent born in state        .002 .012       -.006 .012  -.010 .012 
Percent living in cities of 50,000+  .018* .009    .021* .008       .024** .009 
1 if Post-Furman   -3.959*** .743     -1.958*** .520      -2.787*** .470 
1 if South     1.100 .560  1.098* .538  1.348* .541 
1 if Midwest       .815 .477  .572 .450  .584 .442 
1 if West     1.262* .542      1.022 .526  .937 .534 
Number of death sentences (1-year lag)     .085*** .014        .077*** .013        .075*** .013 
Number of death sentences (10-year lag)       .009 .019         .009 .019  .008 .018 
Lagged executions     .058*** .012       .056*** .013         .059*** .013 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman     -.016** .005       
Incarceration*Post-Furman      .018** .005    
Lynching*African American†              .003 .002 
Constant    -2.128 .492      -.639 .287      -1.018 .273 
Log-likelihood -398.345   -399.363    -402.982  
X²  288.24***    295.00***   296.80***  
AIC  852.690    854.725     861.964  
*p = .05; **p = .01; ***p = .001 
  Period effects are controlled for from 1940-2012. 
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percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates, the percentage of 
Republicans in the state legislature, the percentage of religious fundamentalists, the 
percentage of African Americans in the state population, and the percent unemployed are 
all found to be significantly associated with jurisdictional execution practices. In 
addition, all of the control variables identified in the primary model as significant 
predictors of executions are also significantly associated with the punishment using this 
analytic strategy. The significant control variables consist of the percentage of individuals 
living in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, the post-Furman dummy indicator, the 
southern dummy variable, the number of death sentences measured one year before 
executions, and the lagged dependent variable. No discrepancies were found between the 
findings in Model 1 using this analytic strategy and the results reported in the primary 
full model. Finally, according to the AIC statistic for this model, this specification is 
preferred to the previous strategies that included the two death sentence variables 
separately in the models. 
Turning now to the findings associated with the interaction terms, Models 2 
through 9 in Table 20 contain the results when these variables are introduced into the 
models one at a time. Overall, the results in these models indicate support for four out of 
the five significant interactive relationships identified in the primary models. More 
specifically, support is shown for the relationship between execution practices and the 
interaction terms containing the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates, the percentage of state expenditures spent on welfare, the institutionalization 
rate, and jurisdictional incarceration rates. The graphical representations (not shown) 
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containing these findings are nearly identical to those reported in the previous sections.
47
 
Similar to the findings from the last section, the interaction term containing the religious 
fundamentalist variable is the only significant interactive relationship in the primary 
models that is not supported in Table 20.  
 The findings using this analytic strategy demonstrate support for almost every 
significant relationship identified in the primary models. Particularly, the findings from 
the full model indicate support for all of the theoretical and control variables that were 
identified as significant predictors of executions in the primary models. Furthermore, the 
models containing the interaction terms indicate that four out of the five significant 
interactive relationships in the primary models are also significant. The only discrepancy 
between the results reported for both strategies is the null findings regarding the 
interaction term comprised of the religious fundamentalist variable and the post-Furman 
dummy indicator using the current strategy. 
CONCLUSION    
 This chapter focused on the contextual factors associated with jurisdictional 
executions from 1930 to 2012, and the results for this dependent variable demonstrated 
support for all three of the theoretical perspectives. With respect to the findings from the 
primary full model, these findings indicated that two of the three partisan politics 
variables were significantly associated with execution practices. In particular, the 
percentage of the vote for Republican presidential candidates demonstrated a significant 
                                                          
47
 The only discrepancy between the graphical representations for this analytic strategy and those reported 
for the primary models is in regards to the interaction term containing the incarceration rate variable. 
Similar to the last analytic strategy, the slope of the pre-Furman incarceration line is slightly negative, in 
comparison to the relatively flat slope reported in the primary models. 
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negative relationship with state-level executions, while the percentage of the Republicans 
in the state legislature demonstrated a positive relationship with jurisdictional executions.  
In addition, the results in the full model indicated support for the significant relationship 
between execution practices and the percentage of religious fundamentalists and            
state-level institutionalization rates. In regards to the findings from the social threat 
perspective, the results in the full model indicated that the percentage of African 
Americans in the state population and the percentage of unemployed individuals were 
both significantly related to the execution of offenders. All of these findings regarding the 
key theoretical variables are important to this study because they indicated that their 
relationship with jurisdictional executions is not restricted to the post-Furman time 
period. Lastly, the results in the full model denoted that the percentage of residents living 
in cities larger than 50,000, the post-Furman dummy variable, the dummy indicator for 
the southern United States, the number of jurisdictional death sentences, and the lagged 
dependent variable were all significantly associated with the number of jurisdictional 
executions. 
 The findings from the primary models also indicated that the relationship between 
five of the theoretical variables of interest and execution practices differed across the  
pre- and post-Furman time periods. With respect to the interactive relationships 
comprised of the percentage of religious fundamentalists and the institutionalization rate, 
the movement across the two eras acted to either strengthen or weaken the preexisting 
nature of the relationship between these two variables and execution practices. With 
regards to the interaction terms comprised of the percentage of the vote for Republican 
presidential candidates, the percentage of state expenditures spent on welfare, and      
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TABLE 21: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE KEY THEORETICAL VARIABLES AND INTERACTION 
TERMS ACROSS EXECUTION ANALYTIC STRATEGIES 
Variables 
Expected 
Post-Furman 
Sign 
Primary 
Models 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#1 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#2 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#3 
Analytic 
Strategy 
#4 Robustness  
Percent vote for Republican presidential     
candidates 
+ - N.S N.S - - Moderate 
1 if Republican governor + N.S N.S + N.S N.S Low 
Percent Republicans in state legislature + + + + + + High 
Percent religious fundamentalist + + + + + + High 
Welfare expenditures - N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.A. 
Institutionalization rate  + - - - N.S - High 
Incarceration rate per 1,000 + N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.A. 
Percent African American + + N.S N.S N.S + Low 
Percent African American² - N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.A. 
Percent unemployed + + + + + + High 
Lynching rate + N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.A. 
President*Post-Furman + + + N.S + + High 
Governor*Post-Furman + N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.A. 
Legislator*Post-Furman + N.S + + N.S N.S Low 
Religious*Post-Furman + + N.S N.S N.S N.S Low 
Welfare*Post-Furman - - N.S N.S - - Moderate 
Institutionalization*Post-Furman + - N.S - - - High 
Incarceration*Post-Furman + + + + + + High 
African American*Lynching + N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.A. 
        
 186 
 
state-level incarceration rates, the movement from the pre- to the post-Furman time    
period effectively redefined the nature of the relationship between these indicators and 
the number of jurisdictional executions. All of the findings associated with these 
interaction terms are important to this study because they denote that the changes in the 
social and political landscape in the 1970s significantly altered the nature of these 
relationships. 
 This chapter also examined four alternative strategies for examining the 
relationship between state-level contextual factors and execution practices. Consistent 
with the presentation of the robustness of the findings across analytic strategies in the last 
chapter, Table 21 contains all of the results for the key theoretical variables and the 
interaction terms for each of the strategies adopted in this chapter. Similar to the 
specifications used to determine robustness in the last chapter, “high” denotes findings 
that were supported in at least three out of the four supplemental strategies, “moderate” 
indicates that at least two of the alternative specifications supported the findings from the 
primary model, and “low” represents findings from the primary model that were 
supported in less than two of the alternative procedures. 
With respect to the findings from models that examined direct effects, all four 
supplemental strategies provided support for the significant relationship between 
execution practices and the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature, the 
percentage of religious fundamentalists, and the percentage of unemployed individuals 
within states found in the primary model. Furthermore, three out of the four supplemental 
strategies indicated support for the relationship between institutionalization rates and 
jurisdictional executions. The consistency in these findings across analytic strategies 
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indicates that the results from the primary model for these variables are highly robust and 
that the relationship between these indicators and execution practices is not susceptible to 
the analytic strategy adopted. 
In addition, the findings from the supplemental strategies indicated moderate to 
limited support for a few of the significant relationships identified in the primary models. 
In particular, two of the supplemental models indicated support for the relationship 
between execution practices and the percentage of the vote for Republican presidential 
candidates, while none of the alternative strategies denoted support for the relationship 
between the size of the African American population within states and the use of the 
death penalty. The relative inconsistency in the support shown for the relationship 
between these variables and execution practices indicates that these findings are rather 
susceptible to the analytic procedures relied upon. 
 The findings from the supplemental models also indicated support for a number of 
the significant interaction terms identified in the primary models. In all four of the 
supplemental strategies, the results indicated that the relationship between state-level 
incarceration rates and execution practices were moderated by time period specific 
factors. In addition, the findings from three out of the four alternative strategies denoted 
that the relationship between jurisdictional executions and the percentage of the vote for 
Republican presidential candidates and state-level institutionalization rates differed 
significantly across the pre- and post-Furman time periods. The results for these 
interactive relationships in the supplemental strategies indicated that the findings in the 
primary models are highly robust across analytic strategies.  
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However, mixed support was also demonstrated for a few of the significant 
interaction terms identified in the primary models. The results from two out of the four 
supplemental strategies indicated support for the interaction term comprised of the 
welfare expenditure indicator and the post-Furman dummy variable. Furthermore, the 
findings from two of the supplemental strategies indicated that the relationship between 
the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and execution practices differed 
significantly across the two eras. Finally, the results from all four of the supplemental 
strategies failed to support the significant finding in the primary model for the interaction 
term comprised of the post-Furman dummy indicator and the percentage of religious 
fundamentalist adherents. The inconsistency in the support demonstrated for these 
interactive relationships across the supplemental strategies indicates that the predictive 
power of these variables is particularly susceptible to the analytic techniques relied upon. 
 The findings highlighted in this chapter are of particular importance to this study 
because they demonstrate that variables within all three theoretical perspectives are able 
to account for execution practices from 1930 to 2012. As mentioned, although the 
temporal scope of this study is not broad enough to declare these social and political 
factors as ultimate causes, these findings do indicate that these factors are not proximate 
manifestations associated with the last third of the 20
th
 century. In addition, the findings 
from the models containing the interaction terms indicated that the movement from the 
pre- to the post-Furman time period had a significant influence on the relationship 
between theoretical variables and execution practices. However, in contrast to the 
findings for the death sentence dependent variable, the results associated with 
jurisdictional executions indicated that the movement across the two eras assisted in 
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redefining the relationship between this outcome and three of the theoretical variables of 
interest. This is an important finding because it denotes that social and political changes 
in the 1970s were significant enough to either completely alter the preexisting nature of 
the relationship between these variables and state-level executions or to create new 
significant relationships in the post-Furman time period.  
 This study now turns to the examination of the theoretical implications associated 
with the findings reported for both death sentences and executions. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Historians and social theorists have argued that capital punishment practices 
across history have been shaped by the broader social and political landscapes in which 
they are immersed (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Mauer, 2001; 
Savelsberg, 1994; Whitman, 2005). Despite this theoretical contention, empirical 
researchers have primarily restricted their examination of this relationship to the last third 
of the 20
th
 century in the United States (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, 
Carmichael & Kent, 2005; Jacobs & Kent, 2007; Jacobs et al., 2007; McCann, 2008). 
Due to this limitation, it was relatively unknown whether the same social and political 
factors identified in post-Furman studies were able to account for capital punishment 
practices when the temporal scope is expanded to include pre-Furman and 21
st
 century 
trends. Furthermore, it was also relatively unknown whether the politicization of capital 
punishment practices in the last third of the 20
th
 century changed the nature of this 
relationship across the pre- and post-Furman time periods. In order to address these gaps 
in the literature, this study examined three post-Furman political perspectives that posit 
that partisan politics, political ideologies, and social threat are all factors related to 
jurisdictional capital punishment practices from 1930 to 2012.  
The first section in this chapter provides a brief summary of the robust findings 
associated with each of the three theoretical perspectives for both death sentences and 
executions. In the second section, the broader theoretical implications associated with this 
study’s findings are presented. The third section in this chapter highlights potential 
avenues for future research based on the findings from this dissertation. The fourth 
section examines a number of potential factors associated with the decline in reliance on 
capital punishment practices in both the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. In addition, this section 
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also examines a number of potential factors particular to the more recent decline, and this 
section concludes by speculating as to whether the decreasing reliance on death penalty 
practices will continue into the future. Finally, the last section in this chapter explores 
potential strategies that abolitionist and pro-death penalty groups could use to potentially 
influence lawmakers’ and the public’s support for capital punishment practices. 
SUMMARY OF THE ROBUST FINDINGS 
   Due to the significant number of findings from the primary and supplemental 
models for both dependent variables, this section briefly highlights the findings deemed 
to be highly robust for each of the three theoretical perspectives. The first theoretical 
perspective examined in this study argues that the use of partisan politics is associated 
with capital punishment practices in the last third of the 20
th
 century. In terms of the 
findings for the death sentence dependent variable, the results in Chapter Four indicated 
that all three of the variables used to examine this theory were not significantly related to 
the death penalty practice from 1930 to 2012. These null findings suggest that the 
relationship between political party affiliation and death sentences is a byproduct of the 
time period following the politicization of criminal justice policies and practices and the 
realignment of political ideologies in the 1970s.  
In terms of the execution dependent variable, the findings for this perspective in    
Chapter Five indicated that the percentage of Republicans in the state legislature was 
significantly associated with this stage of the death penalty over the entire time period 
analyzed. This finding indicates that the political affiliation of elected officials was 
significantly related to executions before the ideological realignment of the two political 
parties in the last third of the 20
th
 century. Furthermore, the findings from supplemental 
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analyses indicated that the positive relationship between these two variables was 
conditioned by the inclusion of the religious fundamentalist variable in the full model. In 
other words, this result indicates that reliance on executions is greatest in jurisdictions 
that contain both a high percentage of Republicans in the state legislature and a high 
proportion of religious fundamentalists. Finally, the results from the analyses that 
examined conditional effects indicated that the relationship between the percentage of the 
vote for Republican presidential candidates and jurisdictional executions was conditioned 
by period effects. This finding denotes that the relationship between the two concepts 
shifted from negative in the pre-Furman time period to slightly positive in the            
post-Furman era. This finding indicates that shifts in the political landscape in the 1970s 
effectively changed the nature of the relationship between execution practices and 
political party affiliation. Overall, the findings for the partisan politics perspective appear 
to suggest that the party affiliation of public officials is more strongly associated with the 
actual imposition of the penalty over the course of the entire period analyzed rather than 
with the sentencing phase of the punishment. 
 The second theoretical perspective examined argues that the strength of political 
ideologies embraced among the public influences reliance on capital punishment 
practices. In terms of the findings for the religious fundamentalist variable, the findings 
for both dependent variables indicated that this contextual factor was positively and 
significantly related to both stages of the death penalty process in the 20
th
 and              
21
st
 centuries. In addition, these results also support the findings from prior research that 
indicate that religious fundamentalist values play a significant role in shaping 
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jurisdictional reliance on capital punishment practices (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 2002, 
2004).  
 When examining the findings related to state-level expenditures on welfare, these 
results indicated that the percentage of jurisdictional expenditures on public welfare 
programs was significantly related to the imposition of death sentences. This finding is 
especially significant because scholars had yet to examine the relationship between 
welfare expenditures and capital punishment practices, and it indicated that this variable 
successfully predicts death sentences over an 80-year period. In addition, the analyses 
that examined the moderating influence of period effects indicated that the negative 
relationship between welfare expenditures and death sentences became stronger when 
moving from the pre- to the post-Furman era. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies that have found that higher expenditures on welfare are associated with the 
adoption of less punitive penal practices in the post-Furman era (Beckett & Western, 
2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Stucky, Heimer & Lang, 2005).  
 The third variable within the political ideology perspective that was found to be a 
robust predictor of executions is jurisdictional institutionalization rates. The findings in 
the fifth chapter indicate that there was a negative and significant relationship between 
state-level institutionalization rates and executions. This is a particularly significant 
finding because scholars also had yet to examine the relationship between this variable 
and capital punishment practices, and it directly refutes the hypothesis outlined in 
Chapter Three, which stipulated that its relationship with capital punishment practices 
should be positive. This discrepancy might be attributed to the public’s perception of 
institutionalization as a practice designed to help individuals who suffer from mental 
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disorders instead of a practice designed to punish individuals deemed to pose a danger to 
society. Furthermore, the conditional findings for this variable indicate that the strength 
of the negative relationship became stronger when moving from the pre- to the           
post-Furman time period. Since the conditional findings suggest that the negative 
relationship between institutionalization and executions remained constant over the two 
eras, it might appear as though citizens within states with greater reliance on 
institutionalization are more supportive of rehabilitation, as opposed to being more 
punitive. However, more research is needed in order to determine the state-level social 
and political factors associated with institutionalization practices. 
 The final variable within the political ideology perspective examined in this study 
was jurisdictional incarceration rates. Although this indicator was not found to be directly 
associated with death sentences and executions, the results in Chapter Five indicate that 
there is a conditional relationship between incarceration rates and executions. In 
particular, this finding indicated that the relationship between incarceration rates and 
executions was negligible in the pre-Furman period, but this relationship became positive 
in the post-Furman era. This finding indicates that the social and political changes 
occurring in the last third of the 20
th
 century did have an influence on the nature of the 
relationship between the two variables. In addition, this finding provides partial support 
for the hypothesis outlined in Chapter Three, which argued that high incarceration rates 
should be associated with greater reliance on capital punishment practices. 
 The last theoretical perspective examined in this study posits that the perceived 
threats to the dominant social and racial groups within society are significantly related to 
capital punishment practices. Based on the findings for the four variables used to examine 
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this perspective, the only indicator that was found to be a significant predictor of capital 
punishment practices was the unemployment rate. More specifically, jurisdictional 
unemployment rates were found to predict both death sentences and executions over the 
entire period analyzed. These are particularly interesting findings because previous 
studies have failed to demonstrate a significant relationship between state-level death 
sentences and unemployment in the post-Furman time period. Although previous       
post-Furman empirical examinations of state-level capital punishment practices have 
failed to find a significant relationship between these two variables (Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2007), the results 
from this study indicate that unemployment is a significant predictor when the temporal 
scope is expanded to include the pre-Furman time period. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 The findings from this dissertation have a bearing on two theoretical questions 
regarding the relationship between state-level political factors and capital punishment 
practices over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. The first theoretical question the 
findings within this dissertation are able to address is whether the contextual factors 
identified in post-Furman studies represent the proximate or the ultimate causes of 
jurisdictional death sentences and executions. Based on the key findings from this study, 
it is apparent that the predictive power of the post-Furman variables identified in prior 
research are not limited to the last third of the 20
th
 century. This finding indicates that the 
social and political factors examined in post-Furman studies are not proximate 
manifestations associated with a particular point in United States history. Instead, the 
findings from this study indicate that these state-level contextual factors were associated 
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with capital punishment practices for at least 40 years before the politicization of criminal 
justice policies and practices in the 1970s. In addition, the findings from this dissertation 
indicate that post-Furman theoretical perspectives are also able to account for both 
increases and decreases in jurisdictional reliance on capital punishment practices across 
the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. This finding is also especially important because the          
post-Furman theoretical propositions examined in this dissertation were articulated to 
account for increased reliance on capital punishment practices in the last third of the     
20
th
 century, and prior research had yet to examine whether these propositions could also 
account for decreasing state-level reliance on the death penalty. Even though the 
temporal scope of this study is not wide enough to declare these social and political 
factors as the ultimate causes of state-level use of the death penalty, this study does 
represent a first step in beginning to explain the underlying contextual factors related to 
jurisdictional capital punishment practices across history in the United States. 
 The second theoretical question the findings from this dissertation address is 
whether the politicization of criminal justice policies and practices in the 1970s redefined 
the nature of the relationship between political factors and capital punishment practices. 
Since historians have never explicitly stated whether the political factors associated with 
the use of the death penalty after the Furman decision were similar or different from 
those in the pre-Furman time period, it was unknown whether the social and political 
changes in the 1960s and 1970s merely strengthened a pre-existing relationship or if 
these factors altogether redefined the nature of this relationship. The findings from this 
study primarily demonstrate that the relationship between the significant predictors of 
capital punishment practices across the 80-year period and the use of these practices 
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remained relatively consistent when moving from the pre- to the post-Furman time 
period. These findings indicate that the reconfiguration of political party lines and new 
ideologies in the 1960s and 1970s regarding correctional practices did not significantly 
alter the social and political drivers associated with jurisdictional reliance on capital 
punishment practices.  
 In addition to the theoretical implications highlighted above, the findings from 
this study also provide potential avenues for future theorizing. Perhaps the most 
significant avenue for further theoretical development concerns the articulation of how 
the social and political factors identified in post-Furman studies influenced jurisdictional 
reliance on death sentences and executions in the pre-Furman time period. As noted 
above, the findings from this study indicate that the contextual factors identified in     
post-Furman studies are also robust predictors of capital punishment practices across the 
20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. This is a particularly fruitful avenue for theorizing because 
scholars have argued that penal punishment has always been shaped by political 
considerations (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 2001, 2011; Mauer, 2001; Savelsberg, 1994; 
Whitman, 2005); however, the relationship between these concepts has not been well 
fleshed out in the pre-Furman 20
th
 century. In particular, scholars have primarily 
concluded that the topic of capital punishment was not especially salient in political 
rhetoric in the pre-Furman time period and that the decline in the use of these practices 
was essentially linked to decreased support among the public (Banner, 2003; Bowers, 
1984; Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). Although the impact that these contextual 
factors have on capital punishment practices may not be as evident in the pre-Furman 
time period, historians should pay particular attention to developing a more nuanced 
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understanding of how these predictors influenced capital punishment practices over the 
entirety of the 20
th
 and the early 21
st
 centuries. 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Based on the major findings from this study and the theoretical implications 
covered in the last section, there are a number of potential avenues for future research on 
the political factors associated with state-level correctional practices. The first potential 
avenue for future research is the examination of whether the social and political factors 
associated with state-level death sentences and executions vary based on the race of the 
offenders convicted of capital offenses. Although Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent (2005) 
have examined whether there are differences in the political factors associated with all 
state-level offenders sentenced to death and African American death sentences, this study 
examined the topic only in the last third of the 20
th
 century. Similar to the rationale 
adopted in this dissertation to examine long-term trends in death sentences and 
executions, more research is needed to examine whether Jacobs and colleagues’ (2005) 
findings hold up when the temporal scope is expanded to include pre-Furman trends. It is 
especially important to expand the temporal scope used to examine this topic because 
research has indicated that the factors surrounding the likelihood of conviction based on 
race have changed over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. As an example, in the 
pre-Furman time period, scholars have identified that the race of those accused of 
committing a capital offense played a significant role in whether offenders were 
sentenced to death and were executed (Bowers, 1984; Wolfgang & Riedel, 1973, 1975). 
However, recent studies have found that the race of the victim plays a much more 
significant role in the likelihood of conviction in capital cases in the post-Furman era 
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(Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, 1983; Bowers & Pierce, 1980; Jacoby & Paternoster, 
1982; Paternoster, 1983, 1984; Radelet, 1981). Given these differences across the two 
eras, future research should include pre-Furman death penalty trends when examining the 
social and political factors associated with these practices based on the race of those 
accused and convicted of capital offenses. 
 The second potential avenue for future research involves reexamining the 
contextual factors associated with post-Furman use of the death penalty based on yearly 
measurements. Similar to the methodological approach adopted by Jacobs and colleagues 
(Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael & Kent, 2005) in their            
post-Furman studies, this dissertation examined the independent variables at the turn of 
each decade, and the two dependent variables were pooled for the two years following 
the measurement of predictors. Although this strategy decreases the potential error 
introduced by imputing yearly values for independent variables, this strategy also 
excludes a significant amount of available data for each of the dependent variables. The 
adoption of yearly measurements to examine post-Furman capital punishment trends is 
advantageous because only one study has utilized this methodological approach. Even 
though McCann’s (2008) study examined capital punishment practices based on yearly 
measurements, his examination of the social and political factors associated with death 
sentences and executions is not nearly as methodologically rigorous as Jacobs and 
colleagues’ post-Furman studies (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael 
& Kent, 2005). To illustrate, McCann (2008) used only one variable to examine social 
threat and two indicators to examine political ideology. In addition, McCann (2008) 
controlled only for state population in his analyses. Due to the limited number of 
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independent variables used to examine key theoretical propositions and McCann’s (2008) 
failure to control for a number of jurisdictional characteristics that could impact the use 
of capital punishment practices, more research is needed to further examine the 
relationship between political factors and state-level capital punishment practices using 
yearly measurements. Furthermore, future research could also focus on whether the 
findings reported in this dissertation hold up when yearly death sentence and execution 
trends are examined as well. 
 The final potential avenue for future research involves the expansion of the 
temporal scope used to examine incarceration practices over the course of the 20
th
 and 
21
st
 centuries. Perhaps the main reason for examining this relationship is that historical 
scholars have argued that the same social and political factors responsible for the 
increasing post-Furman reliance on capital punishment practices are also responsible for 
the increasing use of incarceration in the United States during the same time period. In 
addition, post-Furman empirical research has also identified that partisan politics, 
political ideologies, and social threat are all factors related to fluctuations in state-level 
incarceration rates (Beckett & Western, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs, Malone & Iles, 2012; Stucky, Heimer & Lang, 2005). Similar 
to the limitations involved with empirical research on capital punishment practices, 
another reason for the expansion of the temporal scope used to examine the relationship 
between political factors and long-term incarceration trends is that prior research has 
primarily focused on this relationship during the post-Furman time period. Since the 
findings from this dissertation demonstrate that the predictive power of post-Furman 
political variables is not restricted to the last third of the 20
th
 century, more research is 
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needed in order to determine whether these contextual factors are also able to account for 
long-term historical trends in incarceration practices. 
20
th
 AND 21
ST
 CENTURY DECLINES IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PRACTICES 
An interesting development in the 21
st
 century United States that has yet to 
receive much scholarly attention is the significant decline in the use of capital 
punishment practices. As mentioned in the second chapter, the national number of death 
sentences and executions has declined by 65% and 49%, respectively, since the turn of 
the millennium. In addition, public support for the use of the death penalty in homicide 
cases has dropped almost 20% from the mid-1990s (Gallup Poll, 2012), and six states 
have abolished the use of the death penalty in the last six years. Given the lack of 
attention to the social and political factors related to this phenomenon, this section briefly 
examines a number of potential reasons for the waning reliance on the death penalty over 
the course of the last 13 years. The first portion of this section highlights similarities 
between the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century declines in the use of death penalty practices, and the 
second part of this section identifies two factors that are specific to the more recent 
decline. This section concludes with an examination of whether the current decline will 
potentially continue or whether this phenomenon is subject to reversal.  
Perhaps the most significant similarity between the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century declines 
in the use of capital punishment practices concerns decreasing public support for these 
practices. As highlighted in Chapter Two, declining public support for the death penalty 
has coincided with decreasing use of these practices in both the middle of the 20
th
 century 
and the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Figure 18 contains a graph that illustrates the 
percentage of the American population that responded that they were in favor of the death
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Sources: 
Jones, Jeff & Lydia Saad. USA Today/Gallup Poll Results: Support for Capital Punishment: 1936-2012. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories: 1936-1946. 
Cahalan, Margaret Werner. 1986. Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984: 1947-1950. 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons. National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin-Executions: 1960-1971. 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Capital Punishment Series: 1971-2011. 
Death Penalty Information Center: 2010-2012. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 N
U
M
B
E
R
 O
F
 D
E
A
T
H
 S
E
N
T
E
N
C
E
S
 
P
E
R
C
E
N
T
A
G
E
 O
F
 T
H
E
 P
O
P
U
L
A
T
IO
N
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
IN
 F
A
V
O
R
 O
F
 D
E
A
T
H
 P
E
N
A
L
T
Y
 
YEAR 
FIGURE 18: PERCENTAGE OF THE AMERICAN POPULATION IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER CASES AND THE NATIONAL NUMBER OF DEATH 
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penalty for persons convicted of murder from 1936 to 2012 on the primary y-axis, as well 
as the national number of death sentences on the secondary y-axis. According to this 
graph, support for capital punishment generally increased from 1936 to 1953,
48
 at which 
point support for the imposition of death sentences in homicide cases generally declined 
from a pre-Furman high of 67.5% in 1953 to 49% in 1971. Following the Furman 
decision, support for the use of the death penalty in murder cases climbed to a              
20
th
 century high of 80% in 1994. After the mid-1990s, the percentage of Americans 
indicating that they were in favor of the use of the death penalty in homicide cases 
generally declined to a near 40-year low of 61% in 2011. Since public support and the 
actual imposition of death sentences appears to be related over the course of the 20
th
 and 
21
st
 centuries, the remainder of this section focuses on how a number of social and 
political factors have likely influenced public support for capital punishment practices 
during both declines. 
 Overall, there are two potential factors that appear to have impacted public 
support for the death penalty over the course of the last 100 years. The first similarity is 
the saliency of the topic of capital punishment practices in political rhetoric. As Beckett 
(1997) noted, increased attention to matters of law and order by politicians and the media 
has corresponded with how important American citizens view the issue of crime in the 
United States. This factor is particularly relevant when examining public support for the 
death penalty because the topic in political rhetoric was greatest during the period of 
                                                          
48
From 1937 to 1953, the Gallup Poll did not collect information regarding the American public’s support 
for the use of the death penalty in homicide cases. Consistent with the graphical representations used to 
present this data by the Gallup Poll (2012), values for missing years were imputed to avoid significant gaps 
in the graphs. Due to the use of imputation techniques, it is unclear whether support for the use of the death 
penalty in murder cases consistently increased over this 16-year period. The same imputation techniques 
were used in all cases where there was a gap in reporting years. 
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increased support (1970s through mid-1990s) and lowest during periods of declining 
support (1930s through 1960s and mid-1990s through the present). 
 As scholars noted in the middle of the 20
th
 century, capital punishment was not a 
particularly prevalent political topic and politicians were able to comment publically 
regarding their perceptions of the practice without fear of losing constituents (Banner, 
2003; Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). Immediately following the Furman decision, 
capital punishment practices were thrust into the local and national spotlight. In addition, 
conservative politicians quickly incorporated the topic into their law and order rhetoric, 
which was used as a wedge issue for political gain. From the Furman decision until the 
beginning of the 1990s, politicians’ stance on the death penalty was used as a litmus test 
for their views on law and order policies and practices, and politicians who opposed the 
death penalty were unable to speak publically regarding their views without fear of 
reprisal at the next election (Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). Beginning with Bill 
Clinton’s adoption of similar rhetoric in his first presidential campaign in 1992, which 
helped Democrats to find their voice on the topic of law and order, the once clear 
connection between conservatives and tough-on-crime politics was muddied (Garland, 
2001, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006; Holian, 2004; Kramer & Michalowski, 1995; Mauer, 
1999). After Democrats began adopting law and order rhetoric at the local and national 
level, the once polarizing wedge issue was effectively neutralized, and the topic slowly 
began to fade from the political forefront (Holian, 2004). Based on these shifts in the 
political landscapes, it would appear as though public support for the death penalty is 
strongest when the saliency of topic in political rhetoric is greatest and that support 
weakens when the topic is no longer at the forefront of political concerns. 
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 The second factor that appears to be linked to public support for the death penalty 
is crime rates. Recent research that has examined the link between crime rates and public 
support for the death penalty has found that support is greatest when respondents are 
aware of high rates of violent crime (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld, 2003; Rankin, 
1979). This factor is also particularly relevant to understanding public support for the 
death penalty because support for capital punishment in homicide cases was highest when 
crime rates were increasing (1960s through mid-1990s) and lowest when crime rates were 
declining (mid-1930s through 1960s and mid-1990s through the present). As numerous 
scholars have noted, crime rates began declining in the mid-1930s and reached a           
20
th
 century low during the 1950s (Eckberg, 1995; LaFree, 1998; Roth, 2009), which 
corresponds with both the decline in the use of capital punishment practices and 
decreasing support for the use of these practices among citizens. However, beginning in 
the 1960s, crime rates began to steadily increase until the mid-1990s. During this period, 
the increase in crime rates contributed to the sense among citizens that law and order had 
broken down and that the threat of violent victimization had increased (Garland, 2001, 
2011). With the perceived breakdown in law and order among the public and the 
increased saliency of the topic of crime among politicians and the media, the death 
penalty was viewed as a necessary tool in the war against crime (Garland, 2001, 2011). 
Near the middle of the 1990s, crime rates began to decline in almost every jurisdiction in 
the United States (Zimring, 2006), and this decrease has continued up until the present 
day. Based on prior research on the topic and the apparent relationship between crime 
rates and public support for capital punishment, it would appear as though these factors 
contributed to the decline in the use of the death penalty in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. 
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 In addition to the common factors outlined above, there are also two factors that 
are specific to the waning reliance on capital punishment practices in the 21
st
 century. 
The first factor involves the highly publicized fallibility associated with prosecuting 
capital cases. As an example, due to the highly complex statutes and procedures involved 
with prosecuting capital crimes, 66% of cases where offenders are sentenced to death are 
reversed to lower courts before these individuals are executed (Liebman et al., 2000). In 
addition, the advent of DNA evidence and advocacy by special interest groups, such as 
the Innocence Project and the ACLU, have led to the exoneration of 142 offenders who 
have been sentenced to death since 1973 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2013).  
Given the finality involved with the execution of offenders, Illinois Governor Ryan 
highlighted the potential for error in capital cases when he announced a  
moratorium on executions within his jurisdiction in 2000:
49
 
I now favor a moratorium, because I have grave concerns about our state's shameful 
record of convicting innocent people and putting them on death row. I believe many 
Illinois residents now feel that same deep reservation. I cannot support a system, which, 
in its administration, has proven to be so fraught with error and has come so close to the 
ultimate nightmare, the state's taking of innocent life. Thirteen people have been found to 
have been wrongfully convicted. 
 
With the high proportion of capital cases containing procedural errors and the publicity 
surrounding the eventual exoneration of wrongfully convicted individuals, it is likely 
these instances have raised questions among the public and lawmakers regarding whether 
the procedural safeguards adopted after the Gregg decision are, in fact, working properly. 
The second factor concerns the low proportion of death row inmates that are 
actually executed and the high costs associated with prosecuting capital cases. Due to the 
significant delays that have resulted from the judicial review process, research indicates 
                                                          
49
 Illinois Governor News Network, retrieved August 30, 2013, from 
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectid=3&recnum=359. 
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that only 10% of offenders sentenced to death are actually executed (Liebman et al., 
2000) and the leading cause of death among death row inmates in the United States is 
natural causes (Garland, 2011). Furthermore, research indicates that the costs associated 
with prosecuting capital cases exceed the costs involved with imprisoning offenders for 
life (Dieter, 1997; Spangenberg & Walsh, 1989). This is particularly important to the 
topic of capital punishment practices because recent research has indicated that 
jurisdictions across the United States are currently attempting to mitigate the impact of 
the recession by exploring alternative policies to traditional correctional practices 
(Jacobson, 2005; Rengifo et al., 2010). An example of more frugal thinking by 
lawmakers concerning the use of capital punishment can be seen in a statement released 
by the Maryland Governor’s office after the state repealed the death penalty in 2013:50 
Maryland has effectively eliminated a policy that is proven not to work. Evidence shows 
that the death penalty is not a deterrent, it cannot be administered without racial bias, and 
it costs three times as much as life in prison without parole. 
 
Based on the recent economic downturn and the costs associated with prosecuting capital 
cases, it appears as though these concerns have influenced both the public’s and 
lawmakers’ support for the continued use of inefficient death penalty practices.  
Despite declining reliance on capital punishment practices and the growing 
number of abolitionist states over the last decade, 20
th
 century history would appear to 
indicate that these factors are subject to reversal based on the changing nature of social 
and political landscapes. As was the case in the increase in death sentences in the 1970s 
and the eventual increase in executions with the 1980s, the movement towards abolition 
could easily change according to public perception of death penalty practices. To 
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 CNN, retrieved on August 30, 2013, from http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/us/maryland-death-
penalty/index.html.  
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illustrate, in the future, it is possible that rising crime rates and increasing attention given 
by politicians to the topic of capital punishment could influence the public’s perception 
regarding the necessity of the death penalty. Similar to the increased reliance on these 
practices from the 1970s until the turn of the millennium, climbing crime rates and 
greater attention dedicated to the topic in political rhetoric may revitalize the perceived 
need for the death penalty to combat crime. In addition, although it is unlikely that 
society will ever be able to quash questions of innocence among death row inmates, it is, 
however, likely that a rebound from the economic downturn could lead to less resistance 
to the use of capital punishment practices from a fiscal standpoint. Overall, as long as 
criminal justice policies and practices are supported and enacted based on the dominant 
social and political landscape particular to a specific point in history, it is unlikely that 
any abolitionist advances are secure until the United States embraces a national 
moratorium on capital punishment. Even though this section attempts to link a number of 
social and political factors to the 21
st
 century decline in the use of capital punishment 
practices, more research is needed in order to fully understand how these potential 
relationships have operated both individually and in combination with one another. 
POTENTIAL STRATEGIES BASED ON PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY      
 
 Due to the historical nature of this study’s analysis of capital punishment 
practices, the findings from this dissertation do not lend themselves to producing policy 
implications that could be implemented today. However, based on prior research and the 
findings within this dissertation, this study is able to provide a number of potential 
avenues that abolitionists and death penalty supporters could use to strengthen their 
causes. Since scholars have yet to dedicate much attention to the 21
st
 century decline in 
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the use of the death penalty practices, this section situates a number of long-standing 
arguments used by both groups within the social, political, and economic climate 
particular to the 21
st
 century United States. 
 The first strategy abolitionist groups could use to strengthen their cause in the 
eyes of the public involves highlighting how the United States is apparently once again 
turning away from the use of the death penalty. As mentioned in the last section, public 
support for the death penalty in homicide cases has declined by almost 20% in the last 
two decades, and numerous jurisdictions have recently abolished the use of the practice 
within their borders. One reason why highlighting the lower level of public support for 
the practice could act as a potent strategy concerns the relative success that abolitionist 
groups had using the same argument before the Furman decision (Garland, 2011; 
Gottschalk, 2006). Even though this argument eventually succumbed to the newly 
politicized movement to maintain the death penalty and the increasing support among the 
public for its retention in murder cases in the 1970s and 1980s, there is one main 
advantage that current abolitionist groups have today over those who preceded them      
40 years ago. Leading up to the Furman decision, activists had focused primarily on 
building legal arguments for abolition; therefore, activist groups were not well prepared 
to contend with the strength of the pro-death penalty movement outside the courthouse 
(Garland, 2011; Gottschalk, 2006). However, after four decades of debate between the 
two groups, it would appear as though abolitionist groups are better prepared to present 
their case to the public using this argument today. Although it is unlikely that 
highlighting declining public support for the death penalty and the increasing number of 
abolitionist states would hold much sway in the southern United States, these arguments 
 210 
 
could influence the decision of lawmakers to retain the punishment in states where 
reliance on capital punishment practices is weak to moderate. 
 Another strategy for strengthening public support for the abolition of capital 
punishment concerns stressing the inefficiencies and costs associated with prosecuting 
capital cases. Due to the current economic climate, it would appear as though this would 
be an optimal time to continue to publically highlight the low proportion of death row 
inmates who are actually executed and the fact that sentencing offenders to life in prison 
is a more fiscally sound alternative to an ineffective and costly practice. The reason why 
this argument is likely to hold more sway today than it might have in the past is that 
jurisdictions have been severely impacted by the recent recession, and correctional 
expenditures make up a significant proportion of states’ overall budgets (Jacobson, 2005; 
Rengifo et al., 2010). Given the dwindled nature of state-level resources, it is likely that 
lawmakers, prosecutors, and the public will be less likely to tolerate the financial burdens 
associated with prosecuting capital cases, especially when it is unlikely that death row 
inmates will be executed in jurisdictions outside of the southern United States. 
 Based on the ever-changing nature of social and political landscapes within 
jurisdictions, the final suggested strategy for abolitionist groups involves taking 
advantage of the current climate within the United States before circumstances change. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, public support for the death penalty appears to be 
linked with rising crime rates as well as increased attention given to the topic by 
politicians and the media. Although crime rates have declined recently and the topic of 
the death penalty is not as salient in political rhetoric today as it was two decades ago 
(Holian, 2004), these factors could easily change in the near future. Given the inefficient 
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nature of capital punishment practices, the high costs associated with prosecuting capital 
cases, and the recent economic downturn, the declining support among the public for use 
of the punishment in murder cases, and the ever-increasing number of death row inmates 
who have been exonerated, abolitionist groups are more likely to make headway in 
today’s current social and political climate by increasing public awareness of the 
drawbacks involved with capital punishment practices. In order to draw more attention to 
the above-listed factors, abolitionist groups could educate the public about the drawbacks 
of capital punishment practices, and they could increase pressure on lawmakers to rethink 
retention policies in jurisdictions where the use of the death penalty is infrequent to 
moderate. Since it is rather difficult to predict the nature of the social and political 
landscapes in the future, abolitionist groups may want to consider expending more time 
and resources than otherwise planned in order to take advantage of the current 
circumstances that appear to be in their favor. 
 On the opposite side, one potential strategy pro-death penalty advocates could use 
to increase public support for capital punishment practices is to stress the punitive 
scriptures in the Old Testament among religious fundamentalist adherents. Although this 
study finds that jurisdictions with a greater proportion of religious fundamentalists are 
more likely to impose death sentences and to execute offenders, individual-level research 
that has examined the association between religious fundamentalism and support for the 
death penalty has been mixed.
51
 These mixed findings appear to suggest that subscribing 
to fundamentalist beliefs in and of itself does not automatically translate into support for 
punitive responses to criminal activity. Since research indicates that fundamentalists are 
                                                          
51
Applegate et al., 2000; Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick, Bursik & Blackwell, 1993; Grasmick et al., 
1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever, Cullen & Bartkowski, 2006; 
Unnever, Cullen & Fisher, 2005. 
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more likely to hold conservative values and embrace a literal translation of the Bible 
(Curry, 1996; Erikson, Wright & McIver, 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Thorne, 
1990), pro-death penalty activists could potentially stress the “eye for an eye” doctrine 
articulated in the Old Testament as a means of building support for capital punishment. 
One reason this strategy may be effective is that current research finds that individuals 
who believe in forgiving offenders who have transgressed against God and others are less 
likely to support the use of capital punishment practices (Applegate et al., 2000). If       
pro-death penalty advocates were to stress among fundamentalists that individuals who 
violate God’s law are deserving of punishment in proportion to the crime they committed 
and they should not be forgiven for their sins, this group could possibly build support 
among fundamentalist adherents who do not already support the death penalty.  
 Another potential strategy pro-death penalty advocates could use to increase 
support for the practice is to wait until the social and political landscape shifts in a 
direction favorable to their cause. As mentioned above, the saliency of the topic of capital 
punishment practices among politicians and rising crime rates both appear to be 
associated with increases and decreases in public support for capital punishment 
practices. Although both of these factors have been decreasing over the last                 
decade-and-a-half, if crime rates were to begin to rise again in the future, the argument 
for the necessity of the death penalty to combat crime could potentially hold more sway 
again. Another possible strategy related to rising crime rates is for conservative 
politicians to try to recreate the divide between parties on the issue of capital punishment. 
Although liberal politicians appeared to have neutralized the saliency of the topic in the 
mid-1990s when crime rates were declining, conservatives could potentially revitalize the 
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issue if they were to quickly separate themselves from liberals in the face of growing 
anxiety among the public regarding increasing crime rates. Similar to the suggested 
strategy for abolitionists to take advantage of the atmosphere particular to the                 
21
st
 century, pro-death penalty advocates could possibly gain support for the death 
penalty if they were to capitalize on future shifts in the social and political landscapes 
that produce circumstances favorable to their cause. 
 Overall, the current social, economic, and political landscapes in the United States 
appear to be favorable to abolitionist arguments for repealing capital punishment statutes. 
Even though it would appear that jurisdictional reliance on the death penalty has been 
dwindling for the last 13 years, 20
th
 century history would indicate that abolitionist 
advances are susceptible to the changing nature of the state-level climates in which they 
are immersed. Despite the changing nature of the social and political atmosphere within 
jurisdictions, this study has identified a number of contextual factors associated with the 
use of capital punishment practices over the course of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. More 
specifically, the findings from these analyses indicated that the social and political factors 
identified in post-Furman studies were able to account for capital punishment practices 
from 1930 to 2012 and that these political factors are not proximate manifestations 
associated with the last third of the 20
th
 century. Although the scope of this study 
precludes the declaration of these factors as being the ultimate causes of capital 
punishment practices across history, this study does represent an important first step in 
developing a more nuanced understanding of the jurisdictional contextual factors related 
to long-term trends in the use of the death penalty. 
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